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This is a study of a public local inquiry. It is about the ways
in which the different parties participate in the inquiry and also
about the society within which the inquiry has its institutional
place. I locate the inquiry as part of the institutional apparatus of
the state. One of its functions, is to secure legitimacy for planning
decisions taken by the State. These decisions must be awarded
legitimacy by a number of social groups e.g. members of parliament,
journalists, academics, pressure groups and local objectors.
Depending on the particular circumstances any or all of these groups
must perceive the inquiry process and the final planning decision as
the legitimate exercise of power.
In this study, I am interested in the processes through which the
inquiry, seen as part of the decision-making process itself, is
awarded legitimacy by the local objectors who particpate in it. It is
in this sense that it is a study of "legitimation in action".
At one level, the operations of the inquiry reproduce the
dominant ideological and structural relations of society. These
relations are unequal and hierarchical, reflecting the hegemony of a
particular class and culture. However, somehow, these relations are
presented, through the day to day procedures of the inquiry, as just,
equal and neutral. The lay objectors accept the inquiry procedures as
legitimate and fair and participate actively even through they also
think that the inquiry is a sham and that the inevitable decision has
already been taken. This study sets out to account for this
contradiction and thus to demonstrate how legitimation operates in
mundane social practices.
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I employ Giddens, (Giddens 1976) model of "structuration" as a
conceptual framework for understanding the social world. For Giddens
there is a dialectical relationship between social actions and social
structures. Individual actions produce and reproduce structures.
Social reality is , at the same time, both the product of individual
actions and the resource which constitutes individual actions.
Giddens uses the example of speech and language. Speech is
incomprehensible without the structure, language, which is used to
produce speech and which itself is reproduced in speech. This
describes a relationship which is a continuous historical process and
thus raises the problem of how to decide where to interrupt the
process and when to stop.
(1)
The advantage of this analysis is that instead of splitting
(2)
up the social world into the "macro" level of social structures and
the "micro" level of social interaction, or into a variety of
specialist areas or even into a variety of academic disciplines, one
attempts to grasp the relation-ships in the social process i.e. as a
(1) Gregory (1982) recognizes this in his attempt to apply Giddens' model
to a historical study of the industrialization of the Yorkshire
woolen industry.
(2) The distinction between "micro" and "macro" sociology is a
commonplace in introductory courses in sociology. As a
discipline sociology is divided into "sociologies of" the
family, the city, law, industry (etc) and a long standing topic
of sociological investigation, deviance, is also studied by
psychologists, lawyers, social administrators, psychiatrists
etc. My aim in this dissertion is not to attack specialisation
per se, nor to give a complete account of the inquiry which
leaves nothing more to be said. I want to present a study which
attempts to look at the practical relationship between social
structure and social action in a particular setting as opposed
to studying interaction outside any political social or
historical context or studying an institution without examining
it's day to day practices.
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totality. One of the main reasons for "splitting" was that the social
world was too complex to grasp in its entirety. This is still a
truism, but in splitting the study of social structures from the study
of social action, scholars have either ignored their relationship or
used inappropriate conceptual models to attempt to reunite them.
(3)
(Mills 1959 p20)
It is vital to preserve the idea that social action and social
structure are not independent, but inextricably interlinked. Social
structures are not simply produced by the actions of free independent
individuals; nor do social structures entirely determine individual
actions. Actions produce and reproduce structures. This is a
dialectical relationship, the precise contours of which can only be
established by empirical study within a particular historical
configuration. It is possible to see Giddens' approach as a return to
the fundamental concerns of the classic founders of the discipline.
Mills argues that Marx, Durkhein, Weber et al shared the desire to grasp
the relations between history and biography, to understand man as both
the product and the creator of society. (Mills 1959 p6) In this study
I argue that it is only by locating the public inquiry in a historical
and political context that one can understand what actually happens in
the inquiry. The "promise" of the sociological imagination (Mills 1959)
is to understand how the "private troubles" of the various
parties participating in this public inquiry are related to the
structural operations of power in our society.
(3) Parsons (1949) is the most distinguished example. For a
criticism of his conceptual framework see Giddens (1976).
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In political terms, one major function of the inquiry is to
secure the award of legitimacy from the lay participants. To examine
how this is accomplished, I examine the inquiry as an active
construction of the participating actors, using Giddens' (Giddens
1976) framework of 'structuration'. My concentration on the details
of the daily conduct of the inquiry is dictated by my interest in how
legitimation works in practice. This study of the inquiry should be
read as an example of how one social practice reproduces specific
ideological social relations.
It is the normal practice, in a study of this kind, to critically
assess the literature in the field. However because of my theoretical
orientation; there is no clearly defined 'field' to assess. Chapters 1
and 2 set out the central substantive and theoretical/methodological
problems addressed in this research.
Since the work is intended to contribute to current debate on
public inquiry procedures, and most of this debate has been amongst
lawyers. I begin with a critical discussion of the development of
the procedural regulations governing public inquiries. I then look
at some recent commentaries on inquiries, predominantly from within
the field of administrative law. I go on to draw on work in
political and sociological theory to describe the shortcomings of
traditional work in administrative law and to set up an alternative
approach to a study of the public inquiry. I argue that some of the
questions raised by these legal critics can only be answered by a
sociological study of the public inquiry.
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CHAPTER 1
Administrative Law and the Public Inquiry
I begin by giving a brief account of the history of the
legislation governing the procedural regulations of public inquiries.
I intend to show that both in the legislative changes to inquiry
procedures, and in much of the recent work considering public inquiry
procedure, hardly any attention has been directed to the procedures
adopted during the course of the inquiry. Where lawyers have
considered "what goes on" during an inquiry, the criticisms have been
extremely vague and have certainly not constituted an adequate
analysis of the inquiry as a social construction of its participants.
(A) A Brief History of procedural Reform
According to Wraith and Lamb, (Wraith and Lamb 1971) the origins
of the modern public inquiry are to be found in the early nineteenth
century in legislation dealing with land and relief of the poor,
(1)
though it was not until the end of the century that provision for
public inquiries took on a recognisably modern form.
(2)
In a recent book, Burton and Carlen (Burton and Carlen 1979)
describe the increasing use of Royal Commissions and Departmental
Inquiries, also in the first half of the nineteenth century. The
function of these 'inquiries' was to provide knowledge for policy
formation. Burton and Carlen argue that they provided the
administration with a technique for controlling social and structural
(1) Inclosure Acts 1801, Royal Commission on the Poor 1832.
(2) Education (Scotland) Act 1872, Board of Trade Inquiries Act
1872, Housing of the Working Classes Act 1890, Public Health
(Scotland) Act 1876, and the Commons Act 1876 all set out more
detailed provision for inquiries.
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conditions, and for securing legitimacy,
"so that economic interests could be
systematically pursued."
Public local inquiries were clearly much less important in the
nineteeth century than these national commissions and inquiries.
However they seemed to serve the same functions: the creation of
information and the "manipulation of its popular reception", albeit on
a smaller, local scale. The use of inquiries for major technological
developments in recent years has made the "local" public inquiry into
a "national" (3) forum precisely concerned with securing legitimacy
for controversial planning decisions.
The Housing, Town Planning etc. Act of 1909 was one of the first
pieces of legislation in the new field of "urban planning". Its
provisions for a public inquiry were the same as those under the
Public Health (Scotland) Act 1876 and, despite the Housing and Town
Planning (Scotland) Act 1825, the provisions for inquiry remained much
the same until the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1947 and in fact
were not materially altered until 1964.
It seems that from their inception, these inquiries were
conducted predominantly by the legal profession. In Scotland the
Sheriff already had considerable, if infrequently used, administrative
powers and was often appointed as commissioner or inspector
(4)
(3) By this I mean that although the inquriy is held locally into a
particular planning application it can receive attention from the
media pressure groups, members of Parliament etc which make the
inquiry a national public issue. The Windscale Inquiry is an
obvious example.
(4) The Grant Report on the Sheriff Court Cmnd 3248 1967.
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to an inquiry. Parties were often represented by advocates and
(5)
solicitors, there were provisions for the taking of oaths, and
(6)
fines for the non-production of evidence. Inquiries were conducted
according to the adversary procedure adopted in the civil and criminal
courts. There were no detailed procedural rules governing inquiries,
and it would appear that the adversary procedure was adopted in
imitation of the standard legal forms. (7)
Though the procedures and provisions for inquiry remained
unchanged until the early sixties, definition of the function of the
inquiry was being debated both inside and outside the courts. The
debate concerned whether the public inquiry performed a judicial
function or an administrative function. This debate took place during
a growth in the area of administrative law, which worried traditional
lawyers who were concerned that individual freedom and rights would be
eroded by the extension of quasi-judicial discretionary powers.
Conservatives such as Lord Hewart (Hewart 1929) would have wanted
the inquiry classified "judicial" so that individual liberty could be
protected by judicial review of administrative decision making.
(5) In Scotland this official now has the title of "Reporter" the
English term is still "Inspector".
(6) Local Government Board (Scotland) Annual Report 1911 reports an
inquiry held in 1902 under the Housing of the Working Classes
Act 18 90.
(7) During my research I found only passing references to procedures
during inquiries and it is on this absence of attention to
such procedures that I base my argument that adversary
procedures were adopted by default. A proper historical
analysis of the emergence of these sorts of administrative
procedures was beyond the scope of this study and this work
remains to be accomplished.
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A series of cases traces the courts' attempts to classify the
inquiry's function. The present position remains uncertainly
(8)
balanced between administrative and judicial. This controversy is
really concerned with how a court will define an inquiry for a
particular purpose. As de Smith (de Smith 1980) points out, sometimes
a procedure may be classified as judicial and later, for different
purposes, the same procedure may be defined as administrative. An
inquiry possesses both administrative and judicial elements. De Smith
demonstrates that the inquiry itself may be of a judicial type while
the decision made by the Minister afterwards is purely administrative
and political. Wade (Wade 1963) also calls the hearing before the
Inspector "the judicial stage". According to Ganz (Ganz 1974) it is
important to see the inquiry as an extension of ministerial decision¬
making. The inquiry is held in order to elicit full information on
which the minister can base his decision. Since, for this reason, the
inquiry does not fulfill the criterion of conclusiveness, it cannot be
characterised as judicial.
De Smith describes this debate as sterile and suggests that hard
and fast definitions of "administrative" and "judicial" do not exist.
This controversy has in any case had little effect on public
inquiry procedures for though a judicial action must observe the
rules of natural justice these same rules would also be held to apply
to administrative acts, e.g. the Minister cannot take into account a
(8) Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 CBNS 180
Local Government Board v Arlidge [1915] AC 120
Ewington v Minister of Health [1935] 1KB 249
Franklin v Minister of Housing 1948 AC 87
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new fact which has been brought to his attention after the inquiry,
without informing the parties and allowing them to make submissions.
For my purposes there are two important points to be taken from
this legal debate over the function of public inquiries. Firstly as
Ganz says, the main function of the inquiry is the collection of
information. Natural justice will require that this is done in a
"fair and impartial" manner - but the decision lies with the
Government minister responsible. The inquiry itself is not
"judicial" because it does not make decisions but only collects
information. Secondly, the fact that members of the public might
(9)
perceive the inquiry as "judicial" is not a relevant matter for
deciding whether a court should be able to review the action, but it
may be relevant for understanding how lay objectors participate in
an inquiry, (see chapter 8)
The Crichel Down Affair (10), in the early 50's led to the
setting up of the Franks Committee. The details of the affair are
unimportant here but it involved criticism of the Civil Service and
Ministers for abuse of their discretionary powers. The Conservative
Party expressed concern over the threat to individual liberty from the
encroachment of the State. (The Conservative Party 1955)
The Franks Committee had the following terms of reference,
"to consider and make recommendations on,
(9) Although as I argue below (Ch4) the Reporter collects
information "as if" he was the decision-maker.
(10) Cmd 1976.
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a) The constitution and working of tribunals other that ordinary
courts of law, constituted under any act of Parliament by a
Minister of the crown or for the purposes of a Minister's
functions.
b) The working of such administrative procedures as include the
holding of an inquiry or hearing by or on behalf of a
minister on an appeal or as a result of objections or
representations and in particular the procedure for the
compulsory purchase of land."
The two major recommendations of the Committee were
(1) The establishment of a Council on Tribunals to report
regularly on tribunal and inquiry procedures.
(2) The adoption of the principles of openness, fairness and
impartiality as guidelines for the exercise of administrative
procedures.
With respect to public inquiries there were two more specific
suggestions,
(1) The publication in full of the Reporter's Report with
reasoned decisions so that the objector would know the case
he had to answer.
(2) The publication to objectors of new factual evidence (as
opposed to advice on policy) received after the inquiry to
give them an opportunity to make representations.
Immediately circular 9/58 from the Ministry of Housing and
(11)
Local Government was distributed to local authorities. This asked
them to implement the relevant Franks recommendations, most of which
were later implemented in the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1958.
The Franks Committee looked at the conduct of almost all
administrative procedures and their recommmendations were aimed at
securing a broad similarity of standards, hence the principles of
"openness, fairness and impartiality". As far as public inquiry
procedures was concerned, the Committee made specific recommendations
about procedures before and after the inquiry, but seemed satisfied
with procedure during the inquiry as there was no analysis or
recommendations on the point. Of course we can assume that "openness,
fairness and impartiality" apply to procedure during the inquiry, but
these terms are extremely vague and do not specify the procedures to
be adopted during the inquiry.
In 1962 two statutory instruments were published detailing
procedure to be followed before, during and after a public inquiry.
One dealt with compulsory purchase inquiries, the other with planning
appeals. They deal with the notification and advertisment of the
inquiry, the duty of the Minister to inform objectors of any new fact
or where he differs on a finding of fact from the Reporter, and lays
down rules for the general procedure of the inquiry. These were the
first in a series of statutory instruments which were to define
inquiry procedure rules.
(11) This applies to England, the Scottish equivalent is the Town
and Country Planning Appeals (Inquiry Procedure) (Scotland)
Rules, 51 181 (1964)
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S.l. 1962 no 1424
S.l. 1962 no 1425
S.l . 1965 no 473
S.l. 1968 no 1953
S.l. 1969 no 1092
S.l. 1976 no 721
These made changes to pre-inquiry procedures in respect of the
length of notice of inquiry required to be given, provision for a
written statement of the inspector's reasons, the noting of third
party interests, and the inspection of documents and evidence by
written representation.
The foregoing applies to England and though relevant to a general
discussion of the development of public inquiry procedures, does not
apply to Scotland. The following rules currently govern the conduct
of inquiries in Scotland.
(1) Town and Country Planing (Scotland) Act 1972
(2) Town and Country Planning Appeals (Inquiries Procedure)
(Scotland) Rules 1964 SI 181/1964
(3) Comulsorv Purchase by Public Authorities (Inquiries
Procedure) (Scotland) Rules 1976 SI 1559/1976
(4) S.D.D. Circular 14/1975 Public Inquiry Procedures with
Memoranda of Guidance to the Reporter.
(5) S.D.D. Circular 87/1974




Relating to the Town and Country
Planning (Determination of Appeals
by appointed persons). (Ascribed
Classes) (Scotland) Regulation
1976. Town and Country Planning
(Scotland) Act 1972 (commencement
no 4) order 1976.
(7) S.D.D. Circular 64/1976 Development control
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1) Development requiring provision
of new infrastructure.
(2) Appeals against decisions by
Regional Planning Authorities.
(8) S.D.D. Circular 25/1966 Award of Expenses at Statutory
Inquiries.
(9) Cmnd 7133 April 1978 Report on review of Highway
Inquiries Procedures.
(1), (2) and (3), set out the rules for holding an inquiry and
governing procedure before, after and during the inquiry (4) is the
code of current practice which is meant to be followed by Reporters
and parties at public inquiries. This is the most important for the
actual procedure which occurs at a public inquiry. It is based on the
principles of the Franks Committee recommmendations and aims to make
the inquiry cheaper, quicker, more informal and generally more
efficient (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) deal with inquiries into
(12)
particular topics.
The Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1966 brought inquiries under the
control of the Council on Tribunals. Prior to this the Council had
only been responsible for mandatory inquiries. There was also a
Report by the Council on Tribunals in 1962 concerning the position of
third parties, i.e. those without a legal title to appear at planning
appeal inquiries. The final recommendation was that the Reporter
should allow any party with an interest (though not necessarily with a
legal right) to appear in front of the inquiry to give their evidence
or cross-examine a witness. This was not to be made a statutory right
(12) See below Chapter 4 for a detailed analysis of Circular 14.
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as this would materially alter the law and have effects in a much
wider area than the public inquiry.
The Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972 consolidated
previous legislation. There was also a clause implemented in 1976,
which gave the Reporter the power to make decisions in certain small
inquiries, i.e. those not involving Government policy, considered to be
controversial. At the other end of the scale, provision was made for
Planning Inquiry Commissions to replace public lcoal inquiries at the
minister's discretion in the case of an application which involved
highly technical data, or involved issues of national rather than
local importance. Despite calls for the use of P.I.C.'s in such cases
as the Third London Airport and Windscale, none have yet been held.
Thus an exhaustive study of legislation which has dealt with the
procedural regulation of public local inquiries demonstrates that very
little consideration has been given to procedures during the inquiry.
Wraith and Lamb make this comment.
"Procedural rules have had a greater effect
on what happens before and after rather than
during an inquiry."
According to these writers, prior to the Franks report, procedure
had grown from experience and "common-sense". Franks made no
recommendations for the reform of "procedure during the inquiry" nor
did circular 19 of 1958. Even SDD circular 14 1975 is more concerned
with pre-and post inquiry procedure. It seems clear that the actual
processes of taking evidence, gathering information and compiling
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knowledge have been considered unproblematic. There are very few
public rules, regulations or principles governing procedure during the
inquiry. The Reporter has the discretion to adopt any suitable
procedure providing he informs the participants before the inquiry.
In Chapter 4 I discuss how the Reporter deals with this problem and in
Chapter 7 how the lay objectors know what to do in the inquiry in the
absence of any formal instructions.
Some criticisms of Public Inquiry Procedures
Sharman (Sharman 1977) refers to the administrative/judicial
debate, (see above) when he discusses public perceptions of the
inquiry. He suggests that there is a conflict between administrators
and the public. The former see the inquiry as merely one stage in the
process of policy implementation, the latter suggests Sharman, see the
inquiry,
"
as a court exercising independent and
final judgement in a dispute between a
central or local government department and a
member or members of the public."
i.e. the public see the inquiry as a legal institution, as a kind
of neutral mediator or arbiter between the individual and the State.
For the State the inquiry is primarily administrative, for the public,
according to Sharman, judicial.
For Sharman,
"The inquiry has a precise and limited
objective which might not be the real
objective as members of the public see it."
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Sharman also sees inquiries as heavily stacked against the
objectors. He argues that few communities have legal and financial
resources and thus lack information and technical expertise, that the
procedural rules are all left to the discretion of the inspector, (13)
and that the inquiry does not sit in the evenings or at weekends, nor
are there transcripts available to help those who are irregular
attenders.
Sharman is not the only commentator who has noted that for some
members of the public the inquiry seems like a court of law.
"Procedure is somewhere between a cosy chat
and the formal conventions of a court of
law." (Wraith and Lamb 1971)
"For most people attendance at an inquiry is
indistinguishable from a day in court."
(Wraith and Lamb 1971)
"The adversary procedure creates conflict
and formality which do not further public
participation." (Ganz 1974) there
exists "a reaction against over
judicialised adversary procedures which are
time consuming and costly, exacerbate
conflict and are unsuitable for the
discussion of policy issues." (Ganz 1974)
"to the general public, the inquiry is a
trial, it is a court. " (Hansard vol 1590
1957/8 3rd July 1978)
"the courtroom-like atmosphere of the
inquiry makes it difficult for ordinary
people to put their point of view." (HMSO
1972 50 Million Volunteers)
There are then, many legal critics who accuse the public inquiry
of appearing to be "court-like", or of having a "judicial air" when in
(13) i.e. Reporter in Scotland.
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strictly legal terms it would be defined as an administrative tool; a
technique for gathering information.
The major assumption shared by these commentators is that
"adversary procedures", "formality" and "court" or "judicial"
atmospheres somehow hinder participation in the inquiry by lay
persons. However there are no detailed accounts proffered of how
these impediments operate. It seems to be taken as a matter of
"common sense" that more "informality" will assist lay participation,
more "formality" hinder it. There is no discussion of what actually
constitutes "formality" or "informality" nor of how these might or
might not be effective in practice. For example are lay people
intimidated by "legal talk" or are they more generally afraid of
speaking in public? How does intimidation work, i.e. how precisely is
power exercised during the inquiry by lawyers over lay persons, if
indeed this is what happens? (In Chapter 4 I discuss these issues as
they were manifest in the Moss Moran inquiry.) Like the legislators,
these commentators have not concerned themselves with the day to day
procedures of the inquiry. They do not ask who controls the
sequencing and selection of speakers i.e. who is allowed to speak and
when ? or what can be said and what speech is prohibited. These
issues have constantly been taken for granted as unproblematic. It
has further been assumed that this kind of investigation is irrelevant
to considerations of how power operates, e.g. it is assumed that
procedural rules and rhetorical claims can be put into practice
(14)
unproblematically. It is the aim of this thesis to put these
(14) An example of these claims would be "openness fairness and
impartiality" see chapter 4.
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assumptions to the test. Lukes (Lukes 1975) may be correct in proposing
(15)
that the symbolic and ritual aspects of the law reinforce and
perpetuate official views of the nature of social order, i.e. people
are intimidated by the majesty of the law thus increasing their
respect for, and obeisance to, the social order it represents, but
this obscures the problem of how this is practically achieved in a
particular setting. Study of the latter may raise important political
questions concerning the design of public inquiry procedures.
I will return to these points later in this chapter and indeed
throughout the thesis. I want, for the moment, to turn to some more
recent comments on public inquiry procedures.
These concern what have come to be known as "Big Public
Inquiries" e.g. Windscale, Vale of Belvoir, the Size well inquiry
(current at the time of writing). These are inquiries into the siting
of large developments, often involving complex technology, very often
posing potential major hazards, often in areas on which there is no
clear Government policy (energy and nuclear power) and often where the
State is both developer and decision-maker, (see OCPU Chapter 1).
The PERG proposals are based on a study of the Windscale inquiry
(16)
into nuclear fuel reprocessing, but are concerned with the political
context of decision-making in which an inquiry takes place. They feel
(15) See also Arnold (1962)
(16) Political Ecology Research Group is an independent research
organisation based in Oxford. The Outer Circle Policy Unit which
no longer exists) was another independent research group based in
London. Neither group has any formal political affiliations.
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that major policy decisions should be taken by Parliament (rather than
the Government) and thus they say
"It follows that the role of an inquiry or a
commission should be that of a forum for
debate and a vehicle for research and not
that of a court which reaches a verdict."
They feel that, at least in the case of Windscale, the inquiry
report was directed too much towards a conclusive decision rather than
a neutral presentation of information.
PERG also propose an extension of public debate on these issues
by the provision of information in the form of a full range of UK and
foreign technical reports in libraries, local halls and display
areas, of media access for participants in major inquiries and by
allowing public dissent to be voiced by state servants (i.e. a
weakening of the Official Secrets Act). They propose a two stage
inquiry. The second stage would test the evidence by cross-
examination under oath. Evidence would be pre-submitted written
precognitions and would be arranged according to issues rather than
institutions.
They argue that "lawyers should not be allowed to dominate they
inquiry" but envisage their continued employment. They support
funding for the objectors to perform research and for travel,
subsistence and secretarial costs.
- 19 -
In general PERG want to extend public debate on these
controversial, high-technology developments and hold an inquiry which
is concerned to collect information from all relevant and competent
sources. The "testing of evidence by cross-examination" which forms
the central part of current public inquiry procedure thus plays a much
less significant part in the PERG proposals. However this adversary
format is retained without any examination by PERG of how it might
affect the collection and presentation of information.
Representatives of PERG were part of the working party set up by
the "Council for Science and Society", "Justice", and the "Outer
Circle Policy Unit to examine the "Big Public Inquiry". Their report
was published in 1979. (OCPU 1979) The Report claims that,
"though public local inquiries are in fact
part of the process of carrying out central
policy and not self-contained quasi-judicial
proceedings..."
objectors and the general public feel that
"the proceedings are designed, to enable
them, in some real way, to influence a
decision which has not yet been taken - in
short, to participate in the making of
public policy."
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The report argues that the public have lost confidence in the
inquiry system and that the public feel that it provides window
dressing for a decision that has already been taken. The report sets
out proposals for procedures which would allow planning for major
developments in a way that the public "understands, accepts and can
ultimately control". The report argues that planning procedures need
to change in order to preserve "government, by consent through a
periods of profound social change".
I will return to the implications of this analysis after a
discussion of the OCPU proposals for a "Project Inquiry". These
proposals only refer to complex and controversial developments with
national or international implications. The working party accept that
public local inquiries are successful for the vast majority of small
local planning problems.
Like the PERG proposals those of OCPU attempt to place the
"inquiry" into the context of political decision making. They argue
that one current problem is that policy making by Government tends to
be made incrementally, at the same time as developers are drawing up
their planning applications and in consultation with them.
"policy making is secreted in the
interstices of individual decisions".
Thus a conventional inquiry is often presented with a "fait-
accompli" i.e. a Government policy which by implication favours the
planning application. The Project Inquiry would begin before a
planning application was lodged, to fill the gap between a
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Parliamentary Select Committee concerned with general policy and a
public inquiry concerned with a specific application. The aim is to
recognize how policy is made and put into practice and to design
procedures which can penetrate these processes and, again like those
of PERG, open them up to wider and better informed public debate.
The Project Inquiry would be initially extra-statutory, appointed
by the Secretary of State for the Environment who should also appoint
a Chairperson and 6 to 9 other members who should be both experts and
lay persons but above all else should be impartial. The P.I.'s terms
of reference should be as wide as possible and should allow the very
necessity of the project to be questioned.
"The function of a P.I. should be to
investigate impartially, thoroughly and in
public, all the forseeable economic social
and environmental complications and
repercussions of the project including its
benefits and its costs and risks of all
kinds. The P.I. should consider all
feasible alternatives and seek to ensure
that all the assumptions, material facts,
issues and arguments are brought out, tested
and fully and fairly discussed."
The P.I. should also have two stages - investigation and argument
and in this respect the OCPU proposals are very similar to those of
PERG in respect of inquisitorial and investigatory powers and funding.
The report also recommends that once approval has been given for a
development after a P.I., a site-specific public local inquiry should
be held.
Both the PERG and OCPU reports recommend changes in the
procedures for "big public inquiries" which really amount to changes
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in the democratic political process. Both the collection and
presentation of information are to be done in public and by all
interested parties. The aim is to have a public debate about means
and ends, with a background of information on which all parties agree
(or agree to differ publicly for specified reasons). The final
political decision would have to be publicly justified in the mass
media and would be a matter for national debate and criticism.
Arguably this process would be inappropriate for "medium sized
inquiries" such as Moss Moran because the policy decision about the
basic desirability of the development has already been taken by the
Government. OCPU and PERG felt that their schemes were only suitable
for projects of national importance and controversy. Clearly any
definition of these projects will be contestable and the objectors at
Moss Moran certainly felt that the issues raised by the project were
indeed of national importance and controversy. However the OCPU and
PERG reports demonstrate clearly that medium sized inquiries are part
of a broader political context, i.e. that the inquiry cannot be
considered as a neutral information-gatherer. This still leaves open
the question of the participation in the inquiry of non-expert,
lay objectors, who are not representatives of national pressure groups
or political lobbies.
McAuslan (McAuslan 1979) takes up this problem of "meaningful
participation". He berates administrative lawyers for ignoring the
political context of law and for operating with inappropriate liberal-
democratic concepts and assumptions. He describes three ideological
models which , he argues, co-exist within contemporary planning
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legislation. He wants to demonstrate that law is not a "neutral and
objective set of rules" but a "value-laden set of principles".
The first two ideologies, the protection of private property and
efficient administration, share, in the area of planning law, a
community of interest in the maintenance of the status quo; in
preserving the existing state of property relations, socio-economic
order and government and administration. Those interests are anti¬
thetical to the third ideology of public participation which, for
McAuslan, exists as rhetoric but is not achieved in practice,
"except on terms acceptable to and
controllable by public officials, or in
circumstances where the claims of private
property are strong and no law likely to be
introduced in the present circumstances will
give effect to it." (McAuslan 1979 plO)
This third ideology asserts that the right of challenge to a
proposed development should be a citizenship right rather than a
property right and that social and community considerations should be
taken into account as criteria for land use planning as well as
property and economic considerations,
"the law should provide more opportunities
for people's views on their own environment
to be decisive and for them to be able to
act on those views." (McAuslan 1979 p3)
McAuslan proceeds, in this paper to analyse the Windscale Inquiry
in terms of his three ideologies. He concludes that the appointment
of a lawyer as inspector, with a predisposition to support ideology 2
and accept the orthodox point of view, made participation by objectors
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safe. The "ultimate and predictable result" would not be threatened
by the arguments of objectors providing the inquiry was chaired by a
lawyer who, in good faith, regarded the inquiry as a forum for
collecting relevant information to aid the Secretary of State in
reaching a decision. McAuslan argues that the objectors held to his
third ideology of public participation and did not realise that the
inspector did not share this model.
"the whole structure and operation of the
system created, supported and sanctioned by
law and lawyers is such that the alternative
view always does have to mount a challenge
to the orthodox view, in fora, and via
procedures with which adherents of the
orthodox view are very much at home, and
have the merits of that challenge always
judged by adherents of the orthodox view."
(McAuslan 1979 pl9)
This is why McAuslan argues that lawyers should not attempt
reforms within the existing system but should try to change the system
itself to try to include "meaningful participation".
There are two points which I want to raise in connection with
McAuslan's work. Firstly I agree with his emphasis on the political
context of law and his concern with the relationship between law and
State. At the level of generality, at which his work is pitched, it
is sufficient to assert that law sustains
"the existing state of property relations"
(McAuslan 1979 p9)
and to argue that somehow lawyers have to change "the system"
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rather than attempt reforms within the system, but, as McAuslan
himself recognizes, a more detailed and sophisticated analysis of the
relationship between law and State will be necessary as soon as one
attempts to study a particular institution at a particular time. In
the next chapter I draw out those elements of the relationship between
law and State which are relevant to the study of legitimation in
action in a middle-sized public inquiry.
The second point concerns the gap which McAuslan discerns between
"law in the books" and "law in action". With reference to the
Windscale inquiry he argues that there exists provision for lay
participation but that in practice lay participation is "meaningless".
It is not clear what he means by "meaningless". Does he mean
"in-effective in terms of influencing the final decision in their favour"
or is participation perceived by the laymen to be absurd and
disordered? In either case we need to explain why the objectors
participate at all if they are so disenchanted with the process?
McAuslan also fails to distinguish between the participation of "local
objectors" and the participation of third party" pressure group"
objectors. Although the former may appear in the inquiry by virtue of
their property interest (McAuslan's ideology 1) their participation
may well be based on broader objections concerning, e.g. the criteria
of good planning. However they might award legitimacy to the planning
process in quite a different way from those objectors from a pressure
group, who view the inquiry as part of the struggle to promote their
cause and not as a one-off opportunity to prevent major changes to
their immediate environment.
Thus lay objectors might see their participation as "ineffective"
- 26 -
but not as completely meaningless. As I am concerned with the
operation of legitimation in action, it is important to establish how
the lay objectors perceive their own participation.
McAuslan argues that his third ideology of "lay participation" is
at least sceptical to the claims of legitimacy for decisions made by
officials in terms of "the public interest" (ideology 2). Lay
objectors may feel that their version of "the public interest" is
quite different. For this reason the law only allows lay
participation when it can be controlled by public officials, and
"no law likely to be introduced in the
present circumstances will give effect to it
(lay participation)" (McAuslan 1979 plO)
My research would support these arguments but there are gaps in
McAuslan's analysis which I try to fill in this study. It is not
clear how law or legal officials control lay participation. Is this
done completely within the procedures of the public inquiry? How do
public officials use their discretion? How do lay objectors perceive
the operation of this power and how do they construct their
participation? How is legitimacy secured? Why do lay objectors award
their consent and approval to the system?
This brings up the issue of the gap between "law in the books"
and "law in action",between what law says it does and what it does
in practice, which I discuss more fully in Chapter 2. McAusla'n
seems to imply that there are limits to the control over social
practices which can be exercised by law and that we cannot expect a
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one to one correspondence between, legal rhetoric and legal
practices. One implication might be that the design of rules and
procedures to change social practices must take into account the
existing power relationships in those practices, e.g. it may be
possible to suggest and even implement procedures which would make
lay participation more "effective". These concessions might be
granted by the State to secure legitimacy, and in this case, the
political realities of the distribution of power would be
recognized. Thus while one might agree with McAuslan that this is
unlikely, it is not impossible. The point here is that law is not
seen as an impenetrable monolith. If other conditions are
appropriate, it may be possible to use law to redistribute power,
albeit in relatively minor ways. However in order to achieve this,
we must first understand how power operates in social practices. In
the context of this study, we need to understand the details of how
legitimation is secured in the inquiry from the lay objectors and
how the contradictory gap between the rhetorical claims of law and
its practices are managed in this inquiry to secure this end.
In the following chapter I describe in more detail an appropriate
conceptual framework for this analysis. The first section deals with
the relationship of law and state and the concepts of hegemony and
legitimacy. The second section concentrates on the relationship
between social structures and social practices with reference to "the
gap" between "law in the books" and "law in action".
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Summary
I have described how changes in the procedures of public
inquiries from their inception, have dealt with pre-and post-inquiry
procedures but have ignored the procedures during the inquiry itself.
This lack of concern has been repeated by most commentators on public
inquiries, and those who have considered what happens during the
inquiry have done so in an anecdotal, "common-sense" manner which does
not begin to address the complexity and specificity of the position of
the inquiry in overall social organisation.
Similarly, critics of the inquiry, have implied their
dissatisfaction with a liberal-democratic model of the relationship
between law and State so that the inquiry can no longer be
uncritically examined as a "neutral" fact-finding forum, nor as an
opportunity for "free and equal" persons to put forward their
arguments. However none of these critics have specified an alternative
conceptual framework, describing the relationship between law and
state in contemporary Britain.
In the following sections I attempt to sketch such a conceptual
framework and then to address the problems of studying the day to day
procedures of the inquiry as the active construction of the
participants. My aim is to describe a mode of analysis which I then
go on to demonstrate in practice. That is, to describe the inquiry in
terms of the production and reproduction of structures through the
daily actions of the various participants, and to position this in its
political context. In Prosser's terms (Prosser 1982), this work could
be read as a study of "legitimation in action", my aim being to
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examine how power operates in social practices and thereby describe





Underpinning the work of almost all of the writers in the last
chapter, there lies a specific model of law and its relationship
to the wider society. This might be described as the libera
democratic model of law. In this model, law is conceived as a set of
rules which can be derived from case-law and statute. These rules are
interpreted and applied by the exercise of reason. The law is
independent and impartial, it represents no sectional interests but is
the objective arbiter between conflicting interests. Individuals are
conceived of as equal before the law, and the state, in this sense, is
a legal individual. Thus all sections of society are subject to "the
rule of law". Laws are made by elected representatives of the people
in Parliament. These representatives are subject to "the rule of law"
as are the Government and the civil service.
This is a crude account of classic liberal/democratic theory. In
a recent paper, Prosser (Prosser 1982) has criticised public lawyers
for their uncritical use of this model in their work. They have
generally conceived of law as politically neutral and thus proposed
reforms of the law as if from an "objective" position. Prosser argues
that this model of law must be seen as ideological. Law presents
itself as neutral and uncommitted when it represents and secures the
interests of particular sections of society. It is a state
institution which is used not so much to constrain the state but as a
way of securing legitimacy for state actions by presenting them as
"legal".
Prosser emphasises
"the central importance of theory,
philosophy and ideology in administrative
law",
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and echoes McAuslan in his call for the devopment of an alternative
conceptual scheme for the study of 'administrative law'.
Prosser himself cites the work of several social theorists,
whose work spans a variety of traditions. For Prosser, they have in
common, an analysis of modern society which emphasises the growth of
State intervention into the direction of social and economic life.
These writers also argue that the law cannot be conceived of as
separate from the state, and is, in fact, an important executive arm
of the state.
Before questions concerning the purpose of lay participation in
public inquiries or possible procedural reforms for inquiries can be
addressed, we need to know more about the functions of legal
regulation in general in the contemporary state. In particular, the
function of securing legitimacy for State action. Sociologists
concerned with deviance and criminal justice have produced useful work
in this area, and I will argue that the analysis, derived mainly from
the work of Gramsci, presented by Hall et al (Hall et al 1978) is most
appropriate for addressing the problems of legitimation in public
inquiries. I do not propose to enter into the range of Marxist debates
on the nature of Law and state (see Jessop 1980) but rather to present
an analysis which is conceptually equipped to address the public
inquiry as an instance of "legitimation in action". This point will
become clearer as my argument progresses.
Theory of the State
One of the main difficulties in trying to undertand the nature of
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the state, is that the term does not refer to any specific institution
or even any limited set of institutions, i.e. it is not merely the
government, or parliament or the civil service or all three. Gramsci
describes the state as "organisational and connective", and in this
U)
sense it is easier to examine the state as a nexus of relationships.
Relationships between what or whom? The function of the state is to
construct civil society in a manner which secures the requirements of
the economic structure. This is to say that the economic mode of
production (the base) is seen as determinant, in the last instance,
but that the constituent parts of 'Civil society' have a degree of
autonomy from the mode of production.
For Gramsci the social order reproduced by the state could be
maintained either by force or with the consent of the subordinate
classes. The relative employment of these was dependent on the
particular type of state and the historical context. Hall describes
the early 18th State (known as 'Old Corruption') as relatively free in
its use of force. Law was the most obvious instrument of class
oppression, and less effort was required to secure the consent of the
population. The modern State operates with the consent of the masses,
(2)
though the coercive use of the law as ultimate sanction is always
available. Gramsci uses the term hegemony to refer to the exercise of
power through consent. This consent has to be reproduced through the
state, and thus through the institutions of the family, education,
(1) My comments in this section are substantially drawn from
Gramsci (1971) Anderson (1976) Hall et al (1978). The latter
incorporate the work of Althusser (1969) and Poulantzas (1973)
as well as Gramsci (1971) into their discussions.
(2) These arguments are taken from Thompson 1975 and Hay et al 1975.
church etc. and in particular through the ideological function of
these institutions.
Anderson (Anderson 1976) considers Gramsci's conceptual apparatus
in some detail. In particular he is concerned with the relationship
between the state and civil society. He rejects those theorists who
make no distinction between the two. This definition makes it
possible to make the important distinction between the bourgeois
democracies of the West and the State socialism of the East. It is
important, for Anderson, to preserve a conceptual independence between
state and civil society when considering western democracies. So, for
example, the public local inquiry can be distinguished from the coercive
apparatus of the state and examined as an institution which operates
with the "freely given "consent of the lay participants. In this
study I am particularly concerned to investigate how this "consent" is
produced and in what sense it is freely given. Hegemony is not a
simple balance between state coercion on the one hand, and the consent
of the masses on the other. Since the state has the sole legitimate
right to the use of violence, this coercive sanction is always
available as a threat, and as a last resort. Government by coercion
alone in a developed Western capitalist state is almost inconceivable,
but if consent were to be lost, the state would retain the use of
coercion to establish social order.
"The normal structure of capitalist
political in bourgeous democratic states is,
in effect simultaneously and indivisibly
dominated by culture and determined by
coercion." (Anderson 1976)
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In other words, the threat of force is omni-present but largely
invisible, political activity takes place predominantly in the
struggle for the consent of the population, and this takes place at
the level of culture.
For Anderson, this consent is granted not by reference to the
ideology of technical rationality as a replacement for traditional
religious beliefs, but through the ideology of representative
democracy. Those socialists who are critical of the status quo, think
(3)
that "an electoral majority can legislate socialism peacefully from a
parliament". Conservatives don't want to change the "consensus". A
socialist who followed Gramsci's analysis would not, as some have
suggested, be the equivalent of a "reformist liberal". There always
exists the ultimate coercive underpinning to the political operations
which make up the procedures of representative democracy, i.e.
electoral success for a socialist party would be no guarantee of the
establishment of a socialist hegemony. The struggle for hegemony is
the important political struggle. Without popular support or at least
consent, no power-group will be able to exercise their power - it is
inconceivable, in contemporary Britain that any group could rule
through force alone. Thus for any socialist political change - a
socialist hegemony would have to be established. The attitudes and
meanings of the majority would have to change and one of the crucial
tasks of socialism is not simply to display capitalist social
organisation as unjust and absurd, but to show how it achieves some
(3) This is an important issue in Chapter 7. This aim of this study
as a whole is to investigate how, in the practice of the inquiry,
these ideologies operate. I want to examine how consent is
secured in practice.
of its goals and to show how this is accomplished through the positive
efforts of many whose own interests are being threatened.
The aim is to describe a space for political action, showing the
limitations and possibilities for challenging the dominant hegemony,
rather than presenting the domination of capital, as absolute, all-
pervasive and inexorable.
In the manufacture of consent, the function of the state in
universalising class interests is crucial. In the last instance the
state represents and satisfies the needs of the ruling class, as they
control capital. However there are often instances where the state
has to act against certain interests of the ruling class fraction, in
order to promote its long term interests. As Hall argues, the term
"ruling class" refers to that element of a class, or of various class
fractions which exercises authority in the interests of capital. This
includes securing the support of subordinate class fractions through
the connecting organisations of the state. This support can only be
achieved in modern society by ideological means. Those interests which
serve the 'ruling class' have to be presented as universal interests
and this is one important function of the state.
In juridicial ideology, individuals are constituted as free and
equal individuals subject to "the rule of law" and the state
represents the 'general will' also as an individual subject to law.
Law is a crucial means, then, by which class interests are presented
as universal. Private property rights and contract are the basis of a
liberal/capitalist legal system, yet they are presented as the natural
and inevitable basis of any legal system. What has an existence only
contingently in a specific historical context, e.g. the right of
private ownership of property, is presented as having an existence
independently from any historical or economic circumstances; it is
presented as equitable because it is natural and not as the promotion
of one sectional interest over another.
We see here two functions of law. Firstly law constitutes
certain social relations required by capital, title to property,
contract etc. (This argument is similar to that put forward by
Pashukanis, (Pashukanis 1978) that the form of bourgeois law
reproduces the commodity structure and developed capitalist mode of
production. For a critical discussion of his arguments see Jessop
1980) and secondly, through its ideological function, law presents
these class interests as natural and universal. In a more general
sense the ideological function of law is to secure consent, i.e. to
ensure that most people accept the exercise of authority by the
dominant class as legitimate, e.g. the voluntary subordination of
Labour to Capital in the "free" contract of employment. Of course
other institutions perform the same ideological function in securing
consent (the family, the education system, the media)and it may not be
possible, even with detailed empirical study to separate out the
degree of effectiveness of any particular institution in securing
consent, independently of other ideological sources.
Thus, this sort of Marxist analysis moves away from a crude
economism where bougeous law is seen either as an inevitable product
of the market, or as the executive arm of the ruling class. In its
ideological function, law is part of the state machinery for the
maintenance of hegemony through the production of consent. This
conceptual scheme allows us to examine empirically, the relationships
between the maintenance of social order at the political level of the
state with the construction of social order at the level of the
meanings used by people to think and feel about their social world.
We can examine how, in Giddens terms (Giddens 1976), social order is
produced and reproduced. That is, individuals proceed as if they were
making free decisions and in their very actions reproduce a patterned
social order which, in the last analysis, serves the interests of
capital.
Williams (Williams 1977) describes this idea of hegemonic order
well,
"the pressures and limits of what can
ultimately be seen as a specific economic
political and cultural system, seem to most
of us, the pressures and limits of simple
experience and common sense."
Paul Willis's book "Learning to Labour" (Willis 1977) provides an
excellent empirical analysis of the relationship between state and
individual, and it is this relationship which concerns him as a
sociologist.
"macro determinants need to pass through the
cultural milieu to reproduce themselves at
all." (Willis 1977 pl71)
Willis avoids using the term "hegemony" because of debate over
Gramsci's precise meaning. However the sense in which I have used
(4)
(4) See Anderson 1976.
hegemony is not incompatible with Willis's conceptual scheme. In
this, the state is seen as the site of social reproduction, where the
labour force is reproduced and disciplined in particular ways which
serve the interests of capital. Willis's study shows how, through the
family and the education system in particular, the state ensures that
potentially rebellious working class boys end up in unskilled manual
work, as a matter of their own deliberate choice. But it is not so
much this fact itself, as Willis' sophisticated analysis of how it is
achieved, that is important. He uses the concepts of "penetration"
and "limitation", to construct an ethnography of the complex
relationships between the culture of "the lads", the working class
culture of their families and friends and aspects of the dominant
ideologies of wider society. The adoption of subordinate roles is
paradoxically experienced by the "lads" as success and as resistance.
The "lads" are not simply brain-washed into consent nor do they accept
their lot uncritically. There are moments when they "see through" the
dominant ideology and resist (penetrations) and there are parts of
their cultural resources which constrain the nature of this
resistance, espicially racism, sexism and the cult of masculinity and
manual labour (limitations). The maintenance of hegemony is portrayed
as an extremely complicated business. In this case, a swing in the
balance away from "limitations" and towards "penetration", could
result in a withdrawal of consent by "the lads", e.g. Increased
unemployment amongst young people might cause such a swing. If the
"limitation" of positive affirmation of the value of manual labour is
removed because there are no jobs, this leaves more cultural space for
'the lads' to exercise those parts of their culture which penetrate
and criticise the dominant ideology.
I want to use these concepts of "penetration" and "limitation" to
examine the participation of the lay objectors in the Moss Moran
inquiry. I would argue that in these circumstances, there would be
some difficulty in securing consent. The lay objectors were
articulate and educated. They were sceptical of the inquiry system.
They were defending their private interests against those interests
favoured by the dominant ideology of technical rationality. They were
a group united in their opposition to the application who had
deliberately chosen to take up the chance to participate in the
decision-making process.
The scepticism, of the objectors can be seen as a partial
penetration of the dominant ideology. This exists before the inquiry
has even started. Yet they participated enthusiastically and
diligently in the inquiry and at the end were no more sceptical that
at the beginning.
My problem is to investigate what happened during the inquiry,
how consent was secured and how legitimation operates in practice.
B. The Ideological Role of Law
"one could say that the effectiveness of law
as an ideological force, as a means towards
ruling class hegemony, depends upon its
ideological encapsulation of a consensus
constructed outside itself in other economic
political and cultural practices." (Sumner
1979 p264)
This expresses the relative autonomy of law from other instances
of the State and from the overdetermining economic base. (Poulantzas
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1973) Sumner argues that law is more important as a coercive force
than as an ideological force, which is why he emphasises that law
should not be considered in isolation from other practices. I would
agree that because most people in our society have very little direct
contact with law, its ideological significance is therefore less
direct than the family or education, but it is this function of law
which is important in the study of lay participation in the public
inquiry. In general, administrative law operates to secure legitimacy
rather than by direct coercion.
I have argued that law is not the direct rule of the ruling class,
and that legal rules provide real rights and liberties and offer real
protection to the subordinate classes. Thus the fact that most people
obey the law, respect its officers, and believe that law provides
justice and protection against the arbitrary power of the state, is not
because they are completely deceived, but because the law practises
its rhetorical claims with sufficient frequency.
For the purposes of discussing the function of law in securing
legitimacy, I want to distinguish legal rhetoric, legal rules and
legal practices. Legal rhetoric consists of those claims for justice,
equality, fairness, neutrality etc. which are made on behalf of "the
law" by lawyers. These can be found in speeches, judgements,
memoranda as well as in legal textbooks and statutes. Examples of
legal rhetoric applying to public inquiries would be the Franks Report
guidelines of
"openness, fairness and impartiality"
and the Ciruclar 14 instructions to the Reporter to ensure
"the maximum informality of procedures"
Legal rhetoric is characteristically vague and ambiguous.
For the purposes of the inquiry "legal rules" refers to those
procedural rules governing the conduct of the inquiry. I have argued that
while there are rules governing pre and post inquriy procedures, there are
few rules governing procedures during the inquiry. However, procedures at
the inquiry generally follow the adversary procedures adopted in courts of
law and I argue that the Reporter refers to the 'legal rules' governing
evidence and procedure in his conduct of the inquiry even if it is only to
allow lay objectors to deviate from these rules.
Legal practices are "the law in action". For the Moss Moran
inquiry I am concerned with what happens during the procedures of the
inquiry (and, to a lesser extent, with procedures before and after the
inquiry itself).
It is not my intention to make general statements about the
nature of these concepts or about their relationships. In my
investigation of how legitimation operates in the social practices of
the Moss Moran inquiry I am concerned with how the rhetoric of law and
less importantly, legal rules, are reproduced in the practices of the
inquiry.
I will look at the extent to which the opportunities afforded to
the lay objectors to participate in the inquiry operate to secure their
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satisfaction with its procedures and with those of the democratic process
as a whole.
But I would argue, that the most powerful ideological work
performed by law operates at a very abstract level. Despite a lack of
direct contact with legal institutions or practitioners - members of
this society reproduce common-sense or popular "images" of law which
broadly resemble the "liberal democratic" model of law, which is in
turn that reproduced in the rhetoric of judges, politicians, civil
servants and which thus dominates the media. The mention of law
generally elicits ideas of authority, justice, fairness, neutrality,
independence, as well as ideas such as "professional", "complicated",
"mysterious". These sort of notions about law have deep historical
roots and as a result are both widely and stubbornly adhered to.
This is even more true of common-sense ideas about "law and
order". Stuart Hall's (Hall et al 1978) work suggests that this
consensus is being shifted to a more authoritarian position by a
rhetorical assault from politicians and the press.
These general ideological effects are very important but in
certain instances, law, just as education, has to pass through "the
cultural milieu". When members of the public come into direct contact
with the law, in the courts, or through members of the legal
profession, law has to secure legitimacy in its day to day practice.
In the next section I discuss some work that has recently studied "law
in action", all with reference to criminal courts. This study is
concerned with the public inquiry, part of administrative law rather
than criminal law. I would argue that because the inquiry system
actively encourages lay participation, it must be unusually concerned
to secure legitimacy. Carlen (Carlen 1976) argues that defendants
play an extremely passive role in criminal proceedings, but when
articulate objectors organise and present a case at a public inquiry
one might expect the legitmacy both of the legal system and the
political system to come under more serious threat. There are several
reasons for this.
(1) Having been given the opportunity to play an active role in the
inquiry the objectors might have high expectations, both of the
quality of their participation and its potential efficacy in
securing their desired ends.
(2) Active participation is likely to give laymen a much clearer
idea of what lawyers do and how the law works. This may
contradict their expectations.
In this section I have presented the outline of a theory of the
state, and in particular of the relationship of Law and state. The
need for such a conceptual framework arises from the deficiencies of
the traditional liberal/democratic model of law, and from the
impossibility of examining legal regulation without a model of the
relationship between law and other social practices.
My aim is to examine how legitimation is secured in practice by
examining an institution where this ideological role of law has to
operate very directly. The local middle-class objectors of Aberdour
and Dalgety Bay were vigorously opposed to the development and, at the
- 44 -
least, sceptical about their potential effectiveness in the public
inquiry. My problem is how at the end of the day, with the decision
against them, and their scepticism justified, did the objectors come
to accept the inquiry as neutral and fair. Whatever ideological
effects law might have outside the inquiry, it still has to secure
legitimacy through the practices of the inquiry; social structures
have to pass through the cultural milieu.
A note on legitimation
At this point I want to clarify my use of concept of legitimation
by a brief reference to the work of Max Weber. (Weber 1964)
According to Giddens, (Giddens 1971) Weber defines domination as
"those cases of the exercise of power where
an actor obeys a specific command issued by
another" (Giddens 1971 pl56)
The actor may be motivated by habit or self-interest to obey
authority but for Weber the main motivation is a
"belief by subordinates in the legitimacy of
their subordination."
Weber distinguishes three ideal types of legitimacy on which a
relationship of domination may rest.
"Traditional", where authority is vested in the head of a family
or tribe, "Charismatic", where authority is held by an extraordinary
individual by virtue of exceptional personal character and "Rational
legal" where authority rests in a set of consciously and
rationally devised norms administered by officials. The authority of
the official is by virtue of his public office and is detached from
any personal or private qualities.
Though in any society these three types are intermixed, in modern
capitalist society rational-legal domination with its highly developed
bureaucratic organisation is the most important. Authority is obeyed
because subordinates believe in the impersonal norms which define that
authority. An official in a bureaucracy has limited powers and duties
and only authority exercised within these limits will be seen as
legitimate by subordinates. It is the norms and procedures of the
system invested in a particular official position, which are granted
legitimacy rather than any personal qualities of the current
incumbent.
The public inquiry is a part of the rational-legal bureaucracy
and the rules and procedures governing the inquiry such as they are
(see Chapters 1 and 4 partiuclarly) invest the Reporter with duties,
authority and discretionary powers. Amongst his duties, he has to
assist lay objectors to participate in the inquiry by ensuring that
"the maximum informality of procedures" are adopted. There is no
further official indication of the nature of informality (see Chapter
4) but the Reporter has the responsibility of supervising and
controlling participation in the democratic process which goes beyond
the formal participatory rights of representative democracy as these
exist in contemporary Britain. Though some of the objectors had a
right to appear because of a property interest, all objectors who
expressed an interest were allowed to participate. Thus the Reporter
is responsible for extending democracy in addition to his bureaucratic
responsibilities of gathering all relevant information and conducting
the inquiry in as efficient a manner as possible.
So, for the inquiry to be awarded legitimacy by the objectors the
Reporter requires to do more than fulfill his narrow bureaucratic
functions, he must also be seen to uphold the principles of democracy
such as fairness, equality of treatment and freedom of speech. Weber
argued that though democracy demanded the extension of bureaucracy,
the two were almost inevitably in tension. Giddens comments
"For while the extension of democratic
rights in the contemporary state cannot be
achieved without the formulation of new
bureaucratic regulations, there is a basic
opposition between democracy and
bureaucracy. That is, for Weber, one of the
most poignant examples of the contradictions
which can exist between the formal and
substantive rationality of social action."
(Giddens 1971)
The aim of this study of the social practices of a public inquiry
is to analyse how legitimation operates in practice. I provide an
account of the manner in which the objectors perceive the inquiry as a
legitimate exercise of power within a democratic system. One
important fact is the way in which the Reporter copes with the often
contradictory demands made of him. Thus it is important to take
account both of the technical-rational function of the inquiry and of
its broader political function as part of the democratic process, in
securing legitimacy for the system.
I return to a discussion of the nature of the tension between
bureaucracy and democracy in the inquiry in Chapter 8 where I account
for the ways in which the contradictory demands are managed during the
course of the inquiry.
One problem with this model of legitimation is that it operates
with a voluntarist model of the relationships between the individual
and society. Weber implies that an individual act is caused by a
belief in the legitimacy of the command in the same way as it might be
caused by habit or self-interest.
This use of "legitimation" as an explanation of social action is
criticised by Hyde (Hyde 1983) in a recent paper. He argues that no
studies have demonstrated that "legitimation" in this sense, is a
better explanation for social action than Weber's alternatives of
habit or self-interest.
However, though Hyde rejects "legitimation" as an explanation
for social action, he retains a voluntaristic and scientistic model
for sociology i.e. sociology should provide necessary and sufficient
causal explanations for behaviour at the level of the individual.
The approach which I adopt in this study is more structuralist
than voluntarist (see Giddens 1976) and attempts to provide useful
descriptions rather than necessary and sufficient causal explanations
which are not seen as appropriate aims for sociology in this model.
Thus my model of sociological investigation differs from that of Hyde
and so does my use of the concept of legitimation.
As I use the term "legitimation", it refers to the maintenance of
(5)
the consent required by a hegemonic power. That most people do not
engage in revolutionary or other deliberately disruptive behaviour
most of the time, that many value democracy and its institutions, that
many believe in the rhetorical claims of bourgeois law and behave as if they
believed that they are homologous with legal practices are all
examples of legitimacy. As I use the term, it signifies an absence of
unrest which has to be maintained and reproduced as an active process
in a wide range of social practices.
In this study I describe, through an analysis of a public local
inquiry, how legitimation operates in practice. I have not attempted
a necessary and sufficient causal explanation but a detailed
description of the contradictions involved in the maintenance of
hegemonic domination; an appreciation of the complex operations of
power.
Hyde is correct, "the law" is not monolithic, every part of the
system does not function to maintain the whole system, but the inquiry
does serve certain functions - this is to describe its nature not to
(5) My critisms of Hyde's scientistic approach to sociology are
based on Rorty's (Rorty 1983) arguments for replacing epistemology
with pragmatism as a source of criteria for evaluating social
scientific inquiry. He argues that since knowledge is always
inextricably linked with interests the search for a neutral and
absolute basis for knowledge is an impossible venture. This implies
that knowledge cannot be separated from ethics i.e. any claim for
knowledge is also a political position. Thus the political basis of
knowledge must be acknowledged and made publicly available for
discussion. It is not a problem which can be removed. Rorty argues
that social scientific knowledge should
1. Describe situations thereby facilitating prediction and
control
and 2. Produce descriptions which help to inform political
practice - footnote contd.
explain its existence. The inquiry itself does not produce the
granting of legitimacy by the participants but it is the forum where
this must be reproduced. To say that the inquiry does not produce
legitimacy by itself does not mean to say that it does nothing to
produce legitimation. I argue that several things happen during the
inquiry which help secure legitimation. These need not have been
explicitly designed to this end, we may not be able to measure the
degree of effectivity or to specify the precise causal mechanisms by
which they operate. I show that the objectors both believed the
inquiry was a sham and yet participated enthusiastically. Thus there
is no straightforward relationship between law, belief and action.
Law both encourages and discourages, shows itself as fair and partial,
objectors both believe and disbelieve. However at the end of the day,
the Secretary of State's decision is made, the development goes ahead
and the opposition are silenced. Thus the system has worked, it has
secured legitimacy.
I want to use the concept of "legitimation" not to explain
individual actions but as a description of certain functions
performed by a public inquiry. Not a "functionalist" explanation, but
a description of functions performed. I want to show the complex
process of structuration; to show that social reality is an active
(5) contd. Thus the pursuit of knowledge is seen as the search for a
vocabulary which might help with particular problems. Our moral
nature has to be accepted as "just that" and not something which can
be conveniently set aside.
In this work I aim to produce a description of how power operates
in the (social) practices of the inquiry. I argue that it is
important to understand this in order to select political strategies
designed to secure more "meaningful" lay participation. This seems to
be consistent with Rorty's prescriptions.
construction; that it can be fragile - i.e. that dominant ideologies
can be penetrated; that there is potential for political changes that
neither the state nor its institutions are monolithic.
Hegemony in Crisis
I am concerned with part of the ideological function of law
in the reproduction of consensus at a time when many writers have
described the capitalist State as being in a crisis of hegemony.
Stuart Hall (Hall et al 1978 p212) describes some of the
characteristics of the "aggressively interventionist" State which
was constructed in the years after 1945. There are a variety of
interventionist tendencies.
(1) Direct action in the economy e.g. public ownership,
development grants.
(2) General attempts to control the economy, e.g. demand
regulation, prices and incomes policies, interest rate
control. Despite the claim by the Thatcher government that
they want to allow the economy to operate by the free play
of market forces, their attempts to control inflation by
controlling the money supply and increasing unemployment are
an example of State intervention in the economy to attempt
to secure the interests of particular sections of society.
This is presented as "good housekeeping" in the national
interest.
(3) The growth of the Welfare State providing health care and a
variety of social benefits can be seen as an essential part
of the State's role in the reproduction of the labour force
as can (1).
The growth of a State education system.
The State has also, according to Hall, intervened
ideologically to represent itself as a consensus, social-
contract, corporatist enterprise. We are encouraged to
believe that the State acts in the common interest of us all
and that it is therefore better for groups and interests
which are in conflict to reach some agreement between
themselves in the interests of all. Conflict is now not an
inevitable part of a democratic society but something which
is contrary to the common-interest and counter-productive.
This notion is widely applied to industrial disputes, where
the State attempts to put ideological pressure on trades
unions to compromise. (The "quango" ACAS is quite openly
used in this respect to manufacture consensus.) Other parts
of this corporatist ideology include a belief in economic
growth, the technical management of the economy, and the
spread of opportunities for all.
There has in general been a shift of power from the
legislative (i.e. Parliament) to the executive (the civil
service). Partly because of the amount of work, its
complexity, the volume of relevant information, and the
specialised and technical nature of some of this, parliament
makes decisions based on information which has been pre-
digested and pre-structured by Whitehall departments
according to criteria which might be very vague. In Lukes
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(Lukes 1974) terms, Whitehall can exercise power by their
increasing control over the content and form of the agenda.
(7) Quite apart from internal intervention, the State is
involved in negotiation both with foreign States and trans¬
national corporations as part of the management of the
international economy. In the post war years this arena has
rapidly come to be of crucial importance.
There are many other writers who, though they have different aims
and employ different methodologies, share Hall's basic description of
the changing nature of the State e.g. Winkler's (Winkler 1975)
'corporatism', Kamenka and Tay's (Kamenka and Tay 1975)
'Bureaucratic/Legal' administration, Poulantzas' (Poulantzas 1978)
'authoritarian statism', Poggi's (Poggi 1978) 'compenetration of
State and civil society' and Habermas' (Habermas 1976)
'technical/national domination'. All would agree that central notions
(6)
of liberal/democratic theory such as "the rule of law" and "the
separation of powers" are no longer plausible accounts of the complex
network of relationships which forms the modern State, nor would they
accept that this theory can account for the redistribution of power
which has left the State and certain interest groups and corporations
in a powerful position while the back-bench M.P. has become virtually
powerless in comparison.
The main function of the State is to reproduce those social
relations which are necessary to further the interests of capital (in
(6) This point is made by Prosser (Prosser 1982)
the last instance). As society becomes more complex and as the
capitalist economy becomes more unpredictable and unmanageable, Hall
argues that
"In this new form of an interventionist
capitalist State, the securing of popular
consent is more than ever its only basis of
legitimacy." (Hall et al 1978 p214)
Hall is particularly concerned with the "crisis in hegemony"
which is manifested by the disruptive behaviour of certain sections of
the young black population, and by the State's reaction to (or even
production of) this behaviour. However, as I have argued, the law
requires to secure legitimacy for itself and for the State in a range
of other situations, one of these being the public inquiry. I argued
in the first section that the inquiry system has been subject to
criticism from lawyers, social scientists, administrators, pressure-
groups, and "ordinary" lay members of the public. It is arguable that
the inquiry-system, or at least parts of it are in crisis and that
this situation has been and continues to be highlighted by the growth
of critical study.
I have argued that law cannot be examined without a plausible
model of its relationship to the State and of the changing nature of
the State in contemporary society. I have also begun to suggest the
conceptual framework necessary to study "legitimation in action" which
emphasises that structural determinants need to pass through the level
of action, and it is to this level that I address myself next.
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Law in Action
In recent years there has been a growth of work within "socio-
legal" studies, concerning the study of "law in action" e.g. the daily
procedures of courts, police work. Sociologists have been
(7)
concerned with the study of social interaction in "formal settings"
for long enough. These "interactionist" approaches, however, have
restricted their focus to the particular setting in question.
Explanations and accounts of behaviour are expressed by reference to
particular features of the setting. Thus Blau (Blau 1955) provides
accounts for the practices of the office staff by referring to
specific features of bureaucratic organisations. In a legal setting,
Garfinkel (Garfinkel 1956) accounts for the treatment of defendants in
court by referring to organisational features of court practice.
However one significance of the analysis of law and state
presented in the previous section is that no longer can sociologists
provide explanatory accounts for social behaviour which are based
solely at the level of interaction or organisation. Individuals,
groups and organisations all exist within particular social, political
and economic structures.
It thus seems important for sociologists to examine detailed
social interaction with a specific social configuration. We need to
know how social structures are produced and reproduced in social
practices. It is this level of analysis which is crucial for those
who want to make political interventions. Our capacity to rationally
(7) Garfinkel 1956 Emerson 1967 Blumberg 1974, 1967(b)
Cliourel 1968 Bottoms and McLean 1976.
change our institutions and organisations with predictable outcomes is
limited. We therefore need to understand the limitations in each
instance by specifying the relationship between the day to day
procedural practice of a form of social organisation, and the social
and political context within which it is set.
In order to clarify the methods and objectives of my own study of
public inquiry procedures, I want to consider critically three recent
works dealing with "law in action" two of which (Carlen 1976
McBarnett 1981) attempt to show this relationship and one
(Atkinson and Drew 1980) which by ignoring the relationship shows how
important it is.
For Pat Carlen, (Carlen 1976) Magistrates' Courts are experienced
as unreal and absurd by defenants, they feel helpless, hopeless and
manipulated. They are prevented from telling their story except in a
specific manner at the appropriate time. The social reality of the
court is constructed by the "regulars" - those members of the court
personnel who are there daily. The language of lawyers, social
workers, probation officers, and police officers, dominates, to the
exclusion of the 'restricted code' of the defendant. The rituals and
structured exchanges in the court room operate to silence the
defendant. Carlen argues that such exclusion is a necessary feature
of
"the set of social relationships which
emanate from and protect the institution of
private property and the prevailing mode of
capitalist production." (Carlen 1976 pl2)
"Justice" in capitalism has to be mystified to conceal its
injustice and the injustice of the system which produces it. She
therefore describes the court as
"an institutional setting changed with the
maintenance and reproduction of existing
forms of structural dominance." (Carlen 1976
p38)
So for Carlen the court is a site where the structures of our
society operate in practice. An analysis of what happens in court'
must refer both to the relevant structures of society as well as to
properties of the interaction of the participants. By these
intentions, at least, Carlen adopts Giddens' second primary task of
sociological analysis.
"The explication of the production and
reproduction of society as the accomplished
outcome of human agency." (Giddens 1976
pl62)
Giddens' model of social relations is based on a dialectical
relationship between intentional action and social structures.
Structures not only constrain action but also enable
action. The implication of this model is that a sociologist must
examine the relationship between action and structures in a given
context. How is structure reproduced in action? How much 'freedom of
choice' is available for intentional action?
Carlen seems less concerned with these questions, than with
describing the absurdity which resides in the difference between "what
happens in court", and "what is supposed to happen in court", i.e
between the practice of law and the rhetoric of law. The rhetoric of
law is contained in the "formal" rules of law both substantive and
procedural e.g. in the notions of "due process" "innocent until proved
guilty", "the onus of proof resting with the prosecution", "better to
free ten guilty men than to find one innocent man guilty" etc.
The "practice of law", however, is a function of the strategies
of those court actors structurally invested with power i.e.
magistrates, lawyers, the police, probation officers, specifically
excluding the unrepresented defendant. What happens in court is
determined by the "informal rules" negotiated and operated by these
personnel. Carlen wants to argue that the "justice" promised in the
notion of the "Rule of Law" is not achieved in practice. She suggests
that the "informal rules" of the participants maintain the
inequalities of a capitalist society by coercion. The defendant has
no voice in court and his identity is manipulated by other
participants using it to further their own professional interests.
However one result of these informal practices is ironically to re¬
affirm the rhetoric of law. The decisions of the Court are seen as
absolute, objective and essential, and any threats to the legitimacy
of the procedures of the court are silenced by "remedial routines",
i.e. the defendant's attempts to give accounts are typically
disallowed as inappropriate for a number of reasons.
We are left with the absurdity of the gap between rhetoric and
practice. Seen in the context of some of the claims made of the
doctrine of 'due process', the daily practices of the courts are
presented as absurd.
In "Conviction", Doreen McBarnett (McBarnett 1981) takes Carlen's
arguments further. She argues that Carlen, despite her stated
intention to link the levels of "structure and action", concentrates
too much in her text on the "informal rules" which she locates as
originating in the day to day negotiatory procedures of the courtroom.
In defence of Carlen one could argue that the interests which inform
participants in these processes reside in the organisation of their
professions, and their perceptions of the operation of the court, both
of which could be described as elements of social structure, however I
would agree that Carlen does not make clear conceptual links between
the informal rules and their structural sources, though her analysis
is, in fact, dependant on this relationship.
McBarnett argues that this gap between the rhetoric of law and
the practice of law, described by Carlen, is not only due to the
informal game playing of the participants but can in fact be explained
by reference to the form and content of the law itself. The police
procedures following apprehension of a suspect, the prosecution system
and the rules of evidence and procedure, are all designed to secure a
conviction and this, according to McBarnett, contradicts the
rhetorical claim of due process, that a man is presumed innocent until
proved guilty.
Though in Chapter 1, McBarnett describes her work as
complementary to that of Carlen, throughout her text there is the
implication that Carlen's informal practices are less important in
determining the outcome of the prosecution process than the form and
content of the law. Those rules and procedures which Carlen described
as relatively fixed, unambiguous and "formal", McBarnett sees as
malleable, open to discretionary interpretation and flexible. Thus
Carlen's distinction between "abstract" and "situational" rules
becomes blurred. McBarnett's analysis seems to imply that law is a
flexible process and far from a fixed absolute set of formal rules,
though she also wants to use law in an absolute sense in as much as
law guarantees a high rate of conviction in the courts (8).
The work of these two writers on "law in action" raises a number
of crucial questions for further work in the field.
The first concerns the relationship between action and structure.
In Giddens' terms, these are analytically separate concepts which are
in practice, inseparable. Carlen declares her intention to deal with
the informal rules governing action, as if these were somehow distinct
from structure and uniquely situated at the level of action. She
seems to suggest that situational rules are produced from scratch, as
it were, in each separate courtroom practice; that situational rules
are unpredictable and specifically tailored to each unique
circumstance. Given Carlen's definition of "abstract" and
"situational". I would argue that they are both structural, in
Gidden's sense, in as much as the meanings and principles governing
the operation of the "situational" rules derive from the professional
interests of the various groups involved, which can be further located
in their relation to the economic and political functions of the
State. Though the "rules" might be negotiated and mediated in the
daily practices of the courts, their origins are structural. Thus,
(8) For McBarnett it is precisely this flexibility of law which is
characteristic of its form and which achieves its objectives of
legitimating the maintenance of the interests of the dominant class
though situational rules may be less public, more flexible and more
negotiable than abstract rules, (though McBarnett would not agree)
they are both structural resources. Any shared rules are structural
in that sense.
McBarnett seems to recognize this, though without realising it.
Her analysis of the form and content of law is inextricably linked to
their practical operation, see, for example, her discussion of "the
right to silence" (McBarnett 1981 p53), where, quite clearly, the
effect of the rule is due as much to its implementation by lawyers and
magistrates, as by its precise content. Her discussions always
concern the relationship. then, between action and structure, though
she claims that her concern is with the form and content of law as
structure.
Thus despite McBarnett's claim that her work is fundamentally
different from Carlen's, both writers are concerned with how structure
is produced and reproduced in action. Their problem is that they do
not specify the relationship with adequate clarity.
What significance does this have for the notion of "ideological
gap" that both writers use. They both want to argue that there is a
difference between "what the law does" and "what the law says it
does". It can no longer be that there is a gap between respectively,
action and structure. We have seen that both writers deal with the
inextricable relationship of the two levels. If "asbstract" rules can
no longer simply be "what the law says it does", because they are also
concerned with what the law does, the same goes for "situational"
rules which, in any case, share many properties with abstract rules.
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Is there any important distinction to be made? Both Carlen and
McBarnett are dealing with the legitimating role of law, or more
precisely, legal rhetoric. For Carlen it is significant that despite
the bewilderment and absurdity perceived generally by defendants,the
system continues to run smoothly without challenge. For McBarnett,
the surprise is that people believe that "due process" preserves the
status of the defendant as "innocent until proved guilty", when there
is such a high rate of successful conviction in the criminal courts.
This "dissonance" is managed within the form of law itself. By this,
I understand McBarnett to mean that law "in action" both makes
rhetorical claims about justice and practically ensures that these
claims are never actualised. This is due to the flexibility that is
the "form" of law, as well as to the "informal" practices of the
participants and the class based nature of law.
While I would agree with McBarnett's insistence on the importance
of "the form and content of law", I do not agree that this can be
considered serparately from "informal-practices" or "the class-based
nature of law". And in fact McBarnett does confuse them in her
analysis. Part of the confusion created by her analysis is that she
is not dealing solely with the 'form' of law but with the relationship
betwen the rhetoric of law, the form of law, the content of law, and
the practices of its participants, in the lower courts of criminal
justice e.g. the ambiguity and flexibility of the use of precedent is
inseparable from the practices of judges. Her discussion of "the
right to silence" (p53) shows clearly that the practical application
of this piece of legal rhetoric is ambiguous due to the
interpretations of judges. Thus though there exists a common law
right to remain silent after arrest (i.e. an accused person is not
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obliged to communicate himself) the interpretation of this silence in
particular circumstances might indicate guilt rather than protect the
presumption of innocence.
In this case the "flexibility" is due to the interaction of the
rhetorical "right to silence" (McBarnett 1981 p53), and the
interpretative practices of judges. To then describe this as "the
form of law" as if it was something different from rhetoric or
practice, seems to me to add unnecessary confusion.
There is a further problem with the notion of the "ideological
gap" which exists, for both Carlen and McBarnett, between the rhetoric
of law and the practice of law. Though McBarnett herself describes
due process as existing
"in the dizzy heights of abstraction"
(McBarnett 1981 pl56)
both she and Carlen seem to be comparing what actually happens
with what should happen without specifying the conditions under which
the latter is practically concievable. As McBarnett herself says.
"the law cannot allocate equal rights in an
unequal society." (McBarnett 1981 pl67)
The law is class-based, its claim to treat all equally is a myth.
Law constitutes the liberal-democratic model of society and secures
legitimacy for this model ideologically, by presenting itself as
neutral and just. I have argued that law operates to secure the
interests of a few and to present these as the interests of all. What we
need to know is firstly, how the law operates, how it legitimates
itself and secondly what sort of changes can be made to reduce the
more blatantly oppressive inequalities of law. McBarnett claims to be
surprised at the high rate of conviction given that law is supposed to
protect the accused. The criminal justice system is a technology
precisely designed (as McBarnett herself demonstrates) to ensure a
high rate of conviction. How else could it operate? Why should we
imagine that there would be an equal proportion of "innocent" to
"guilty" accused persons? Of course, (as McBarnett again points out),
the categories of "guilty" and "not guilty" are legal constructions
which only bear a relation to "the real world" and do not mirror it.
McBarnett talks about law "redefining" proof and truth - law, however,
is a technology - i.e an apparatus designed to secure certain ends,
and to produce certain sorts of knowledge to further these ends. It
is not a science which has absolute access to the truth of social
relations. Law needs criteria on which to base decsions. it has
practical interests, it is a technology. McBarnett's surprise at its
success is misplaced, especially when she describes its procedures in
such detail. McBarnett does not describe what procedures she would
employ to actualise the "rhetoric of justice". I would argue that
those procedures she selects would produce a different set of criteria
for the ascription of the categories of "guilty" and "not-guilty" but
these would still be criteria imposed by the law; legal constructions
which constitute the event as "relevant event" for legal purposes.
There will always be a gap between the constructed "legal truth" of a
matter and the "whole truth" of the matter, whatever procedures and
criteria are adopted in order to determine the latter. McBarnett
seems to suggest that law is unjust because its procedures for
establishing "truth" are "partial" rather than "absolute". I would
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argue that it is not these procedures in themselves that are unjust.
(9)
Injustice arises because law preserves certain interests,
inequalities, hierarchies and distributions of power in society. It
is the relationship between the power structure which underpins law
and the knowledge which law produces which results in the production
of "actual" injustice. This is presented as 'justice' produced by the
disinterested pursuit of truth.
The notion of "ideological gap" depends on an empirical knowledge
of what "the people" believe and percieve of law. Neither Carlen nor
McBarnett come anywhere near an adequate description of this.
McBarnett simply asserts that people believe in due process, justice
and the rule of law. She takes it for granted. From Carlen's work, we
can say that she describes defendants as baffled, alienated,
manipulated and dehumanised. We never know what beliefs they have of
law. Perhaps the very fact that they do not protest suggests that
they perceive law as legitimate or intractable. Do ordinary people
percieve the ideological gap? or do they see no difference between
rhetoric and practice? Is this the success of legitimation; the fact
that no gap is perceived? What is the political significance of this?
These are some of the questios that this study sets out to address.
While it is important to demonstrate that the criminal law is a
means of securing a high rate of conviction, this should not imply
that legal procedures are, on their own, the cause of injustice. The
procedures are designed to be as sure as possible that someone who
(9) I argue in Chapter 8 that absolute truth is a chimera in any case.
See Rorty 1983.
has not done that of which he is being accused is not found guilty.
This is not the same as doing everything possible to ensure that
someone who has done that of which he is being accused is found not
guilty, which is another way of putting McBarnett's notion that the
system bends over backwards to protect the accused.
The findings of this study would suggest that Carlen and
McBarnett's own unarticulated definitions of justice, equality, etc.
(the components of the rhetoric of law) are much more idealistic and
Utopian than those of "the general public". For example, the lay
objectors were well aware of injustice and inequality and were
prepared to accept certain levels of both as being the "realistic"
actualisation of the rhetoric of law i.e. their notion of substantive
justice was not a Utopian model.
If the law constitutes and protects the asymmetrical social
relations of the capitalist state, its organisational and procedural
forms will generally reproduce this asymetry. If the layman who comes
into contact with the courts understands this in some inarticulate
way, then we should expect sociologists to do more than demonstrate
ironically the gap between reality and Utopia. The empirical research
of Carlen and McBarnett ought to be used to examine the relationships,
in particular contexts, between the various structures of law, other
structural resources for the actors in court, both lay and
professional, and the day to day interaction in the courtroom. Much
of McBarnett's work does precisely this, but her constant theoretical
emphasis is the primacy of her confusing concept of "the form of law".
In the same way Carlen's work addresses these same issues, but her
conceptual emphasis is unhelpful.
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A presentation of "the ideological gap" between the rhetoric of
law and the practice of law, may demonstrate the mystificatory nature
of ideology. If however we have an interest in influencing or
informing political practice, then we should stop marvelling at the
existence of this gap and proceed with more detailed analysis of how
it is manifested in the construction of social reality in particular
instances e.g. are the objectors in the Moss Moran inquiry aware of
this gap? Law preserves inequality but not all law and not in every
institutional practice. Some of its practices may indeed reduce
inequality, protect the less powerful, or, at least provide potential
space for change.
I have argued that both Carlen and McBarnett have concluded that
there is a gap between the rhetorical claims of law and the social
practices of law. They want to be able to use this analysis to help
close the gap. Both writers assume that the rhetoric of law, which is
Utopian, can be achieved in practice. They claim to be studying the
social process from the point of view of the relationship between
action and structure. However, to propose, even implicity, Utopian
alternatives to existing social relations is to misunderstand that
relationship. My analysis of the Moss Moran inquiry demonstrates some
of the complex ways in which structural power operates in social
practices. The implication is that in order to change social
practices, social structures have to be changed; the distribution of
power has to be altered.
Atkinson and Brew (Atkinson and Drew 1980) seem to share this
criticism of writers who propose Utopian alternatives.
They comment
"Sociologically derived recommendations are
often unashamedly Utopian and unconstrained
by any regard for the possibility that an
organisation might place practical limits on
dreams of an ideal world."
The suggestion here is that there are limits to potential social
organisation within existing social organisation. They acknowledge
the importance of mundane, everyday organisation on the construction of
social reality. They are critical of those sociologists, particularly
Carlen, who seek to analyse court procedure by comparing it ironically
with "normal interaction". Their first point is that since the
significance of any social action is inextricably linked to its
context, it is easy to produce absurdity by placing action in a
different context. Court procedures "make sense" when they are
understood within the context of the form and content of law and the
training of the legal profession but can easily be made to look absurd
by comparing them with conversational practice in everyday
interaction. For Atkinson and Drew the two are different techniques
for different situations; to compare one with the other, as if they
might somehow be interchangeable, is to ignore the importance of
mundane organisation to the construction of social reality.
They argue that
"orderliness is the product of the
unexplained and taken for granted procedures
of practical reasoning used by members."
(Atkinson and Drew 1980 pl6)
They are concerned with the day-to-day construction of social
order, and particularly with language use as one of the fundamental
resources for making sense of the world. They note
"the fact that talk....(is)....situated in
particular contexts has been a perennial
problem for all those who have tried to
design some rule or definition for general
application and for those whose task it is
to apply them to particular settings."
(Atkinson and Drew 1980 p7)
Atkinson and Drew, folowing Garfinkel (Garfinkel 1967), want to
study social order, by looking at how conversations are bult up;
conversation being a basic and elementary example of the construction
of social order in interaction.
The problem is that language is indexical; i.e. it always refers
to something other than itself; to the world or, as Garfinkel would
put it, to the auspices and procedures which produced the talk as a
social construction. All accounts then, whether everyday talk or
sociological analysis, are indexical. For Garfinkel this is
constitutive. Sociologists are then faced with the problems of
relativism; (how can we say one account is better than another?) and
reflexivity or infinite regress; (how can we deal with the notion that
there is no absolute authority to grant significance to our talk).
In my view, these problems are important and have to be faced by
any social scientist who wants to make statements about the social
world. There are no absolute solutions to these problems, rather they
describe the epistemological boundaries within which social scientists
have to operate.
(10)
Despite their awareness of these problems, Atkinson and Drew
operate by pretending that they don't exist. Their search for the
formal properties of conversation ignores the context of the talk. A.s
"conversational analysts", the precise source of their data is
unimportant, they are concerned with the formal properties of "any
conversation". In this sense, the court setting of their data in this
book is at best marginal, if not irrelevant. Despite their claims,
correctly echoing Garfinkel, that speech is indexical and always
refers to its context and the methods of its production, they ignore
the context and concentrate only on those properties of the methods of
its production that they consider to be formal properties of
conversation.
If all accounts are relative and infinitely relexive, then,
according to Atkinson and Drew, sociologists have no justification for
claiming that their accounts are any better than those of ordinary
members. If we accept that the very nature of language is responsible
for this "restriciton" on the activities of sociologists, then, as a
sociologist, my intention would be to use language, not to found an
absolute scientific method, but to describe and justify the use of
particular concepts and methods. (11)
(10) Rorty (1983) argues for a pragmatic response to the impossibility of
epistemological certainty.
(11) See Giddens 1976 p 162 "The 'double hermeneutic' is treated as an
inevitable resource for sociologists. They have to accept that
the process of understanding is circular and is not either
progressive nor based on some absolute 'knowledge'. See also my further
comments in Chapter 8 of this study concerning the aims and scope of
sociological investigation.
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Atkinson and Drew, resort to a radical and naive empiricism, which
takes any talk out of its context and proceeds to analyse this
data using "the methods of ordinary members" ("What everybody knows").
I would argue that their description of relativity logically implies
that "everyday members practices" have no greater claim to
authenticity than any sociological account. For Atkinson and Drew to
rely on "everyday practices" means that their work has no more status
than common-sense, and that they deal with the "fundamental" (Atkinson
and Drew 1980 p6) problems involved in "doing social science" by
ignoring these problems. It is ironic that after subjecting
sociologists to criticism for their lack of rigour, their scientism
and their lack of awareness of specific methodological problems, that
they themselves should resort to a kind of common-sense empiricism
masquerading as a science. Having shown that there is no absolute
epistemological base for social scientific work, they behave as if
they have found one. All they do is take "common-sense" for granted
and use all sorts of sociological and political assumptions (about
meaning, motive interpretation, intention, social relationships in
situational settings and so forth) which more perceptive sociologists
would recognise as cultural resources and would subject to
criticism. It may be useful to know the formal principles of the
organisation of speaker-sequencing, but this is only a very minor part
of the construction of social reality. Atkinson and Drew are aware of
the limitations of their work. They are content to
study the way we build up conversations avoiding either complete
silence or everyone talking at once by orienting to the rules of
"one at a time" and "speaker selection". This may turn out to be
fruitful work but it certainly cannot replace the important broader
aims of sociological analysis, which must face up to the
methodological and political contradictions of social relations
rather than ignore them, which seems to be the case with Atkinson
and Drew. In criticising sociologists for ignoring the formal
properties of social organisation in their attempts to derive
generalised rules governing social relations, Atkinson and Drew
ignore the political, historical and cultural context of social
action inpursuit of some decontextualised formal properties
governing that action. It is precisely the relationship between
action and structure which should concern sociologists. They should
not be attempting to assert causal or epistemological priority of
one over the other, nor should Atkinson and Drew accept that the
task of sociology is to derive generalised rules governing social
relations. It is their own committment to this form of behaviourism
which leads them to a fruitless search for "fundamentals."
In a sense while ostensibly making claims to be studying the
construction of social reality in a courtroom setting, and thus
contributing to the work of Carlen and McBarnett, Atkinson and Drew
have very little to say about the organisation and work of the courts
or of law in general. Their work is marginal to the sociological
enterprise and the fact that their data is from a legal context is of
no significance to their analysis.
Thus for Atkinson and Drew the "limits" to Utopian
recommendations in existing social organisations (see p61), turn out
to be not social of political but linguistic, the formal properties of
conversational use. I have argued that this definition of context as
an attempt to repair the indexicality of speech is a fundamental
misunderstanding of crucial and methodological questions which face
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all social scientists. Atkinson and Drew draw attention to these
questions but ignore them in their analysis. These questions concern
the relative status of sociological accounts and those of ordinary
'lay' members, and the inevitable indexicality of speech and action.
In his attempt to describe a methodology for sociology which
confronts many of its major critics, Giddens (Giddens 1976 Chapter 4),
discusses these questions at some length. I will very briefly
rehearse the bones of his argument here. Both the notions of
'relativity' and 'indexicality' contain the idea that meaning is
dependent on its context. Giddens notes that discussion of
"paradigms" or "forms of life" has tended to assume that they were
internally consistent, incommensurable, and unaffected by external
social and political influences. He argues that these assumptions do
not necessarily hold and presents a model where "forms of life"
mediate each other. To understand an 'alien' form of life one has to
immerse oneself in its structure and attempt to understand the
structure of significance, in terms of other forms of life that are
more familiar. In other words, all understanding is metaphorical.
(12)
Because each form of life may be allowed authenticity does not mean
that it has to be given an equal value, to use Giddens' example - the
Azande believe rain is caused by the Gods - as western sociologists we
can acknowledge this belief, we can attempt to understand the
significance of this belief for Azande culture and analyse it's
importance for Azande social relations. However we can still claim
that meteorology provides for us, a more embracing, useful, and
credible version of the cause of rain. This is not to say that ours
(12) See Hollis and Lukes 1982 passim.
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is true and the Azande's false, the notion of mediating forms of life
does not entail this form of absolutism. The absence of a theory-free,
neutral, observation language, does not condemn as to silence, rather
it directs us to hermeneutics, the understanding of structural
relationships. In the absence of any absolute and fundamental basis
for "knowledge" we can assess knowledge claims not by how closely they
approximate to some absolute "reality" but on pragmatic criteria such
as how useful it is for the purposes we have in mind? (see Rorty 1983)
Sociology, unlike the natural sciences, has the problem of a
"double hermeneutic." The world which the sociologist seeks to
describe, is already a pre-interpreted social world, and, what is
more, that world is shared by sociologists as "ordinary members".
Atkinson and Drew's reaction to this is to give up being sociologists,
relying instead on their "common sense" resources as ordinary members,
but, as Giddens points out, "common sense" is, at least in part, a set
of theoretical assumptions and ideas about the world which have their
origin in the works of "men of ideas" and more broadly in the history
of social relations, and not some sort of accumulated "basic" human
experience whatever that might be. (see Giddens 1976 pll5) Common-
sense knowledge is a theoretical "form of life" and so has the same
formal status as sociological models of the world. One of the points
made by ethnomethodology was that all members of society "do
sociology" in the process of their everyday work in constructing
social reality. The task of a sociological theory is to mediate
between "common-sense" ways of looking at the world and its own
concepts and metaphors. Atkinson and Drew want to restrict sociology
to common-sense methods and thus reduce the "double hermeneutic" to a
single hermeneutic.
- 74 -
It is easy for sociologists to react violently and perhaps
unfairly to ethnomethodology. As Giddens points out ethnomethodology
(13)
raises important methodological questions which cannot be ignored by
the discipline. However, as I have argued, "conversational analysis"
at best may provide us with some data about the formal properties of
conversation, but there are major criticisms of its own methodological
stance and very severe limitations on its usefulness as a form of
knowledge. It doesn't tell us much and what it tells us is of very
little political use, regardless of one's political position.
In this section, through a critique of work by Carlen and
McBarnett and also by Atkinson and Drew, I have tried to demonstrate
the importance of preserving the relationship between social action
and social structure, and to clear up some conceptual confusions which
I found in the work of these writers. To conclude this chapter I
want to return to the structural aspects of law and set out in the
light of this analysis, the aims of the main body of my study.
As E P Thompson (Thompson 1980) points out, the use of
representative democracy, the rule of law, trades unionism, etc.
have provided "real" freedoms and protections to the citizen.
Though in one sense "representative democracy" is an ideology which
has allowed the domination of bourgeois cultural hegemony to exist, it
has at the same time constructed conditions which may permit that
hegemony to be challenged. Civil society in Western capitalism does
provide opportunities for individuals and groups to challenge dominant
ideas - in many cases these opportunities may be illusory, in many the
(13) See Burton F. 1980.
challenges may be completely unsuccessful - but the opportunities
exist. Western democracies are based on an ideology of freely given
consent which has at least some relationship with practical outcomes,
but there are "gaps" where competing ideologies can threaten the
dominant ideology, e.g. the rhetorical claims of "openness fairness
and impartiality" are made for the public inquiry, presenting the
ideology of free democratic participation. One of the aims of this
work is to examine the extent to which this ideology is reproduced in
the inquiry and where the gaps, if there are any, exist for critical
penetration of the dominant ideology. In Anderson's (Anderson 1976)
presentation of Gramsci's ideas concerning the relationship between
State and Civil society, we are given a conceptual framework for an
empirical investigation of 'the limits of freedom'. Representative
democracy is an ideology; that is, a theory of the relationship
between the individual and the state, and a justification for the use
of this theory. In practice the social world is much more complex,
power is unequally distributed, social practices take place in
specific contexts (historical, political, bureaucratic) and so on.
Thus the ideology of freedom is reproduced in the inquiry because
participants act as if they were free. The belief in freedom makes the
freedom real because it is real in its consequences - the reproduction
of the dominant ideology, the award of legitimacy and the maintenance
of hegemonic domination. The ideas of the freedom and uniqueness of
the individual, the responsiveness of parliamentary democracy, the
justice and rectitude of the rule of law - are reproduced - most
people still construct their model of their society on the basis of
these sorts of assumptions. And, because the state does not rule
solely by coercion, nor simply fills up peoples heads with the
"correct" ideas, people must, to some extent, perceive the ideology
actually working in practice, e.g. not only must the rhetoric of
justice be proclaimed by judges, lawyers and the media - but the
public, in the courtroom must experience justice being done. If
Carlen's analysis of Magistrates courts was taken as an accurate
description of the peoples' perceptions of the procedures i.e. if they
all experienced the process as absurd and without meaning - there would be
mass social unrest tomorrow. Any social practice can be
described as absurd, if it is viewed from an inappropriate context.
The important point is that magistrates courts (and public
inquiries) have several contradictory objectives. They must present
the law symbolically, that is, the rhetoric of justice according to
the rule of law. They must accomplish the technical tasks for which
they were designed (high rates of conviction,the approval of planning
permission). These tasks may potentially be seen as unjust, unfair
and exploitative by critics and are thus usually tacit and unpublished.
They must fulfill those formal procedures which preserve the rights of
individuals and thus,as it were,display the rhetoric in the practice.
The liberal democratic ideology of"justice according to law" will be more
dominant,more fully or exclusively reproduced in some legal institutions
than others. To what extent is it reproduced in the public inquiry?
The questions raised can only be answered by empirical
investigation. This is the study of 'legitimation in action'. The
level of "freedom" available in a context e.g. the extent to which lay
objectors can use the inquiry to achieve their aims,or to arouse
public opinion,contribute to the process of decision making or
exercise their democratic rights,can only be established by looking at
a particular instance in detail. Similarly the degree to which people
are constrained and the social structures which contain these
constraints can only be established empirically.
The degree of "freedom" really depends on the extent to which the
dominant ideologies can be penetrated by competing ideologies. Just
what these ideologies consist of and where they are structually
located are problems I address in chapter 7.
This work, then, is an exercise in theoretically informed
empirical sociology. To study, in a non-reductive way, the mundane
procedures of daily social practice in their political, historical and
social context, from a perspective which uses concepts which enable
the writer to move around the complexity of the social process, from
structure to individual, from practical meaning to ideology in a way
which preserves and illustrates the inevitable contradictions.
This analysis will then be compared to the critical work on
public inquiry procedure discussed earlier in the introduction and I
(14)
will examine the extent to which their procedural reforms are
practically attainable,and which aims of the enquiry they serve,in the
light of my analysis of the Mossmoran inquiry.
Having introduced the study,I should now describe how it
proceeds.
Chapter 3 describes the formation of the action group and the
nature of the subject matter of the inquiry,and also summarises the
(14) See above pages 13-20 and for a fuller comparison see Chapter 8.
conduct of the inquiry and what it was like to be there. The purpose
of this descriptive material is both to help the reader understand the
more detailed analysis which follows and also to substantiate
arguments which I make in subsequent chapters.
The bulk of my analysis of the procedures of the inquiry is in
chapters 4 to 7. In chapters 4, 5,and 6, I attempt to reconstruct the
methods by which the reporter,the lawyers and the experts,participate
in the inquiry.
Chapter 4 deals with the Reporters direction of the day to day
proceedings of the inquiry. I look at the Reporter's operational
distinction between formal and informal procedures, and how this
distinction relates to both lay participation and the construction of
knowledge. In chapters 5 and 6, I am concerned with the criteria used
by the Reporter and lawyers to describe what constitutes a relevant
fact in the inquiry; the criteria for ascribing 'relevance'and
'facticity'. I argue that the control over the procedures of the
inquiry is inextricably linked to its function of knowledge
construction. I am particularly concerned with the methods used by
the Reporter to move from the instructions, procedural hints and
institutional and professional principles to the day to day practices
of the inquiry, and the link between his role as fact-finder and
supporter of lay participation.
In chapter 7 I deal with the participation of lay objectors. I
argue that they have a completely different approach to the inquiry
from the professionals, that their actions reproduced a wider range of
structures and ideologies, and that their award of legitimacy is
delicately secured by their ideologies of respect for authority, and
reasonableness. These ideological beliefs are encouraged
by the inquiry system itself and in particular by the attitudes
of the Reporter. Chapter 8 summarises the main points of the
thesis and defends the model of sociological analysis adopted in terms




In the general scheme of the study, this chapter serves several
functions.
Given the detailed nature of much of the later analysis, I
think it is important to describe, at least in outline, the nature
of the proposed development and the proposed site. For a similar
reason I also describe the conduct and organisation of the inquiry
itself, a typical day's proceedings at the inquiry, and some of my
own general impressions based on daily attendance at the inquiry.
This information was culled from my own daily observation of
the inquiry, interviews with participants, publications produced by
the participants as evidence and press reports. It describes the
narrower political and social context within which I locate the
detailed analysis of the transcript which follows. Thus this
chapter is, at the same time, evidence in support of my arguments,
and a resource to help the reader understand my analysis. If the
introduction attempted to set the inquiry in a broad political
context, this chapter attempts to provide the more local context.
I also discuss the history of the planning application, and the
formation of the Action Group, and make some comments on the
contemporary political background, both at a national and local
level. The inquiry itself is only part of a much wider political
process. Its effects will operate outside the forum of the inquiry
itself, and I argue, in this chapter, that part of the legitimating
function of the inquiry, operates to construct a particular mode of
objection from the Action group, before the inquiry takes place.
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General Background
In February 1976, when Shell-Expro (1) first published plans
for an N.G.L. (2) processing plant at Peterhead, there was no
government policy for the siting of such plants, though, according
to Frank Fraser writing in the "Scotsman", this was a "key question"
occupying the minds of the officials in the Scottish Office, as well
as the Departments of Energy and Industry in London. Apart from the
unpopularity of such plants, there were several other problems, e.g.
the need for a deep-water harbour, the provision of infrastructure
(housing, roads, water supply, power, emergency services etc),
suitability for downstream development (3) and, not least, the
unpredictable demands of the oil companies, which might have
prevented the Government from issuing a policy statement on the
siting of petro-chemical complexes. Thus the inquiry is set against
a background of political uncertainty; should the Government set
aside an area in Scotland for all future petro-chemical development?
And if not, how much control could and should the Government
exercise over the siting policies of these powerfull multinational
companies. Though there is no policy on possible sites for oil
related devopment, there is a general Government policy, accepted as
a fact by the Reporter in the inquiry, that every encouragement
should be given to the most efficient use of the oil resources from
the North Sea.
(1) Shell U.K. Ltd., Esso Petroleum Company Ltd. and Esso Chemical
Ltd are subsidiaries of the multi-national Exxon Internationsl.
The first two companies to explore for and recover oil in the
North Sea jointly as Shell Expro.
(2) N.G.L. stands for Natural Gas Liquids - see below P.85
(3) "Downstream development" refers to industries which use certain
separated components of crude oil to manuafacture other chemical
compounds such as various types of plastics.
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Peterhead
In February 1976, Shell-Expro first applied for permission to
construct their N.G.L. plant near Peterhead, intending to ship the
product out from Peterhead harbour. Both Grampian Regional Council
and Banff and Buchan District Council (the latter with strict
planning conditions) approved the application, though there were
objections lodged particularly by local food processing and drink
industries who feared the pollution of their product. The R.N.L.I.
and local fishermen also objected to the oil company's proposed
development of the harbour. A public inquiry was held in May 1976
and was adjourned after three weeks, at Shell's request to enable
the impact of proposed harbour works upon other harbour users to be
fully assessed by model testing at the University of Delft. In
November 1976 Shell abandoned their Peterhead project as they
considered that the additional cost and time involved in harbour
protection works were unacceptable and that completion by the winter
of 1980/81 was uncertain.
Shell had a contract to supply gas to the British Gas
Corporation at St. Fergus which could not be supplied until the
N.G.L. plant was in operation. Until this time the gas was pumped
back into the reservoir in the Brent field which might in time
reduce the amount of recoverable oil in the field. Shell also had a
contract to export £.300 million worth of propane and butane to an
American company by 1980.
Shell Expro were thus looking for an alternative site for the
N.G.L. plant. It is also relevant to note that Peterhead might have
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been considered an unsuitable (4) location for an ethane cracker
and downstream petro-chemical development, an important factor in
the selection of an alternative site.
Shell Expro were rebuked by the Reporter for failing to reveal
full details of plans to construct adaptations to the harbour. This
gave the objectors no details on which to base their objections.
In April 1977, following the recommendations of the Reporter, the
Secretary of State ordered Shell to meet a bill for the objectors
of over £16,000 because of their unreasonable behaviour. Counsel
for Shell claimed that the company had approached the inquiry in
good faith and with confidence in the adequacy of their plans.
The Proposed Development - Moss Moran - Braefoot Bay
This development was designed to process the product from the
Brent field which had an estimated N.G.L. capacity of 3 million,
million cubic feet of recoverable associated gas and 1,500 million
barrels of recoverable crude oil. Depending on production rate,
these reserves give the field a life of some 15-20 years.
Crude oil and associated gases from an undersea field flowed
into the Brent field drilling platforms where there was an initial
separation process. Oil was piped to Sullom Voe in Shetland where it
was stored for collection by tanker. The remaining mixture of gases
and natural gas liquids (N.G.L) was piped to St. Fergus in the North
(4) This is because of lack of infrastructure. Companies would not
be attracted by the lack of good road access, lack of housing and
recreational amenities, the high cost of transport from such a
remote area to the major industrial centres, and so forth.
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East of Scotland. Here, methane, the lightest component, was
separated and sold to the British Gas Corporation as supply for the
national grid.
Shell Expro planned a further 135 mile land pipeline to
transport the remaining N.G.L., at ambient temperature but under
pressure, to Moss Moran in Fife where it would be fractionated into
the individual products of ethane, gasolene, propane and butane.
Ethane, the lightest component, is the best feedstock for the
manufacture of ethylene and the subsequent downstream petro-chemical
developments. It would go to Esso Chemical for conversion to
ethylene in the proposed steam cracker. Until the downstream
development arrived, the ethylene from the cracker would be
transported as a vapour to Moss Moran where it would be stored in
refrigerated tanks prior to shipping out.
Gasolene is very similar to motor gasoline, i.e. petrol. It
would be stored at Moss Moran and piped at ambient temperature to
Braefoot Bay for shipping. Butane and propane are clean burning
premium fuels, which are known by the generic form L.P.G.
(liqueified petroleum gas). They would be stored at Moss Moran in
refrigerated tanks and piped in insulated pipelines for shipping
from Braefoot Bay to export markets in the U.S.A., a £300 million
contract.
The Proposed Site
The Moss Moran site is roughly rectangular and covers some 265
hectares of a wide flat valley of unwooded agricultural land. It is
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zoned for agricultural use but has been identified in a Fife
Regional Council general planning report, as suitable for industry.
The site is naturally screened by the contours of the land. This
should result in only columns and stacks over 50m high being visible
to neighbouring communities.
At the North-West corner of the site there is Gray Park, a
local authority housing estate, which consists of 64 recently
modernised houses, lock-up garages and a small recreation park.
The pipelines wil run for 5 km from Moss Moran to Braefoot Bay.
The latter is a small sheltered cove which lies in between the
communities of Aberdour and Dalgety Bay. It is the development at
of Braefoot Bay on which controversy settled during the inquiry.
There were few objections to the main development at Moss Moran.
The Braefoot Bay site would contain storage tanks for ethylene,
a refrigeration plant, N.G.L. loading facilities, and two jetties
in a Y formation stretching out into the Forth 280m and 240m
respectively, from the high-water mark. Immediately opposite
Braefoot Bay at a distance of 1km, lies the island of Inchcolm with
its uninhabited abbey and bird santuary. It is possible to walk
along the shore from Aberdour, through Braefoot Bay to Dalgety Bay,
and there is no doubt that the area is of both high landscape value
and high amenity value. The visitor to Braefoot Bay feels very
secluded due to the rocky headland and wooded slopes behind the
sandy beach. The area forms a natural playground for local
children, though there was no evidence presented at the inquiry on
the frequency of use. I visited the bay about half a dozen times
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and talked to about a hundred local residents and from this limited
information, I would say that the Bay is not used a great deal, but
that its peace and quiet are its major attraction. About 1km behind
the Bay, there runs a path between Aberdour and Dalgety Bay. This
is a very popular local walk, though it does not give direct access
to or a direct view of Braefoot Bay itself. There seems little
doubt that the proposed develop- ment of the bay along with the
frequent movement of large tankers would completely change the
character of the area.
Background to the Inquiry
The news that Shell-Expro were planning a development at Moss
Moran/ Braefoot Bay began to appear in the press in early September
1976, about three months after the adjournment of the Peterhead
inquiry, but two months before Shell Expro's official decision to
switch the development to Fife. During this time, the company had
discussions with representatives of Fife Regional Council and the
Forth Ports Authority.
Local opposition groups were formed in the two communities
adjacent to Braefoot Bay. In October 1976 the Dalgety Bay Residents
Association circulated broadsheets claiming that the terminal would
present an explosion risk comparable to Flixborough (5) and objected to the
development on the grounds of safety, destruction of the
environment, and threat to wildlife. After a meeting in Aberdour
which was "the biggest turn-out of villagers in living memory", the
(5)
(5) The "Scotman" reported an audience of 350.
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Aberdour Ratepayers' Association were instructed to protest in the
strongest terms possible to the Secretary of State and Fife Regional
Council.
Towards the end of November, the residents of Dalgety Bay set
up an action group to contact experts who could establish the
possible effects of the development on the town, before framing
their formal objections.
Local Government leaders and elected representatives in the
area all declared themselves to a greater or lesser extent in favour
of the develop- ment, and the Aberdour Ratepayers' Association was
accused of scaremongering by their Regional Councillor, an
accusation which they rejected.
During late November and December there were letters and
articles in "the Scotsman" dealing with the subject of alternative
harbour sites, the broader implications of the devlopment, and the
possibility of a public inquiry. Local objectors whom I
interviewed gave contradictory opions. Some thought they had a
strong case which had a good chance of convincing the inquiry
Reporter, some thought the development was inevitable and that they
ought to seek concessions from the oil companies, while others
thought the inquiry process was a sham and that more disruptive
opposition ought to be attempted.
This latter argument came from a small number of local
objectors who were familiar with the Edinburgh Airport Inquiry which
had involved objections form a similar community on the other side
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of the Forth. The objectors had raised a considerable
(6)
amount of money and presented a sophisticated technical argument
which convinced the inquiry Reporter. However, the Reporter's
recommendations were rejected by the Secretary of State. There was
also reference to the Nigg Bay inquiry where a similar
(7)
outcome occurred.
A petition was handed to the Secretary of State by the
(8).
Aberdour Ratepayers' Association objecting to the development on the
grounds of impact on the total environment, contradiction of
official policy, hazard to health, pollution, restriction of freedom
of navigation and restriction of public access to the Braefoot
foreshore. Shortly afterwards, Shell-Expro held a public meeting in
Aberdour to explain their plans to the local community and were
faced with pointed questions backed up with detailed information and
knowledge, from some of the local objectors.
At the end of January 1977 the Dalgety Bay Residents
Association and the Aberdour Ratepayers' Association formed the
Aberdour/Dalgety Bay Action Group, to prepare objections for a
public local inquiry. There was a public meeting organised by Shell-
Expro in Dalgety Bay which, according to a report in the "Scotsman",
ended in uproar.
(6) see Mutch 1974.
(7) see Taylor 1975.
(8) This was signed by 1183 people.
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The application was "called in" (9) by the Secretary of State
in February 1977 and there followed applications by Esso Chemical
for an ethane cracker and a site for unspecified downstream
development at the same time. In May, the Secretary of State
nominated a Reporter to conduct a public inquiry beginning on June
13th. After protest from the objectors this was later extended to
June 27th.
The Communities and the Joint Action Group
Aberdour might be described as a "picturesque" little village of
around 1500 inhabitants. There are many fine old buildings and the
housing stock is varied: from large private properties to small
cottages and a small council estate. It is predominatly a commuter
village serving Edinburgh and Fife, though a relatively high
proportion of the population are retired. There is a sandy beach
adjacent to the village which attracts coach loads of visitors in
the summer. There is also a ruined castle. The Regional Council
want to promote Aberdour as a tourist resort, with its golf course,
tennis club and beach, and there are plans to designate the village
as a conservation area, though new private building has already been
discouraged.
Dalgety Bay is a different community. It was planned as a
private "new town" in the late 50's to meet a demand for private
(9) The "Calling in" of a planning application normally occurs when
the proposed development is seen as being of national importance.
The procedure means that the Secretary of State makes the final
decision based on the Report from the inquiry and thus removes
the decision from the local authorities.
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housing which was forecast due to the opening of the Forth Road
Bridge. The town is half-complete and a target population of 7000
looks like being an underestimate. The Regional Council want to
encourage the rapid development of the rest of the town which now
has Scottish Special Housing Association and District Council houses
aswell as a predominance of private houses.
The houses are built on a gentle slope which rises from the
broad curve of a pebbly beach. The town has been described both as
an eyesore and delightful. It certainly is not as conventionally
attractive as Aberdour. The town has been designed to attract mostly
young professional families and there is a fast turnover rate for
population. The yacht club is very popular and there are a large
number of boats moored around the bay.
In April 1977, I went to the Dalgety Bay Yacht Club to meet the
leaders of the Action Group, and to see the exhibition they had
organised to enlist support and raise funds. The exhibition was
about the dangers of the petro- chemical industry and displayed
criticisms of the plans put forward by Shell Expro. There were
magazine and newspaper clippings, books, journal articles,
photographs and artist's impressions, and a large model of the
proposed Braefoot Bay devopment made by local school children with
information given and questions answered by leaders of the Action
Group. During the evening, I estimated that over 200 people passed
through the exhibition which was later displayed in Aberdour and
Edinburgh.
The Action Group itself had a fluctuating leadership, sharing
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the varied funtions of the group. Amongst the leaders were a
solicitor with personal experience of the Cramond/Edinburgh Airport
inquiry, a medical technician with some political experience
(10)
and some specialised knowledge about petro-chemicals and the oil
industry, a naval architect, a chemical engineer, a retired naval
officer, a housewife, a banker, two teachers, the managing director
of a local clothing firm and a systems analyst. Their ages ranged
from late 20's to over 60 but most were in their early 40's. In
general they were an articulate and intelligent group of middle-
class people.
A general impression of their reaction to the development and
their plans for a public inquiry came out of my conversations with
them. Their reasons for objecting were fear for their safety,
interference with recreations such as golf and sailing, destruction
of the environment, danger to children and falling house prices.
They felt that with money and time, they could put up a good
technical argument which would convince the Reporter but that this
was unlikely because they did not have much money and time was
short. Some felt that the decision had already been taken, "a carve-
up between National and local government and the oil companies",
others thought that they ought to disrupt the inquiry and instigate
other unspecified "disturbances", but the consensus feeling seemed
to be that their best chance lay in putting forward a good case (11)
(10) Though this gentleman had taken part in that public inquiry, his
normal work did not involve court appearances and he was not
particularly experienced in the techniques of advocacy.
(11) See Chapter 7.
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at the inquiry. Thus they concentrated their efforts on door to
door fund raising and campaigning and studied the Shell/Expro
applications closely. If they raised enough money they hoped to
employ a scientific expert and perhaps an advocate to present their
case at the inquiry, though the scientist had priority, suggesting
that the objectors thought they could present their own case
adequately but would have little chance without expert technical
evidence of their own.
I conducted a number of unstructured interviews in the two
communities asking local people questions about the development, the
Action Group and the inquiry. What follows is an impression of
local feeling based on conversations with around 100 people
encountered randomly.
It was immediately evident that most people seemed to know
little about the development, a little more about the Action Group
and nothing at all about public inquiries. The exceptions were
those few who were actively involved or who knew someone who was
actively involved.
By and large reaction was against the development because it
was dangerous and would spoil the area, though few were able to say
why or how. A few thought it would bring jobs and would not be too
dangerous and therefore was good. The Action Group was composed of
a local clique, according to the people I spoke to, but most thought
they were doing a good job. Hardly anyone knew anything about the
public inquiry. When I described it to them and asked them if they
would go along to voice their objections, most said they would leave
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it to the Action Group to which many claimed to have made financial
donations.
This impression would support John Roger's theory (Roger 1978) that
this sort of situation, a small group take control of an Action
Group and operate autonomously with little contact with or feedback
from the community they are representing. In this case the Action
Group decided to fight their case in the inquiry on technical and
scientific grounds and their active membership consisted
predominantly of technical and professional people prepared to put
across technical arguments. If we accept that the public
(12)
inquiry system encourages the formation of Action groups who attempt
to pursue technical cases, this would support the argument that, at
a very basic level, lay participation is constructed and channelled
by the prospective operation of legal processes as perceived by the
active representatives of the community. In other words the very
nature of the public inquiry system constructs lay participation in
certain ways despite the declared intention of the legislature
(13)
to extend and encourage lay participation. John Roger (Roger 1978)
argues that this is an example of depoliticisation in a
technical/rational society, which encourages the growth of private
space at the expense of the reduction of public space. i.e.
individuals do not perceive the organisation of their lives by
others as something they should be concerned about and participate
in.
(12) Their cross-examination in practice very often moved away from
the purely technical. See Chapter 7.
(13) SDD Circular 14 1975.
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If, as I argue in Chapter 1, the inquiry is seen as part of a
process of legitimation, the formation of an Action Group
demonstrates how this works on at least two levels. Firstly it is
clear that most local people would have accepted the development
without any objections or any public inquiry. For them, the
operations of the state are awarded legitimation at a more general
level. This is what depoliticisation means, the feeling that it is
not their job to be actively involved.
The public inquiry system then acts to locate the vociferous
opposition and construct it in a particular manner. The Action Group
members have not been depoliticised at this stage, they are
politically active. In an important sense, their participation in the
public inquiry is political activity directed at having an influence
on the decision making process. For Roger the inquiry is
depoliticised because it transforms political questions into technical
questions. Roger however doesn't deal with the political activity of
the action group. I aim to show how their views are presented and
managed in the inquiry. If the inquiry comes to a technical decision
it has to do so by somehow defusing the anger and discontent of the
active objectors during the process of the inquiry itself. I have
described the contradictory views and strategies held within the
Action Group. They felt the inquiry was a sham, that the decision had
already been taken and that they had inadequate resources to
participate effectively. Nevertheless they were also highlymotivated
and enthusiastic. The Group took the trouble to do their own research
both on public inquiries and into the specific technical concerns of
the inquiry. They entered the inquiry well-informed, determined to do
their best and angry at the way they had been treated by the oil
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companies and civil servants. At the end of the inquiry most of these
contradictions remained. Their experience of participation had
somehow both confirmed their scepticism and sustained their
committment to participation. I want to argue that because the
objectors actively and enthusiastically participated in the inquiry,
they can be said to have seen the inquiry as a legitimate exercise of
power. In this study I want to describe how these contradictions were
maintained throughout the process of the inquiry and thus how
legitimation was secured in the social practices of the inquiry.
These lay participants were not planning advocates nor
experienced inquiry participants, nor experienced members of active
pressure groups, some of them were confident public speakers, others
more nervous but they were not naive or inarticulate. I would argue
that in comparison with a randomly selected group from the wider
community, this group was unusually well equipped to participate in a
public inquiry. If these people found participation difficult, how
would the uninformed, the ignorant, the ill-prepared, and the
inarticulate fare?
The Public Local Inquiry
The inquiry was postponed for two weeks from the original date, June
13th, to give the objectors more time to prepare their case.
Contrary to their expectations, the objectors had raised sufficient
money to employ an advocate as well as a scientific advisor. The
objectors were unwilling to specify the source of their new found
resources or to reveal the identity of their expert witness until he
was due to appear.
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Pre-Inquiry Procedure Meeting
This precursor to the inquiry proper was, until recently (14) a
Scottish experiment. According to the Reporter, the meeting had
three functions, to help parties focus on what were likely to be the
main issues, to exchange productions of evidence and to arrange a
provisional timetable to avoid the lengthy retention of experts and
to allow objectors to plan their participation.
The Reporter opened the meeting by describing what the
procedure at the inquiry would be, establishing those parties who
would be appearing, negotiating a timetable and making general
observations. The meeting passed fairly smoothly with the objectors
requesting further adjournments, the instigation of a Planning




The Dean of Faculty of Advocates, an advocate, a firm of solicitors
For Esso Chemical
A Q.C., an advocate, a firm of solicitors
Local Authorities
For Fife Region and Dunfermline District Councils
A Q.C., and an advocate
For Kirkcaldy District Council
A Q.C.
(14) S.I. 1976 no 721 recommended the introduction of a pre-inquiry
procedure meeting in English Highway Inquiries.
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For the Forth Ports Authority
The Secretary
Objectors
For the Dalgety Bay and Aberdour Joint Action Group and Aberdour
Golf Club
An advocate and several members of the Joint Action Group
For the Conservation Society
The Secretary and Chairman of the local branch
For the Forth Yacht Clubs Association and Aberdour Regatta
Committee
Two members
For Mrs. F. Witaker St. Colme House
A Q.C. and a firm of solicitors
For Donibristle Investments
The Secretary
For Gray Park Residents
A solicitor
Evidence
Shell Expro called 6 witnesses, Esso Chemical 5 witnesses there
were an additional 5 witnesses common to both companies. Messrs
Cremer and Warner, an independent consultancy, appeared as authors
of a report commissioned by the local authorities. The Health and
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Safety Executive provided 2 witnesses, the Forth Ports Authority one
witness, the local authorities seven, the Joint Action Group five,
the Conservation Society three, the Forth Yacht Clubs two, the Gray
Park residents two. In addition there were statements of evidence
made by twenty other individual objectors. Though it might appear
from this that the objectors played a large part in the inquiry,
their evidence took up very little time in comparison with the
applicant companies. They did, however, take up a good deal of time
in cross-examination.
The inquiry
The Inquiry was held in the courtroom in the offices of
Dunfermline District Council in Dunfermline. The room had a high
ceiling and large windows running along each side wall. The judges'
bench where the Reporter, his Assessor and his clerk sat, and whence
witnesses gave their evidence was raised a few feet above the florr
level and was constructed in a light wood in a modern design.
On the first day the room was packed as it was on the last
day. Apart from those two days there were always plenty empty seats
on the public benches though the rest of the room was well filled
and quite cramped. The room became very warm and stuffy especially
in the afternoon and quite frequently some participants seemed to
have difficulty staying awake.
On a normal day the proceedings would begin at 9.30 and end at
4.30 with a 10 minute coffee break in the moring and one hour for
lunch. On Fridays the inquiry ended at 1.00 p.m.
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The first day began with the evidence and cross-examination of
the Shell policy witness, a very senior executive. There was almost
an exciting atmosphere, with much comment and movement from the
public benches which made it difficult to hear the witness. Most of
the objectors showed their nervousness in their cross-examination.
In the afternoon, the public benches were almost empty and the
inquiry settled into what was to become its regular almost soporific
procedure with the evidence of Shell's second witness.
Though the first morning session was untypical of the inquiry
as a whole, it presented a stereotypical picture of what a public
inquiry ought to be like from the point of view of "an angry local
objector". The witness for the developers, a very senior executive,
a decision-maker rather than a representative, was there to
justify his decisions in the face of cross-examination from local
objectors. The language and the issues were not technical; this was
the moral centre of the inquiry. For the majority of those in the
public benches, these were the questions and answers with which the
inquiry ought to be concerned. This was democracy in action, the
"little man" putting the multinational company on the spot. "Why did
the development have to be bult here? What about the safety of their
children? Had the whole deal not been "carved-up" already behind the
scenes with central and local government?"
In the afternoon session, most of the public had disappeared, a
technical witness was on the stand and the cross-examination was
being performed by an advocate. The normal procedures of the
inquiry had taken over.
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How can we account for the "theatricality" of the first
session. There were good reasons for Shell beginning their case
with a general statement of policy covering all aspects of the
devopment from a senior executive, before the very detailed
examination of the design of the plant. It paints a picture of the
whole development for the Reporter and the media and for the public in
general, and performs a public relations task, explaining how the
interests of Shell coincide with those of the general public in ensuring
efficient exploitation of the resources from the North Sea.
The Action Group organised a good turnout of local objectors
for the first session to attract media attention and demonstrate the
strength of their support.
Thus the first session of the inquiry was treated by both
"sides" as an opportunity for a public display of strength,
organised largely with the media in mind. Ironically, as I will
show later, the evidence and cross-examination at this session was
largely irrelevant in terms of the Reporter's final Report. In
Chapter 7 I will examine the extent to which the Action Group were
aware of the gap between the symbolic importance of this first
session and its relative insignificance for the practical outcome of
the inquiry.
Shell concluded their evidence on the fifth day and Esso
Chemical began their evidence. With a few exceptions most of the
witnesses precognitions had been circulated in advance, so the
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normal procedure was for the advocate to note any late changes in
the precognition and sometimes to run through the main points,
before the Reporter invited cross-examination. He always did this
in the same order which resulted in an "in-joke"; the Reporter asked
the Esso Q.C. if he wished to cross-examine a "friendly" witness and
the Esso Q.C. paused, rose, intoned "No questions, Sir" in a serious
voice, and sat down. There was general amusement at this repartee.
Normally a witness faced "friendly" cross-examination if any, first,
(15)
then hostile cross-examination. Unless time was consideration, an
advocate took precedence over a lay participant in cross-examination
but it was generally left up to the Action Group to decide their own
order of cross-examination.
Esso Chemical finished their evidence on the tenth day of the
inquiry, though half a day had been taken up during this time, by
the Forth Ports Authority. Cremer and Warner took just over a day,
the Health and Safety Executive just under a day, the Local
Authorities two days interrupted for half a day by the Action
Groups's expert witness, the Conservation Society and the Action
Group shared a day and a half, individual objectors took up half a
day and the closing speeches took up the remaining day and a half.
The transcript of the inquiry runs to some 3,500 foolscap pages of
typescript, the final Report some 400 pages. In all, the Inquiry
lasted 18 days (including 3 half days) and this was considerably
less than the Reporter's original estimation based on his experience
at Peterhead where Shell were still giving evidence in the third
(15) A further example of informality as analysed in the next chapter.
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week of the inquiry. (16)
The Issues
As future chapters tend to concentrate on particular issues,
this section is intended to give a brief idea of the content of the
inquiry.
The applicant companies spent about half the inquiry
describing, in great detail, the plans for the development. They
also put forward arguments that the development was in the national
economic interest and countered possible objections by claiming that
there was evidence to show that the plant would present an
acceptable level of risk, an insignificant threat to the environment
and no problems of noise and pollution. Their planning witness also
claimed Braefoot Bay was the only possible site for the development
in Scotland.
The three "independent expert bodies", Cremer and Warner, the
Health and Safety Executive and the Forth Ports Authority, made some
technical criticisms of the applicants' plans, some of which were
later drafted into planning conditions put forward by the Local
Authorities. The latter appeared to defend their reasons for
approving the application. The objectors, apart from cross-
examining the undermentioned witnesses at some length, also put
forward evidence and arguments on their own account. In general
(16) In other words, this inquiry was very much quicker due largely
to the efficient organisation of the advance circulation of
precognitions of evidence. This meant that evidence did not
have to be led in the inquiry. This could be interpreted as
an aid to lay participation.
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they claimed that the development posed an unacceptable level of
risk to the community that it would destroy the lcoal environment
and remove its amenity value, and that it was the wrong sort of
economic stimulus for the area. The Objectors from the Forth Yacht
Clubs were concerned to negotiate assurances that the annual
Aberdour Regatta would be allowed to proceed without interference,
the most contentious single topic was safety and I will look no more
closely at the controversy in Chapter 6.
The Objectors
I have described the growth of the Joint-Action Group as they
prepared for the public inquiry. I now want to enumerate the objectors
who appeared at the inquiry.
Objections were maintained at the inquiry by several groups and
individuals. The owner of St. Colme House was represented at the
inquiry by a Q.C. who attempted to negotiate compensation from the
applicants for his client as her house was the nearest dwelling to
the development at Braefoot Bay. The Company secretary appeared for
the company largely responsible for building Dalgety Bay,
Donibristle Investments. Two lay members represented the
Conservation Society, and two lay members represented the Forth
Yacht Clubs. A solicitor represented the Gray Park residents. They
took no part in the cross-examination during the inquiry, only
appearing very briefly at the end of the inquiry to give their
evidence.
The main objectors were the Dalgety Bay/Aberdour Joint Action
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Group, who were represented by an advocate and a fluctuating number
of their members. Since the Q.C. for St. Colme House rarely appeared
at the inquiry, the Action- Group advocate shouldered the bulk of
the cross-examination, and generally was the first "objector" called
to cross-examine a witness. The lay objectors from the Joint Action
Group, the Forth Yacht Clubs and Donibristle Investments usually
cross-examined each witness and for the purposes of this thesis are
classed together as "the lay objectors".
There did not seem to be a rigid division of labour between
counsel's cross-examination and that of the lay objectors, though in
general, the lay objectors spent more time in the cross-examination
of policy witnesses or safety witnesses while the advocate was
entrusted with most of the detailed scientific and technical cross-
examination. They usually supplemented each other's cross-
examination, though this often led to repetition. This problem also
occurred through the fluctuating attendance of some objectors e.g.
one member might attend every other day, another only for half an
hour every day, and another for three consecutive days only. This
made it difficult for the objectors to keep up with the evidence.
The objectors Q.C was generally only present at the inquiry when he
was performing cross- examination, he was not in full-time
attendance at the inquiry.
A typical day
At about 9.20 a.m. the room would begin to fill up with
participants taking their seats, exchanging precognitions, sorting
out documents, reading newspapers and chatting to acquaintances.
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There was some social contact amongst the various interests at this
time, particularly amongst the advocates.
The Reporter would start the day's proceedings at 9.30, usually
with some business or procedural matters concerning timetabling or
the availability of witnesses. Then evidence or cross-examination
would continue where it had left off until around 11.00, when a ten
minute coffee-break, (this usually took at least 15 minutes) was
taken. At this time the whole of the inquiry including the
Reporter, the press and members of the public mingled.
Evidence continued until sometime between 12.30 and 1.00 p.m.
when lunch was taken. The Shell/Esso entourage adjourned to the
adjacent hotel, others to nearby pubs and restaurants. Quite a
number of participants favoured a walk in the nearby park, on
occasions it seemed as if half the inquiry were walking around.
The long afternoon session began around 2.00 p.m. and continued
without a break until 4.30 p.m. or occasionally later if e.g. cross-
examination of a witness was almost completed. Often the same witness
would be on the stand for most of the day, sometimes one
representative's cross-examination would go on for three hours or
more. it was only towards the end of the inquiry when the objectors
were giving evidence and there was little cross-examination from the




The analysis of the inquiry which follows in the next 4
chapters gives little idea of the atmosphere of the inquiry, of what
it was like to be there. I now want to set out some of the features
of the inquiry which I found most striking, in my daily
observations. This information will be important in the more
general discussions of lay participation below.
Perhaps the most startling "seen but unnoticed" feature of the
(17)
inquiry was the atmosphere of almost friendly co-operation and
conciliation which dominated the inquiry. I found this remarkable
in view of the anger, deterr- mination and emotion shown by the
objectors before the inquiry. During the inquiry there were only
rare outbursts of anger or passionate questioning from the
objectors. I had expected more. Quite apart from the detached
professionalism of the advocates and experts, the lay objectors gave
a surprising display of calm co-operation and cool objectivity.
Their only concession to their feelings seemed to be the occasional
resort to irony, a popular rhetorical device frequently used by the
advocates.
The inquiry at times took on the atmosphere of a committee of
arbitration: each side negotiating concessions from the other,
dealing in the minutiae of applications, moving towards a consensus
solution. This was particularly noticeable in the behaviour of the
Yacht Club objectors. Though these people were also part of the
(17) Garfinkel 1967.
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Action-Group and associated themselves, sometimes actively, with the
Group's participation, they concentrated on negotiating with the
applicant companies, to retain the right to hold their annual
regatta. They behaved as if the development had already been
permitted and were only concerned that their interests were not
ignored by the companies.
This amicable "business-like" atmosphere contrasts with the basic
adversary system underpinning the organisation and procedures of the
inquiry. Following the traditions of the adversary procedure, witnesses
appeared according to their allegiance, were cross-examined and were
then, almost certainly, finished with the inquiry. Though logically
the inquiry is about the collection of information on various
(18)
topics, it is organised along the lines of the adversary system, that
is, according to "sides" rather than issues. In this system you
either support the development or you are against the development.
Thus a formal system originally adopted to settle a dispute between
parties usually involving a point of law has been carried over into a
fact-finding commission hearing evidence from a number of parties who
do not fall neatly into two camps. One of the most important results
of this is that the "issue-centred" nature of the inquiry is obscured.
I argue later that the dominant group (Reporter, lawyers, experts)
approach the inquiry in this way but this approach is not made
explicitly available to the objectors, nor does it become apparent
(19)
during the course of the inquiry.
(18) I argue in Chapters 4,5 and 6 that the Reporter sees the inquiry
in this way and operates accordingly. I also argued in Chapter 2
that this is the bureaucratic "function" of the inquiry.
(19) Both the OCPU and PERG proposals discussed in Chapter 1 suggest that
inquiries ought to be organised by issues rather than parties.
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The lay participant experiences the inquiry as a succession of
witnesses. How does he decide what the "issues" of the inquiry are?
How does he recognise that certain witnesses give evidence on the
same issue? In addition, the layman has to be able to understand
complex technical evidence if he intends to participate effectively,
(see Chapter 7) I would argue that these difficulties partially
account for the boredom expressed by many of the lay objectors during
the inquiry. I would maintain that for much of the time the
objectors were bored because they did not fully understand what was
happening at the inquiry. The advance circulation of written
precognitions of evidence meant that cross-examination was difficult
to follow and understand if you hadn't read the precognition, and
there were rarely enough to go round, despite the efforts of the
Reporter. The advocates' cross-examination was often so precise and
concise that it was difficult to know what points he was trying to
make and whether or not he was successful. Evidence was technical
and each witness spoke to his own expertise and would not comment on
matters outside that e.g. questions such as "Do you think this plant
ought to be constructed close to people's homes?" "What would you
think if you lived in Aberdour?" which were fairly frequently asked
by objectors. As I will argue later (see Chapter7), it seems to me
that the dominant group and the objectors have very different
methods of participating in the inquiry and very different notions of
the aims and functions of an inquiry. The dominant group have the
power to enforce their definitions as official without ever
articulating or making publicly available, these definitions. As a
result effective lay participation becomes extremely difficult.
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After the Inquiry
The Reporter produced a Report in two parts. Part 1 which was
circulated around the participants for their comments, consisted of
a summary of evidence and the Reporter's findings of "fact", and
Part II, the Reporter's conclusions and recommendations. This
Report was lodged with the Secretary of State for Scotland awaiting
his decision.
Since then, the objectors attempted to have the inquiry
reopened because of new evidence they claimed to have found. This
evidence was submitted to the Secretary of State who made
investigations and decided that the evidence did not help him in
coming to a decision. However there was long delay, as yet
unexplained by the Scottish Office, before a decision was finally
taken by the Conservative Secretary of State in November 1979, that
the development should go ahead. This decision was made over 2
years after the end of the inquiry. The Action Group appealed
against this decision to the Court of Session on the grounds that
the Secretary of State had exceeded his powers and had acted
unconstitutionally. The Court rejected the appeal in February 1980,
awarding costs against the Action Group,who announced their
intention to take their case to the European Court of Justice.
The bulk of this chapter has consisted of descriptions of the
participants, the issues and the general conduct of the Moss Moran
inquiry. I argued that the very fact of holding a public inquiry draws
together a group of activists who will "represent" the rest of the
community in an Action Group which will participate in the inquiry.
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The vast majority of local people accept the proposed
development and/or the public inquiry (if they know about either) as
legitimate at least in as much as they do not either become
politically involved themselves or give active support to the Action
Group. I am not concerned in this study with legitimation as it
affects this community.
I concentrate here on the participation in the public inquiry
of the lay objectors (most of whom were members of the Action
Group). These people were activists, and though sceptical of the
inquiry process, they had expectations for their participation. I
describe and explain how they were able to maintain their
contradictions throughout the inquiry: how they managed to
participate vigorously and with purpose when all the time they had
grave doubts that there was any point to their participation.
In the following four chapters I present an analysis of the
conduct of the inquiry which demonstrates some of the ways in which
legitimation operates through social practices.
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CHAPTER 4
The Reporter 1 - the control of procedures
A quotation from the transcript of the final day of the inquiry.
Reporter - "We seem to be kind to each other today in this end of term
feeling and it is my turn to say thank-you. At the
procedure meeting an estimate of evidence indicated an
inquiry running to 5 or 6 weeks and it is due to the
efforts of all parties, the Applicants, the Local
Authorities, and the objectors that we have completed these
proceedings in 4 weeks.
And I look upon it as an important aspect of my job to
help all parties to present their case as effectively and
as economically as possible both in time as well as in
money.
And the presentation of so much written evidence in
advance has not only reduced the length of the hearing
but it has also enabled all parties to be better informed
before they come along to hear evidence, so that cross-
examination has therefore been shorter and more to the
point than might otherwise have been the case. Without
this cooperation I would really have had a much more
difficult inquiry on my hands....On the whole it has been
I would not say a pleasant inquiry but it has been a
business like inquiry."
Objector: "Mr. Bell, as co-chairman of the Action Group I should like
to add my appreciation of the very fair, patient and
sympathetic way in which you have conducted this inquiry.lt
must have come as some relief to you that we have not found
it necessary to revert to such tactics as chaining
ourselves to items of furniture or to drown the proceedings
inshouts of "Ban the Braefoot Bomb."
In the "descriptive" account of the inquiry in the last
chapter, I tried to give a general impression of the main issues of
the inquiry and an idea of what happened at the inquiry and what it
was like to be there. I now want to look at the day to day
procedures of the inquiry in more detail. In this chapter I look at
the way in which the Reporter defines procedural "informality",
i.e. how he exercises his responsibility of encouraging lay
participation. This is his responsibility to "democracy" as I argued
in Chapter 2. The following two chapters will deal with his
"bureaucratic" responsibility the collection of relevant facts in
- 112 -
order to construct his final Report and in particular the findings
of fact.
Of course these twin responsibilities are only analytically
separable, in practice they affect each other all the time. For
example a Reporter who concerns himself too much with the efficient
collection of information risks dissatisfaction amongst the
objectors who need to feel that their participation is worthwhile.
In this chapter and the following two, I describe the balance
between these two functions that the Reporter constructed in the
Moss Moran inquiry.
As stated in the introduction; I share with the
ethnomethodologists, an interest in the methods and procedures
employed by actors to construct social reality. I see the inquiry
as a process consisting of the work of the participants. Thus its
existence is not something mundane, to be taken for granted, but
rather a serious problem worthy of examination. How is the inquiry
organised? How do participants produce particular statements and
questions? How do they know when to speak? The basic question is
really "How is society possible?" i.e. how can we account for
repetition, pattern and predictability in social life?
Social actions actually construct social reality but they do so
within the process of structuration, (Giddens 1976) that is to say
that they produce and reproduce social structures. My project is to
examine how certain structures are reproduced in the action of the
inquiry. This enables us to see how power is transmitted e.g. how,
in practice, one mode of participation is privileged over another,
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and how the exercise of power is legitimated, again in the day to
day procedures of the inquiry.
I start by examining the cetnral role of the Reporter in the
inquiry. I argue that he has very wide discretion to direct
procedure during the inquiry and to select and order information for
the final Report. This chapter deals with his control and
direction of the procedures during the inquiry.
I have suggested that legislation on inquiry procedure has
concentrated on procedures before and after the inquiry, leaving
what happens during the inquiry to the discretion of the Reporter.
SDD circular 14/1975 contains the most recent set of instructions to
the Reporter on the conduct of public local inquiries. Does this
document give any directive to the Reporter as to how the daily
procedure of the inquiry ought to be organised? The contents of the
circular are not detailed procedural rules, but suggestions as to
how the inquiry ought to be conducted, e.g.
The Circular states that in general.
"It is important that the inquiry serves
efficiently as a means of open
investigation of the issues to be
considered in arriving at a proper balance
between the various competing interests."
This doesn't really give much more indication of how the
procedure ought to be conducted. What do "efficently", "open" and
"proper balance" mean? Who decides which "issues" are to be
considered?
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If the Reporter was guided by this statement and he made it
clear early in the inquiry that he intended to follow the
suggestions of Circular 14, then we can only establish its precise
meaning in this context by looking at his final report and his
conduct of the inquiry. The Reporter was satisfied with the inquiry
at the end (see Chapter 5); I take this to mean that he must have
felt reasonably satisfied that the inquiry had been "open, balanced
and efficient" and that it had considered the 'correct' issues.
The Circular also directs the Reporter's attention to several
particular issues.
(1) The inquiry should ensure the fullest possible explanation
of the applicants' proposals.
(2) As far as possible, documents and precognitions of evidence
were to be circulated amonst the parties in advance.
(3) Repetitious cross-examination was to be avoided.
(4) The Reporter was reminded that his role was both directive
and inquisitorial.
(5) The Reporter was to encourage
"the maximum informality of procedure so
that the ordinary interested person does
not feel inhibited from making a
contribution without professional
representation."
(6) The principal means of testing evidence should be cross-
examination.
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Finally the Circular stresses the need for informality,
avoiding, where possible, formal procedures and terminology,
suggesting that the Reporter in regulating procedure, be guided by
the principles of "openness, fairness and impartiality".
The Reporter himself, talked about his role on several
occasions during the inquiry. He said he always kept in the
forefront of his mind the question "What is before the Secretary of
State?" i.e. What question does the Secretary of State have to
answer. As I argued in Chapter one, the presumption that Government
policy counts as a fact narrows this question to "Should these
applicants be permitted to build this particular development on
this particular site?", but there are still no criteria specified
for selecting information on which a decision can be made. This is
concerned with the Reporter's fact finding role and will be dealt
with in the next Chapter.
The Reporter made two other comments on his function. He
claimed it was his duty,
" to help all the parties to present
their case as effectively and as
economically as possible both in time as
well as money."
A further statement came in response to an interjection from an objector.
Objector: - "Is there any point in having a lot of recommendations
if that is all they are, recommendations? Unless there
is some sort of mechanism to make the applicants abide
by them?"
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Reporter: - "Well the public inquiry is the forum where not only the
recommendations of these consultants but the expert
evidence of other parties as well is put forward and
tested, and rt is my job at the end of the day as a
seeker after truth to weigh up the respective merits
of these recommendations, and if I am minded to
recommend approval to the Secretary of State then take
account of these recommendations as well. Sometimes,
because of lack of detail it is not possible for a
Reporter to recommend specific conditions. Instead he
will recommend the aim which conditions ought to be
framed to meet, if I could put it that way, and that is
the fairly normal practice. The fact that some people
have rejected or discounted recommendations of these
consultants doesn't mean that they will necessarily be
ignored."
Circular 14 still leaves the conduct of the inquiry i.e. the
day to day procedures to be adopted, to the discretion of the
Reporter. Of his two major functions, the circular emphasises the
need for him to use his directive role to maintain "the maximum
informality of procedure", while the Reporter tends to give
precedence to his fact finding role, "a seeker after truth" Chapter
5 will deal with the latter role, the rest of this chapter will
focus on the Reporter's control over the procedures.
I want to emphasise here that there are few public rules
governing the procedures during the public inquiry. I described in
Chapter 2 how "law" could be divided into three concepts, legal
rhetoric, legal rules and institutional practices. The Reporter
has the discretionary control over the procedural conduct of the
inquiry. He is governed by very few legal rules and by rather
more rhetorical exhertations. My purpose here is to describe how
the rhetoric appears (or not) in the social practices of the
inquiry.
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The procedure followed at the inquiry was the adversary
procedure habitually used in courts of law. The evidence of a
witness was led by one side, the witness was cross-examined by the
opposition and re- examined by "his" advocate. The applicants and
those supporting them put their case first followed by independent
assessors and lastly the objectors.
In what sense can the adversary procedure be described as
informal? What does "the maximum informality of procedure" mean?
According to circular 14, the point of this "informality" is to
enable lay objectors to make a contribution without professional
representation. In other words an "informal" procedure is intended
to allow laymen to participate with the lawyers, not necessarily on
equal terms but on more equal terms. The basic formality of the
adversary procedure is to be modified to make lay participation
easier.
The logical expression of "informality" would seem in idealist
terms to be to allow laymen to put their arguments on the inquiry in
any way they liked and to ask any questions which they considered
relevant. Here we come up with the notion of "proper balance" and
with the tensions felt by the Reporter in his conduct of the
inquiry. He has to ensure "openness and informality" to encourage
and enable lay participation. He is to make the inquiry as
efficient and effective as possible in terms of time and money. He
has to collect, sift and present evidence in the form of his
"findings of fact" on which the Secretary of State can base his
decision. These aims are mutually contradictory, e.g. if the
inquiry was to be completely informal and objectors were allowed to
- 118 -
say what they liked when they liked, the inquiry would take longer
and cost more and he might find his fact finding duties more
difficult. Similarly if the inquiry was run very formally, like a
court, objectors might not be able to participate and feel
aggrieved, thus creating a problem of legitimation.
In his "democratic role" the Reporter reproduces the rhetorical
intentions of lay participation i.e. the extension of democracy,
the opportunity for ordinary people to take part in decisions which
affect their lives. Objectors expect this opportunity to be
"meaningful". In some way they must feel that the inquiry is
operated justly and fairly and that the Reporter is heeding their
arguments. In his bureaucratic role, his function is to test and
collect relevant facts in an fast and efficient manner. This is part
of the technical rational organisation of society. (Habermas 1971)
Bankowski and Mungham (Bankowsi and Mungham 1978) describe this
tension as the gap between democracy and efficiency. The demands of
"democracy" for lay people to be able to put forward their
arguments and have their say in an unrestriced manner, pull in the
opposite direction to the bureaucratic and professional demands for
the inquiry to be efficient in terms of time, cost and outcome.
Bankowski and Mungham describe this as an "unbridgeable gap". It is
my intention in this study is to describe the nature of the gap in
such as way that the possibilities for political change can be
examined. (see chapter 8)
Thus we have to look at the Reporter's words and actions, in
the inquiry, to discover how he interpreted "maximum informality of
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procedure", and at how he maintained a balance between formal and
informal procedures.
Like any text, the language of circular 14 is indexical, that
is, the words only have meaning in particular context. Thus "free",
"open" and "informal" only have meaning in the practice of what
happens during the inquiry. In terms of the discussion in the
first two chapters this is an examination of the gaps between the rhetoric
of law, the public rules of law and their practical application in
the inquiry, (see Chapter 2) "Openness fairness and impartiality"
came from the Franks Report, "the maximum informality of procedure"
from circular 14, both are rhetorical claims in the sense that they
refer to public notions of justice, democratic participation,
freedom etc. without specifying the precise procedures by which
these principles are going to be practised. The operationalisation
of these principles is at the discretion of the Reporter and I have
argued that these compete with a variety of other aims which the
Reporter has to try to satisfy to maintain his professional
standards. The Reporter is a central figure at the inquiry and has
control over the procedure thus it is his operational definition of
"informality" which has meaning in that it is imposed on the other
participants and affects their actions.
I want to look now at how the Reporter controls the procedures
of the inquiry. I need to have definitions of "formality" and
"informality" with which to work. "Informality" is used in
circular 14 and once or twice by the Reporter himself - but neither
of these uses tell us what constitutes informality.
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For the purposes of the following analysis "formality" will
refer to those instances where the Reporter insists on conformity to
the adversary procedures of the court and "informality" to those
instances where the former are relaxed by the Reporter. I will
argue that the Reporter has to mediate amongst the contradictory
aims which he is expected to achieve and that "informality"
coincides, for him, with helping the lay objectors to participate
and allowing them to have their say. "Formality" for the Reporter
lies in his needs to collect information, avoid delays and preserve
orderly procedures.
One should not assume that the distinction between formal and
informal is equivalent to that between legal and non-legal, thought
his may be the case so far as the practices of the Reporter are
concerned. For example there is no logical reason why lay
participation might not be aided by formal, non-legal procedures
e.g. in some sort of lay seminar, or why informal legal procedures
might not aid lay participation. I do not make the assumption that
all "formality" inhibits lay participation, nor that "real informal
participation" would imply that objectors could say what they liked
when they liked. Social life is ordered in complex ways. I have
argued that we cannot even make general statements about how formal
rules work without examining the way these rules appear to operate
in social practice. I do not want to consider the logical
possibilities of arrangements of ideal type concepts, the aim of my
analysis is to examine how, in practice, the Reporter organises the
procedures of the inquiry and to locate the criteria on which he
bases his decisions. I can then examine the extent to which his
practices influence or inhibit lay participation. Thus I make no
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prior judgements about the constitutive effects of formal or
informal, legal or non legal procedures but rather I want to look at
the relationship between the routine social practices of the
participants in the inquiry and the procedural guidelines available
(as well as to broader social and ideological structures).
I will now look at several examples from the transcript which
demonstrate the nature of the balance drawn by the Reporter between
formal and informal procedures.
In example (A) the Reporter acts on the assumption that the
taking of oaths is an unnecessary increase of formality. He does
not expect this relaxation to affect the truth-value of the
evidence presented to him. This is an example where the
informality is supposed to aid lay participation by creating a more
relaxed atmosphere than a courtroom while not affecting the
Reporter's fact-finding duty.
(A)
1.17. Reporter - "I should make it clear also that I do not wish to
over formalise the proceedings by putting
witnesses on oath but I expect to get truthful
evidence whether witnesses are on oath or not".
The following, relatively trivial, example shows that the
Reporter is conscious that there may be a formal atmosphere, similar
to a courtroom, in the inquiry, or at least that it is possible that
some participants might feel a courtroom atmosphere. I noted above
that (see Chapter 1) several critics had commented on this
"courtroom atmosphere" of a public inquiry. This invitation by the




7.1168. Reporter - "Before we start I would just make an
announcement, as you are all aware, Public
Inquiries are a less rigid art form that a Court
of Law and in these weather conditions if you all
wish to remove your jackets, please do so."
While the previous extracts have been examples of the extension
of informality the next is an example of a maintenance of formality
which acts to restrict lay participation.
(C)
Reporter - "In fairness (Mr. Grant), this is not as strict as a
Court of Law but really this information should have
been put before the technical witnesses who were giving
evidence, like Cremer and Warner, and it is unfortunate
that you didn't equip Dr. Edmunds with this information
to put these questions this morning."
The objector has put a question to one witness when the
Reporter considers that the question should have been addressed to
another witness who could have given "best evidence". The principle
of "best evidence" avoids duplication of evidence and cross-
examination and is supposeed to ensure that the Reporter gets the
evidence of the most qualified witness on any topic. In this case,
this particular witness was not the recognised expert on the field,
he was a local politician and thus the Reporter was not interested
in his evidence on this topic. At one moment the Reporter asserts
the greater informality of a public inquiry but goes on to state
that this behaviour is too informal and impedes him his role as
"seeker after truth". This restricts lay participation because it
imposes restraints. In this case the objector would have to know
which witness was regarded as the most expert on his particular
topic and attend the inquiry at that time. The first piece of
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information would not necessarily be available, he might find that
that particular witness had already completed his evidence. I
describe in Chapter 4 the practical difficulties faced by the
objectors in regularly attending the inquiry.
In the next extract (D), the Reporter interrupts a lay
objectors cross examination to instruct him on the discipline of
cross-examination. The objector makes three mistakes: he gives
evidence himself, during cross-examination, he interprets the
witness's remarks instead of allowing the witness to explain what he
himself means and he inserts value-laden assumptions ("pouring",
"uplift the quality" and "backward") without allowing the witness to
comment on them. The Reporter tried to tell him how to conduct
cross-examination and though by the end of the inquiry, this
particular objector had become more proficient, in this instance he
quickly terminated his cross-examination.
D
Reporter - I think you are giving evidence again and interpreting what he
says. Give the witness a chance to explain what he means
by it and you can then follow up if you feel he hasn't
given the correct answer.
Objector - Fair enough, I will simply say briefly that these
employees that you are pouring in as new trade people
to uplift the quality of a backward people
Reporter - No, no, really you give us so many throw-away assumptions
that unless the witness is noting them as he goes along
he isn't going to be in a position to answer the
questions.
Objector - I am sorry.
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Reporter - Those who are unfamiliar with the discipline of cross-
examination because it is a discipline - do tend to tell
a wee story before they come round to the question. So
if we could ask the witness to react to this statement
and say what he means and then you can come back on him.
I am not trying to protect the witness from you.
This is another example of the Reporter describing the limits
of informality. He operates on the assumption that the formal
principles of cross-examination are required to produce useful
evidence. Only one point should be made in each question, i.e. if
the witness is required to react to an assumption made by the
questioner, this ought to be done by the witness, any assumption
should be agreed between the witness and the questioner. This
presents the Reporter with a set of concise points whose factuality
and relevance he can then assess. He does not see his job as an
interpreter, he collects facts and does not construct facts by
making assumptions, thus he expects cross-examination to provide him
with facts.
This insistence on the formal procedures of cross-examination
(See Chapter 7 for a discussion of how the lay objectors dealt with
the techniques of cross-examination), increases formality and
restricts lay participation. It must hamper the layman's free
expression to be required to put his questions into particular
forms, a technique which for the lawyer, is regular and virtually
automatic.
The next extract concerns an objector who has not been able to
keep up with the evidence and asks questions which have already been
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answered. He becomes very heated in his questioning to an extent
that would probably attract censure in a courtroom. (e.g. the
threat of being in contempt of court) the Reporter, however shows
much sympathy with the objector's predicament and is content with a
mild reprimand. Though he prevents the witness from continuing in
the same vein, he does not invoke any formal sanctions. The breach
of formality is allowed to pass. The Reporter can be seen as
encouraging lay participation by treating the breach in a
sympathetic manner and by not trying to exercise his authority
strongly.
E
Objector: - "In paragraph 2.2 of your precognition you say that
investigation was made of all potential sites on the
east coast of Scotland. I wonder if you would explain to
me why it was limited to the east coast of Scotland?"
Witness: - "I think this was covered in earlier evidence, but my
understanding as a marine man, we were given a remit
which was to look towards a suitable location on the
east coast."
Objector: - "Well I have not been here all the time personally, I
would like to have heard your view?"
Witness: - "I am sorry I am not the person to speak about where the
pipeline will land."
Objector: - "We get this time and again that each witness that comes
from the company, that there is some aspect that you
can't speak about, it is somebody else's problem. None
of you seem to be able to give a straight answer on the
whole range of your subject. You are concerned with the
marine aspect, you don't seem to be able to speak to
all of it, it is somebody else that will speak to that.
Every single one that comes gives that answer they have
passed the buck to somebody else. Now who can answer
the question?"
Reporter: - "There are witnesses who have been here who have
answered the question."
Objector: - "Well I did not hear it, I must confess. I am not often
here or I may not have picked up the point, I am sorry."
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Reporter: - "I appreciate your difficulty in not being able to
attend every day, but you should not vent your anger on
this witness."
Objector: - "I am sorry, it is not personal to the witness."
Reporter: - "Who so far has not been evasive. You would be quite
entitled to anger if he gets evasive within his own
field. I would have hoped that your colleagues could
have kept you abreast of what is going on. It is a
difficult situation for people who have a job of work to
do as well."
Objector: - "Quite that is the problem in a nutshell."
This extract also raises an interesting effect of the policy of
"best evidence". For the Reporter, insisting on "best evidence",
i.e. accepting only the evidence of the most qualified expert on
each particular topic, saves a great deal of duplication both of
evidence and cross-examination and this makes the inquiry faster and
cheaper. The lay objectors, as in this instance, often had problems
caused by this policy. Because of their relative lack of
specialised or technical knowledge they sometimes weren't sure which
witness ought to answer certain questions so they either asked
questions of the wrong witness and were instructed to reserve those
questions for later, or they asked questions after the relevant
witness had completed his evidence possibly due to the fact that
they could not attend the inquiry every day and had difficulty
keeping up to date with the evidence.




Reporter: - "With the number of parties taking part in this inquiry
there is a great risk of endless scope for repetitive
cross-examination and this doesn't help me and it
doesn't really help parties in the end of the day and
it is my intention to be fairly strict on restricting
cross- examination. For instance when Shell and Esso
are giving evidence I would not expect them to be cross-
examining each-other's witnesses nor would I expect the
Local Authority to be cross-examining these witnesses
unless in the area which may well remain in dispute,
which is the area of the Planning Conditions which the
Local Authorities would wish to compose. Cross-
examination should truly be cross-examination not a
further echo in support of the witness's earlier
statement. Similarly when we come to the objectors'
case being presented I would not expect all the other
body of objectors to be cross-examining the witnesses of
the main objectors."
In this extract the Reporter outlines the procedures to be
followed in cross-examination and indicates that he intends to
restrict repetitive cross-examination on the grounds that it wastes
the time and money of all the participants without providing him
with any new factual information. The Reporter admitted that he had
allowed "a fair number of repetitive questions to be put" but he
regularly interrupted the inquiry to restrict repetitive cross-
examination as the following extracts show.
4.818 - Reporter - A. "I fully understand the importance of this
line of cross- examination to your clients
but I think I have been more than patient in
allowing a fair amount of repetitive
questions to be put, I thinkyou have been
covering a lot of this ground already
today".
4.870 - Reporter - B. "I don't want to restrict your cross-
examination but I think this is a subject
that is very familiar to all of us from your
advocate's cross-examination yesterday and
this morning". (Said to an objector who was
cross-examining the same witness as the
Action Group advocate in the previous
extract.)
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6.1015 C. To the same Objector.
Reporter - "I am conscious that your line of cross-
examination is very repetetive. It is very
difficult to try and split your personality,
but in as much as you are co-chairman of the
Joint Action Group, I am expecting you to be
instructing the advocate on behalf of the
Joint Action Group and leaving only for
yourself the areas surrounding Barnes
Cottage and the outlook which you wish to
preserve otherwise I am giving the Joint
Aciton Group a double opportunity of cross-
examination" .
Objector - "I am conscious of that and I am trying to
avoid repetition but I am of course an
individual objector not only in relation to
Barnes Cottage, to protect that, but the
environment as a whole".
Reporter - "I am very anxious to avoid for all
concerned at this inquiry repetitive cross-
examination, and if you can assist me in
that I will be grateful".
6.1017 D. and again the same objector....
Reporter - "I think again we are getting a bit
repetitive here, I think it might assist you
to know that as far as I, as Reporter, am
concerned I consider it a relevant factor to
know what the track record of the company
had been".
E. to Witness
Reporter - "Don't keep repeating yourself. You stand
up well enough to cross-examination without
having to repeat your points all the time".
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In order to recognise a piece of evidence or cross-examination
as repetitive, any participant must be thoroughly familiar with all
the evidence and cross-examination which has gone before. Thus, the
Reporter's recognition of repetition confirms my earlier remark that
the Reporter was involved with selecting evidence and ascribing
relevance and facticity continuously throughout the inquiry, i.e.
the Report is in an important sense constructed during the inquiry,
not after the inquiry. This provides a striking example of how
social reality is constructed by actors reproducing social
structures. In this instance the Reporter's direction of the inquiry
derives from his attempts to reconcile his conflicting functions.
For the Reporter to make a decision to stop repetiive cross-
examination or to allow an objector to ask "irrelevant" questions,
he must refer to criteria based on his perception of his functions
in the inquiry. This is part of his "professional frame of
reference" which I go on to analyse more fully. It is by reference
to this that the Reporter controls and directs the inquiry and
constructs his final Report.
The very fact that there was so much repetetive cross-
examination during the inquiry from the lay objectors suggests that
they do not have the same familiarity as the Reporter with the
preceding evidence and cross-examination. There are practical
reasons for this such as irregular attendance at the inquiry, lack
of access to a copy of the verbatim transcript, lack of time to do
the necessary reading and so on. In Chapter 7, I will suggest other
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reasons for the Objectors' repetition which is concerned with their
different approach to the inquiry.
What assumptions, then, does the Reporter make about repetitive
cross-examination in relation to lay participation? In extract B (pl29)
below he re-affirms his committment to helping the lay objectors
participate;
"I don't want to restrict your cross-
examination "
However he cannot allow participants to ask questions designed
to elicit information of which the Reporter is already in
possession. Once the Reporter has the information he can decide
whether it is relevant and factual, but he does not need the
information repeated. In the case of repetition, his role of fact¬
finder takes precedence over his role as maintainer of informal
procedures to enable lay participation. The justification for this
is economic; Repetitive cross-examination wastes time and money.
The fact that the questioner may have been unaware of his repetition
(see example E above) becomes irrelevant to the Reporter. He may be
sympathetic but he still exercises his power to control the
procedure and restrict repetitive cross- examination.
This restriction of repetition is also a restriciton of lay
participation. It is an attempt to structure the procedure of the
inquiry in a way that suits the Reporter. He makes the assumption
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that every participant can, or at least should, approach the
inquiry in a similar way to his own. It does not matter
whether they actually do or not. The "professional frame of
reference" which underpins the Reporter's conduct requires that the
inquiry be conducted in a specific way. This is not to say that the
Reporter or anyone else is conscious that the conduct of the inquiry
is tightly structured but this is the effect of the Reporter's
patterned conduct which I interpret as the reproduction of a variety
of structural pressures in which inevitable contradictions are
somehow reconciled.
To go back for a moment to example F. The Reporter uses the
applicant companies and the local authorities as examples. When he
warms the lay objectors about repetitive cross-examination, he
refers to cross-examination of "their own side" i.e. the evidence of
other objectors. However in practice most of the Reporter's
interventions to stop repetitive cross-examination were to stop lay
objectors questioning witnesses from the applicant companies and the
local authorities.
His remarks in example F could be read as a warning to the
objectors. However by addressing his remarks to other parties the
Reporter avoids the accusation of unfairness or victimisation and
attempts to give the impression to the objectors that he is being
even-handed by treating them as at least the equals of counsel for
the applicants and for the local authorities. In other words this
can be seen as another attempt to secure legitimacy.
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I now want to pull these examples and some other comments
together to form a picture of what constituted "the maximum
informality of procedure". I make the assumption that the object of
the Reporter's encouragement of informality is to make lay
participation easier. Whether informalities allowed by the
Reporter actually did make lay participation easier is a question
which this thesis will answer, but I think that my assumption, which
is based on my interpretation of Circular 14, the Reporter's
statements in the inquiry along with observation of the procedure
and analysis of the transcript, is justifiable.
In what ways, then did the Reporter attempt to encourage lay
participation? He did not require the oath to be taken, he
encouraged more informal dress, he excused minor informalities such
as losing one's temper, he tolerated much irrelevant cross-
examination and evidence, as I have suggested in the examples
below. There were many other ways in which the Reporter helped the
lay participants which do not appear in the transcript; he was very
patient with lay objectors' fumbling attempts to phrase some of
their questions, and their sometimes poor diction and voice
projection. He rephrased some of their questions to help them get
the answer he wanted, ensured that any layman who indicated his wish
to speak was given an opportunity to do so, answered some completely
irrelevant questions by a very elderly member of the public, showed
sympathy with the objectors' problems over lack of time and money
and their calls for a Planning Inquiry Commission, and in many other
ways demonstrated his sincere desire to give the lay objectors
assistance and guidance in their participation. (This was
recognised by the objectors.)
- 133 -
I would argue that these efforts by the Reporter to introduce
"informality" into the inquiry are an important part of the
procedures for securing legitimacy for the inquiry. It is not
important whether or not lay participation was made "more effective"
by the Reporter's efforts. Legitimation depends on the perceptions
of the lay objectors. I look closely at their participation in
Chapter 7 and I do not want to pre-empt my arguments there by
introducing them at this stage. However I would argue that through
such demonstrations of the Reporter's good intentions, decency and sensitivity,
that the objectors own beliefs in the absolute justice and fairness
of the inquiry system (and perhaps even the democratic process in
general) were sustained. The rhetorical claims for justice
according to law were reproduced in the inquiry through the personal
characteristics qualities of the Reporter. Although it was part of
his bureaucratic function to support and encourage lay
participation, he required to use personal characteristics which are
typically divorced from the official role of a functionary in order
to do so. In a sense legitimation was secured by a mixture of
charismatic and rational/legal domination. (see chapter 2) By
his personal qualities attached to his official position, the
Reporter was able to reproduce the rhetoric of "openness and
fairness" in the social practices of the inquiry. I discuss this
more fully in Chapter 7.
This emphasis on informal procedures assisting lay
participation conceals an assumption that there exist some formal
procedures which might otherwise operate to restrict lay
participation. In Chapter One I argued that there has always been a
link between the court system and the public inquiry and that the
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adversary procedure has always been common to both. Thus it seems
that in order to enable lay participation, the inquiry has been made
more informal than a court, where laymen very rarely conduct their
own cases. Though the adversary procedure is basic to both, the
atmosphere of the inquiry is very different. The advocates wore
morning dress but not robes or wigs, the rest of the participants
wore suits or more casual clothes. Participants, journalists and
members of the public were constantly entering and leaving the room,
trying to do so quietly but without the exaggerated tiptoeing and
bowing practised in many courtrooms. The inquiry was noticeably
noisier than most courtrooms I have been in. Though the procedure
of the inquiry was dominated by lawyers, numerically laymen, such as
company experts, journalists, civil servants and local authority
executives were in the majority. Before and after the inquiry and
during the intervals there developed a social life of the inquiry
amongst the participants. Groups intermixed to drink coffee, walk
in the park or eat lunch and the atmosphere was cordial if not
friendly. In a courtroom it may be that the officials and lawyers
associate with each other, but it would be rare for defendants and
witnesses to join them.
In these ways then, the inquiry is more "informal" than a
courtroom and the Reporter actively encourages this informality.
Does this mean that the critics accusing the public inquiry of
being overformalised and indistinguishable from a court for most
people, are wrong?
While I would argue that the legislative changes to the
procedural rules, (see chapter 1) have altered the atmosphere of the
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inquiry towards more informality and that the lawyers at the inquiry
certainly saw the procedure as more informal. I think that the
dominance of lawyers, the use of the adversary procedure and the
language of the inquiry still led to it being indistinguishable from
a court of law for most people who probably have very little
experience of either.
Aside from peoples' impressions of what the inquiry felt like,
what balance was maintained between formality and informality and
what effects did any encouragement of informality have?
I would argue that most of the relaxations in the inquiry are
at the level of appearances on the surface of the inquiry. The
absence of oath- taking, the absence of formal dress, the sympathy
with angry objectors, and the Reporter's friendly attitude, may
have relaxed the lay participants, but did it make their
participation more effective and easier? It may have given them
confidence to speak, but did it help them to say the "right" things?
Several of the earlier extracts were examples of the Reporter
restricting informality and maintaining formality. He encouraged
the lay participants to cross-examine and put forward their
arguments but he still controlled how the cross-examination should
proceed and what it should include and exclude. He consistently
insisted on the formal techniques of cross- examination. He would
not accept evidence given when the questioner was meant to be
engaged in cross-examination, discouraged repetitive cross-
examination, insisted on "best evidence", insisted that examiners
allow witnesses to interpret their own remarks, encouraged the "one
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question one piece of information" model of cross-examination and
allowed very little repetitive cross-examination.
Thus the Reproter encouraged an informal atmosphere to develop
in the inquiry and adopted a helpful attitude towards the objectors,
but at the same time he demanded that the formal techniques of
cross-examination be adhered to. These techniques are required to
produce the sort of evidence the Reporter needs. In this form he
can assess its factuality and relevance. Thus the Reporter puts most
weight on his fact finding role - any relaxation of formality must
not interfere with that. His next priority is efficiency; the
saving of time and money. This is the sort of balance that the
Reporter operates, with "informality" of procedure to encourage lay
participation having a lower priority and only allowed to operate on
the surface of the inquiry, (the atmosphere), so that it does not
interfere with the Reporter's central function of fact-finding. Note
that I am not suggesting that the Reporter consciously attaches a
low priority to encouraging lay participation. In fact the
Reporter as an individual could hardly have been more sympathetic
towards the lay objectors. Rather, the ways in which he saw himself
as being able to encourage lay participation restricted
"informality" to the surface of the inquiry while maintaining a
quite precise control of these precedures which most affected the
collection of information.
Summary
This chapter is the first of four which examine how the inquiry
is constructed as a social event through the reproduction of
structures in the social practices of the participants.
- 137 -
This analysis is necessary in order to investigate how
legitimation operates during the course of the inquiry. I want to
explain how it is that the objectors are both sceptical of the
inquiry and at the same time obedient and respectful participants.
I argue that the Reporter has discretionary control over the
procedures during the inquiry. He is constrained by very few public
procedural rules, but is guided by a number of rhetorical
instructions to keep the inquiry open and informal in order to
encourage lay participation.
This "democratic" role which he is encouraged to perform is in
tension with his "technical rational" role i.e. the efficient
collection of relevant facts. I argued that the Reporter reproduced
the rhetorical claims of "openness and fairness" in his personal
attitude towards the objectors and in certain relaxations in the
surface appearances of the inquiry. So long as it did not
substantially interfere with the efficient conduct of his
bureaucratic function, the Reporter made what he considered to be
genuine efforts to encourage lay participation. This substantially
secured legitimation because the objectors responded to his displays
of decency and fairness and believed that they were playing a
significant part in the inquiry.
This then, is the "directive" role of the Reporter and his
interpretation of the "maximum informality of procedure". He
approaches the inquiry with a frame of reference consisting of a set
of guidelines for organising the procedure in the inquiry and
cerain criteria for ascribing facticity and relevance to evidence
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presented to him.
It is these criteria that I go on to examine in the next two
Chapters and I will then discuss the Reporter's "frame of reference"
in more detail. This is crucial in describing the conduct of the
inquiry, both in terms of the constraining influences on the
Reporter and the potential for change.
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CHAPTER 5
The Reporter 2 - the criteria of 'Relevance'
In Chapter 4 I described the Reporter's role in organizing and
controlling procedures at the inquiry. His operational definition of
"informality" permitted certain lapses from the formal procedures of
the courtroom and also manifested itself in the atmosphere of the
inquiry and in the Reporter's helpful and sympathetic attitude towards
the objectors. However he also maintained the normal adversary
procedures, insisted that certain techniques of cross-examination be
followed, and in a number of other ways restricted and ordered the
participation of the lay objectors. Thus, though on the surface, the
inquiry appeared more "informal" than a court, the Reporter maintained
precise control over most of the procedure. I argued that this
"informality" could be explained by the overriding importance to the
Reporter of his role as "fact-finder" and it is this role that I turn
to examine in the next two chapters, i.e. I now investigate how he
performs his "technical rational" role which, I argue, takes
precedence over his "democratic" role.
(1) The Final Report
At the end of the inquiry the Reporter produces a final Report.
It is on this document that the Secretary of State bases his decision.
The Report is in three parts (1) A summary of the evidence (2) The
Findings of Fact and (3) The Reporter's recommendations and
conclusions.
The summary of evidence consists of a precis of the evidence of
each witness arranged in the chronological order in which they
appeared. The Reporter has to summarise any written precognition of
evidence and evidence led at the inquiry and in additon select those
parts of the cross-examination which he considered either contradicted
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or seriously challenged the evidence.
The Findings of Fact is a very much shorter document. This
reduces the inquiry to a number of factual statements on a series of
"issues" such as environment impact, hazard etc.
It is at this stage that the Reporter's interpretative scheme
becomes more obvious. This document is less a matter of summary and
more a matter of selection. All the participants at the inquiry were
concerned with "issues" e.g. safety, economic benefits, the effect on
amenity-value, but the issues that concerned the Reporter made their
first public appearance in the Findings of Fact apart from isolated
indications of his concerns made in remarks during the course of the
inquiry. My argument is that the Reporter always had the construction
of the Findings of Fact in his mind, from the beginning of the
inquiry. He wanted to get "the facts" on particular issues, but there
was never any public announcement as to what these issues were or what
criteria the Reporter used to determine "a fact".
By comparing the "findings of fact" with the "summary of
evidence" in this chapter and the next, I examine the criteria of
"relevance" and "facticity" employed by the Reporter during the
inquiry to analyse and control cross-examination and, in effect,
construct the final report. I argue that the Reporter does not
restrict cross-examination arbitrarily but does so in order to make it
easier for him to construct the 'findings of fact'.
Formal Guidelines
The Findings of Fact are the most important part of the Report.
It is this information on which the Secretary of State will base his
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decision. These are the 'facts' he will use to justify his arguments
for or against the development. This is the primary role of the
inquiry in the process of technical rational decision-making. One
measure of a party's success in the inquiry, could be the extent to
which their evidence appears in the findings of fact. If any decision
has to be justified on the basis of publicly declared "fact", then a
party which has the majority of facts favouring their case stands a
greater chance of success. In the Moss Moran inquiry the oil
companies were successful in having their evidence accepted as
"factual" and "relevant" by the Reporter, the lay objectors, very
unsuccessful. Why was this?
I will examine the participation of the lay objectors and I will
look at the kind of evidence they present in chapter 7. Firstly I
want to see what sort of information is available to lay objectors on
the criteria of "relevance" and "facticity" employed by the Reporter.
There are no public definitions of such criteria in any of the
legislation nor in any government memoranda. One indication came
from the Reporter near the beginning of the inquiry,
"What is in my mind is the question, "What
is before the Secretary of State?""
This does not appear to be of much help. It must be understood
in relation to stated Government policy - which is accepted as a
"fact" in the inquiry. In this case the policy was to generally
encourage the commercial exploitation of North Sea Oil resources, (see
Chapter 3) Given this policy, "the question before the Secretary of
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State" is narrowed down to:
Should these applicants be allowed to
construct this development on this
particular site?
Thus it is clear that such issues as the advantages of wind, wave
or solar power over irreplaceable oil resources, or the damage to the
environment from non-biodegradable plastics, would not be relevant to
this inquiry. There are still however no precise specifications.
Circular 14's instructions to Reporters are no more clear. The
Reporter is urged to satisfy himself on "all the relevant issues" but
there is no attempt to define what is to count as "relevant" or as an
"issue". In two senses, of course, this is inevitable. Each inquiry
will be concerned with different, specific issues and it would be
impossible to be precise in advance of the case. However, there were
no public indications in this particular inquiry and it is left to the
discretion of the Reporter to construct and apply the criteria of
"relevance" and "facticity". These are only available to an observer
by studying his remarks and actions during the inquiry and the
differences between the "findings of fact" and the "summary of
evidence." These techniques are obviously not available to lay
objectors before the inquiry begins.
Secondly, this is an example of the gap between rhetorical
instructions and the actions which these are intended to govern which
I discussed in Chapter 2. The precise meanings of "relevant" and
"issue" only exists in the social practices of this particular
inquiry, in the same way as the meaning of "informality" can only be
found by examining the participation of the lay objectors and the
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various restrictions placed on their participation. These meanings
derive from the reproduction of a particular "professional frame of
reference" shared by the Reporter the lawyers and experts.
Steward Asquith (Asquith 1977) makes the following observation,
"under a model of professional decision
making, the ultimate justification of a
decision is that the decision was made
through the correct exercise of professional
judgement."
The criteria on which such judgement is based, according to
Asquith, are drawn from a stock of professional knowledge which he
calls a "frame of relevance". This provides a basis for a shared
understanding of a problem for those who have access to the "frame of
relevance", though there may be room for disagreement and
contradictions within the frame.
This concept of "frame" is useful for my analysis of the
underlying structure of a public inquiry. Because I have used
'relevance' in a different context in this study, I want to use the
term, 'frame of reference'.
The "frame of reference" in this inquiry consists of the criteria
for the ascription of "relevance" and "facticity" to evidence and the
standard techniques of examination and cross-examination used by
advocates (Chapter 7). To share this frame of reference is to share a
model of the inquiry. Knowledge of those issues which are "relevant",
of what counts as a "fact", and how to present evidence and cross-
examine opposing witnesses, is a form of power. This is how the
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inquiry operates. If as an objector you don't share this knowledge,
then neither effective participation nor effective political
opposition is likely to be possible.
I will argue in Chapter 7, that the instructions and principles
describing "informality" and attempting to encourage lay participation
have their practical significance through the exercise of power by the
Reporter and the lawyers. That is to say, the Reporter reproduces, in
the inquiry, a frame of reference, which constitutes the practical
significance of terms like "maximum informality of procedures" and
"all the relevant issues", which otherwise exist as rhetorical claims
with a range of potential meanings rather than a particular practical
significance.
The Reporter is encouraged to adopt a directive and
inquisitorial role in the inquiry. In comparison, a judge in a court
of law, is reponsible for the direction of procedure but leaves most
of the questioning to the lawyers on either side. The Reporter in
this inquiry, regularly questioned witnesses, as he said
4:2 "in order to get these points quite
clear in my mind",
and these interjections give the observer indications as to how
the Reporter operates and glimpses of those criteria he applies to
ascribe "relevance" and "facticily" to evidence. Given his insistence
on efficiency i.e. avoiding time-wasting during the inquiry, it is
reasonable to assume that the Reporter only intervened where he
thought it was important. He would not ask irrelevant or repetetive
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questions himself.
I repeat my argument here. In order to interrupt and direct the
inquiry, from the start, the Reporter must have had criteria of
"relevance" and "facticity" which he used to assess evidence and
cross-examination as it was being performed. In his function as
"information-gatherer", the Reporter is concerned with the
construction of knowledge. Habermas and other philosophers of method
have argued that knowledge is always the production of certain
interests. (Habermas 1971a) They reject the arguments of empiricist
philosophers who, crudely speaking, see the mind as a bucket or tabula
rasa waiting to be filled by sense experience which constitutes
knowledge.
It is not necessary here to get involved in complex philosophical
discussions concerning the relative merits of competing claims as to
what constitues "knowledge". My argument here is straightforward.
The "findings of fact" are constructed by the Reporter, using specific
criteria of selection, from the total evidence and cross-examination
during the inquiry. These criteria of "relevance" and "facticity"
constitute an important part of his "method" for participating in the
inquiry. In other words "the facts" do not somehow present themselves
in the inquiry, they acquire the status of "relevant" facts" by the
Reporter operating specific criteria.
This is not to say that the Reporter is necessarily aware of
these precise criteria, his work in the inquiry might seem to him to
be a product of "common-sense" or to be, "second-nature" to him.
However, his actions and speech during the inquiry reproduce
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structures which include criteria for ascribing relevance and
facticity to evidence which are not shared by lay objectors. Their
notion of "common sense" would refer to quite different criteria of
"relevance", for example.
In this instance, there are no public descriptions of what
constitues a "relevant fact" for the Reporter, but by analysing his
participation and his construction of the Findings of Fact, I can
describe those criteria he uses and suggest their origins. I show the
methods and assumptions which the Reporter reproduces in this
construction of the final Report. It is not, in any absolute sense,
neutral or objective, but I will argue that this has nothing to do
with any personal or political bias on the part of the Reporter. In
terms of structuration; the Reporter reproduces different structural
resources to which the lay objectors have only limited access.
In this chapter I locate the structures of "relevance" through an
analysis of the Reporter's own comments and actions during the inquiry
and by comparing his selective "Findings of fact" with his "summary of
evidence".
Transcript Extracts
The first two examples show the Reporter specifying a particular
substantive area, in this case, that of alternative marine sites, as
relevant.
4:3 Reporter: "My own thinking on the subject
of alternative sites is that the
prime site that one must look to
is the marine site; both at Peterhead
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and in my reading for this inquiry,
I have had that born(sic) in on me that
the key to the development is the
suitability of a marine site and if
an alternative marine site cannot
be produced suitable to marry up
with an alternative land site then
it may be an abortive exercise to
follow up the detail of the land
site."
4:4 Reporter: "Could you give me information of
what you are seeking, because I
mentioned at the beginning of the
inquiry, and I think it has been
borne out by the evidence, the key
to the development is the findings
of a suitable marine site, and working
back from that is then a secondary
operation."
These examples also support my argument that the Reporter
operates with criteria of "relevance" and "facticity", from the
beginning of the inquiyr. His reference to "my reading for this
inquiry" indicates that he has prepared for the inquiry. He has
determined for himself those issues which are relevant and the most
important of these is the suitability of the marine site for the
tanker terminal. This was, in fact, the major single focus of
attention during the inquiry. It was the tanker terminal rather than
the Moss Moran plant which affected the communities of Dalgety Bay and
Aberdour.
Another example of what constitutes "relevant" evidence can be
seen in the following example. Here, the Reporter interrupts cross-
examination to clarify an issue. An objector has been asking about
the possible effects of a pipeline rupture and the witness has been
trying to argue that the line has been designed such that the
likliehood of a rupture is minimal. The Reporter's interjection
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indicates that while pipeline design is relevant, the real issue is
the quality of the design engineering. He secures an admission from
the witness that a rupture would be hazardous but then implies that
the real issue is that of monitoring the design to minimise the risk.
One might argue that the Reporter gets the admission from the witness,
to keep the lay objector happy. The lay objector was dealing with a
relevant issue but in the wrong way. (see Chapter 6)
4:5 Reporter "I think we are getting a bit repetitive
there would you agree that if a
major rupture of the line were to occur,
they would at least have cause for concern?"
Witness "At that moment you mean?"
Reporter "Yes."
Witness "Indeed."
Reporter "If that rupture did occur then they are in trouble?"
Witness "If it would occur they would be in trouble."
Reporter "So it is the job of the pipeline engineer or the
designer of any system that the likliehood
of this happening is as low as you can
obtain from any human product that you make."
Witness "Of course."
Reporter "I would find it helpful if you would amplify
the evidence you have given on page 5 of
your precognition "
The following example shows that the Reporter has not been
satisfied by either evidence or cross-examination on the topic of the
mode of supervision of jetty operations. He asks a list of detailed
questions, indicating that he considers the issue to be relevant.
Circular 14 urges the Reporter to ensure,
4:6 "the fullest possible explanation of the
applicants' proposals."
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The Reporter used his inquisitional powers in this way on a
number of occasions, where he felt cross-examination had
insufficiently tested the applicants' evidence.
4:7 Witness "Are you interested in just the loading
system per se or the communication
system?"
Reporter "What I am particularly interested in
is the communications system and in
the manpower whose job it is to ensure
that things are in fact carried out
correctly "
" "What is the function of the Board man
as you describe him?"
" "Is there a remote T.V. control, can he
see the jetty?"
" "Now this seems a fairly heavy respons¬
ibility for one man. Is he on long
shifts?"
"I don't want to be frivolous on a very
serious aspect of it, what I am really
testing is the risk of the Board man
becoming a bored man and missing out
on these visual checks?"
(The Reporter continued with a series
of detailed questions on plant layout,
hydro-carbon disposal and labour
requirements.)
In the next extract the Reporter gives a general statement of his aim
in the inquiry, a kind of cost-benefit analysis of the project. Again this
does not specify his criteria of relevance, but gives another indication.
4:8 To an objector cross-examining
Reporter "I could perhaps mention the fact that the companies hope to
make a profit is not a valid reason for turning them away
from Moss Moran and Braefoot Bay. It is quite valid for
you to make the point that they don't come bearing gifts
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exclusively. But they are hoping to make a profit, and the
debit and credit, the balance sheet that I will be drawing
up, isn't whether they are going to make a profit or not,
but whether the overall benefit and disadvantage to the
community is one that says they shouldn't come here at
all."
The Reporter's use of the negative "shouldn't come here at all"
could be read as indicating sympathy for the objectors' case, he could
just have easily have said
"whether the overall benefit and
disadvantage to the community is one that
says the development should go ahead."
Thus though he begins by criticizing the objector's cross-
examination as irrelevant, he softens his criticism at the end with a
gesture of sympathy. In a similar way to that seen in example C above
(Chapter 4), the Reporter seems to deflect attention away from the
strict "irrelevance" of the objectors' cross-examination by his
indirect expressions of sympathy: another example of the "surface
informality" of the inquiry.
The Reporter gave no direct explanations of his criteria of
"relevance". He mentioned certain subjects and issues which he
considered relevant and made some general statements about his role in
the inquiry. The latter were non-specific and can be considered as
rhetorical claims, in the same way as I dealt with "maximum
informality of procedures" in the last chapter. That is to say, we
can only see the significance of "benefits and disadvantages to the
community" when we examine the precise meaning of this in terms of
the final Report e.g. what "community" is the Reporter talking about,
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the local objectors, the people of Aberdour and Dalgety Bay? Fife?
Scotland? or Britain? What counts as a benefit to the community? How
does the Reporter compare hazard probability statistics with the
expressed fears of the objectors for their children's safety? The
effective significance of these claims depends on their practical
menaing in the final report.
Though, as I described in Chapter 3, the Reporter frequently
interrupted lay cross-examination because the techniques were
inappropriate, he was more reluctant to stop cross-examination because
it concerned an irrelevant topic, even though a great deal of the lay
objectors' cross-examination was on topics which did not appear in the




"Now I don't want to say very much
on this one, but you pride yourself
on your community relations, your
record of community relations?"
"Yes."
"I find this a little bitty puzzling,
perhaps we are a particularly dour
people, for example, I find one or
two things in your paper slightly
offensive - does that surprise you?"
Witness: "I apologise, it was certainly not my
intention."
Objector: "Well, to take one example, you give one
figure and I want to ask your confirm¬
ation of this, you mention 6 million
dollars you propose to spend in 1977.
Do you in fact mean pounds?"
Witness: "No this is in dollars."
Objector: "Americans are very sensitive about being
treated as colonials and they should be
the first people to appreciate that other
people might be equally sensitive, I find
it offensive to have that figure given
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Witness:













"You said that Esso Chemical made only a
small profit last year?"
"Yes."
"Sorry about that, by the way, what about
Esso Euro-Chemical is it?"
"Esso Chemical Europe."
"Did they make a profit?"
"They made a profit but not an adequate one."
"Could one ask what it was in sterling?"
"You can, but I don't think I can recall it,
I think we published it."
"I hope that Exxon at least made a profit?"
"Yes, they did all right."
This type of questioning was quite commonly used by lay objectors
in cross-examination. Providing that the questions generally fitted
the techniques of cross-examination described in the last chapter the
Reporter rarely intervened. He was keen to stop repetitive cross-
examination and did so frequently, but was more lenient with
irrelevant cross-examination.
Where a relevant issue was concerned, the Reporter insisted that
the techniques of cross-examination be maintained. This would make it
much easier for him to establish whether evidence had stood up to
cross-examination and which evidence constituted a factual finding.
Had he allowed laymen to be less formal in their techniques his
interpretative and anlaytic work would have been much more difficult.
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However if the topic of questioning was not relevant this really only
took up the time of the inquiry rather than made his job more
difficult.
Thus questioning such as in 4:9 and 4:10 above can be seen as an
extension of participation. The questions are irrelevant to the final
report but they allow the laymen to express a view, and the Reporter
does not see it as his function to silence the objectors, but rather
to attempt to structure their participation in a way that best serves
his functions in the inquiry. That is, he will allow the objectors to
participate except when their participation interferes with his
primary function.
John Roger, amongst others, has described the inquiry as a forum
for allowing the objectors "to let off steam", and these extracts may
be examples of this. I would describe these as further examples of
the procedures through which legitimacy is secured in the social
practices of the inquiry.
From the point of view of the Reporter, the questions are
innoccuous, if time consuming and irrelevant; the sort of questions
which oil company representatives should be able to deal with as a
matter of public relations.
From the point of view of the objectors, I would suggest the
questions represent an attempt to realise the rhetorical claim of
"equality before the law". The point of these sort of questions is to
ridicule the oil company, through its representative, by locating
errors or absurdities or insults in their evidence: to bring the "big
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men" down to size and demonstrate that, in a democracy, the "little
man" is equal in intelligence, perception and wit and is only defeated
by his position of powerlessness. The objectors may derive a sense of
dignity and worth from having made an active public attempt, as they
might see it, to defend their homes and families from bureaucrats and
trans-national corporations. If this analysis is correct, then one can
see the importance of the inquiry in terms of legitimation. The
inevitability of the outcome, and the resultant devalution of the
inquiry, both percieved by the objectors, become less important than
"putting up a good show". The objectors, in the name of notions such
as "justice" and "equality", accept their democratic rights and
responsibilities and their public exercise of these seems to make them
less angry about the final outcome. I will discuss these ideas at
greater length in chapters 6 and 7.
In this section, I have argued that there are no formal
indications as to what constitutes "a relevant fact" in the inquiry,
and also that where there are indications either in documents or in
the comments or interventions made by the Reporter himself during the
inquiry, they are non-specific. I argued that the Reporter will
generally allow the lay objectors to participate in cross-examination.
He will not stop irrelevant cross-examination but only that cross-
examination which does not follow the standard techniques or which is
repetitive. There is, then, very little information available to the
objectors even in the form of allusion during the inquiry, as to what
constitutes a relevant fact. In the next section I try to establish
the criteria of relevance which were used by the Reporter and which
form a crucial part of his "frame of reference". This "professional
knowledge" structures not only his participation in the inquiry, but
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inevitably, the conduct and procedures of the inquiry itself.
(3) Findings of Fact - The Contents
These 70 headings take up only 12 pages of over 400 in the Final
Report. There are several reasons for this brevity.
(1) A great deal of the cross-examination, and some of the
evidence was considered irrelevant. As I mentioned above,
the Reporter did not generally stop lay cross-examination
solely on the grounds of irrelevance.
(2) Justificatory arguments and lengthy technical detail are not
included in the findings of fact which deals only with
"conclusions".
(3) Several witnesses gave evidence on the same points. While
the summary of evidence paraphrases the evidence witness by
witness, the findings of fact deals with the evidence in
terms of issues. Thus several witnesses might have given
duplicate evidence on the same issue.
The following issues appear in the Findings of Fact; Factual
Background (including Government policy on the use of North Sea Oil
resources), a statement of the evidence on the unsuitability of
proposed alternative sites, the design and construction of the plant
and terminal, a statement of the nature of the hazard and various
conclusions to be drawn from the evidence on this matter, the absence
of information on potential downstream development (i.e. those
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manufacturing industries which would use the products of the Moss-
Moran plant), the adequacy of the infrastructure and the economic
costs and benefits of the scheme to the community.
These facts did not appear at the inquiry in this particular
structure or order. The information is drawn from the evidence of a
number of witnesses, how was it organised in this particular way?
Looking in more detail at the content of the 70 headings it is
possible to construct on argument which links the facts together and
would account for their particular ordering.
"In 1980 there will be available from the
the Brent Field, gas which needs to be
processed rather than flared off or burnt to
realise its full value as a feedstock for
the petro-chemical industry. It is
Government policy to encourage the full
development of this industry based on the
oil and gas from the North Sea.
The Moss Moran site is excellent for the
N.G.L. plant, but Braefoot Bay would not
normally be considered for development
because of its natural beauty and amenity
value. There would have to be convincing
evidence of pressing need before the site
would be approved.
There is no evidence which suggests the
existence of an alternative site in Scotland
which would not require the costly
construction of a new harbour.
Given the suitability of the sites, the
evidence suggests that the plant can be
designed and constructed with an acceptable
level of risk, though a full hazard and
operability audit would have to be carried
out before the plant came into operation.
There is not much known about the behaviour
of vapour clouds but this is not a problem
because the maximum credible spill of
petroleum gas from any part of the
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development is too small for the formation
of such a cloud.
The environmental effects of the plant can
be controlled to a level within acceptable
limits and there is adequate infrastructure
to support the development.
The plant would realise significant export
earnings for the U.K. economy and contribute
to the rates in Fife Region (though this
would be reduced by a reduction in rate
support grant) and though the immediate
local employment effects would not be large,
real employment benefits could accrue with
the arrival of downstream development."
A crude summary of this argument might read as follows,
"It is very necessary to build this plant
somewhere; no-one has found anywhere else to
build it, it can be built so that it has no
undue effect on the environment and so that
it presents an acceptable risk to the local
communities, therefore the development
should go ahead."
Part of the Reporter's function is to collect information, or
constuct knowledge in the form of these "Findings of Fact". This
document is constructed by reference to the above crude argument -
framed interogatively.
"What are the economic and commercial
reasons for the construction of this development?
Is the site suggested suitable? What will be
the effects on the evironment? How can these
be measured and compared to the economic
benefits? How does one decide what level of
risk is acceptable."
In other words, although the Reporter is not responsible for
making the decision, he collects information, as if he had this
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reponsibility. These points are relevant because they are the
technical/rational issues on which the Secretary of State will
require facts, so that he can make a decision. Information is not
collected neutrally nor in a vaccum, it is collected for a purpose,
in this case to conform to the categories which the Reporter knows
that the secretary of State will find relevant. Thus the Reporter
approaches the inquiry with this scheme as part of his professional
frame of reference. The relevant issues are economic need,
suitability of site, degree of environmental impact and level of risk.
"Economic need" is defined according to Government policy and so,
for example, arguments about the desirability of a no growth,
ecological economy will be deemed irrelevant because it has been
accepted for the purposes of the inquiry that it is an economic
priority to exploit our oil resources. This is an example of how the
State, through the public local inquiry, intervenes to provoke certain
conditions within which favoured economic activity can thrive.
As regards the suitability of the marine site, the Reporter can
consider the evidence on suitability of various sites produced by
either side, but is not himself empowered to search for alternative
sites, nor are the objectors required to provide alternative sities but
can simply challenge the company's selection of one particular site.
The criteria for measuring environmental impact and comparing it with
economic benefit are not made clear. The Reporter collects
information (facts) on the changes to the local environment rather
than peoples' opinions on how the changes affect them or how they
perceive the changes. There is an assumption that if the economic
need is established, then environmental changes will be regulated by
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planning conditions or particular residents may be compensated - but
that the plant will go ahead. In this case the argument from
economic need was considered as of the first importance.
As "risk" was felt by the Reporter and particularly by the
Objectors to be of central importance - I concentrate on this issue in
the next chapter on the criteria which establish "facticity". The
Reporter's postion was to ensure that every aspect of the design had
been assessed to the highest standards of the industry and that this
process was monitored.
In other words, the Reporter is collecting information relevant
to making a planning decision. Planning, as McAuslan (McAuslan 1979)
comments, is concerned with the maintenance of the status quo, with
the reconciliation of conflicts according to a set of political
priorities. These political priorities are, for the purposes of the
inquiry, "facts", and as such are not to be challenged during the
procedures of the inquiry. This is the sense in which John Roger
(Roger 1978) comments that a political decision is transformed into a
technical decision. There could have been political debate concerning
the desirability of exploiting oil resources, alternative criteria for
weighing up economic need against environmental damage, or for
assessing risk acceptability etc. but these were all irrelevant to the
inquiry because the political decision had already been made. It was
considered economically essential to exploit our oil resources. The
inquiry concerned the technical specifications of the proposed plant
and terminal. The Reporter intended to ensure that the standard
practices for design and safety had been adhered to, but was not about
to start setting new standards or instigating new procedures without
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concrete evidence that the existing standards were inadequate. (It is
this point I consider in more detail in the following chapter.)
The proclaimed extensions of "informality" and the consideration
of "all relevant issues" are not designed to allow a different mode of
democratic participation e.g. by allowing a small group of objectors
to argue about how, if at all, the State ought to use oil from the
North Sea. The latter is a task for Parliament, in terms of liberal-
democratic theory, or for the Civil Service in consultation with the
Government and certain multi-national corporations, according to a
cynical objector.
This is only to consider one "function" of the inquiry - that of
providing the Minister with information which is "relevant" to the
political decision he must make, in the terms outlined above. But, as
I argued in Chapter 1, if it is evident to the lay objectors that the
inquiry is a formality which conceals the true nature of decision
making, then why do they bother to participate? The answer lies in
the legitimating function of the inquiry. Very few participants in
the inquiry shared the cynical view caricatured above, certainly not
the Reporter nor most of the objectors, (see Chapter 3 and 7)
I have described the "fact-finding" function of the Reporter as
being of prime importance to his control of the procedures of the
inquiry. Amongst competing claims, the speed and efficiency of the
inquiry, the encouragement of lay participation, full investigation of
the issues etc. I argued that fact finding took priority. However the
Reporter himself had a much less precise notion of his own function
and , I would suggest, saw himself as constantly balancing the
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contradictory claims in an attempt to achieve fairness or justice. It
is a tribute to his skill, that the lay objectors were generally
satisfied with the conduct of the inquiry.
Some evidence of the Reporter's "sympathetic attitude" can be
seen in his recommendations. I crudely caricatured, what I saw as the
essential argument of his recommendations. This was modified in the
document by reservations, conditions and qualifications which, while
they do not destroy the central argument, nor concal it, may make it
more palatable to those objectors who feel that their political rights
have been dangerously eroded.
While asserting that he had not heard any evidence which showed
the existence of a suitable alternative site, he mentioned that the
objectors were not required to produce evidence on alternative sites
and would not have had sufficient resources even if they had wanted to
produce such evidence. He also mentioned that the objectors, on a
number of occasions, had asked for a Planning Inquiry Commission.
This body would have had the scope to acquire detailed evidence on
alternative sites at public expense. The Reporter was sympathetic to
the criticisms of the inquiry system made by the objectors e.g. their
lack of time and money, and listened patiently to their requests for a
P.I.C. While the Reporter recommended approval of the development and
expressed confidence over its safety, he also expressed his regret
over the destruction of the amenity value of Braefoot Bay, and
recommended that the Health and Safety Executive monitor a full hazard
and operability audit on the plant, before it comes into operation, to
ensure its safety. Finally, he regretted the costs to the local
community but had decided that the benefits to the national community
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were sufficiently great to recommend approval.
In these remarks the Reporter displays a sensitivity to the
objectors' case and to the problems they faced in taking part in the
inquiry. This sensitivity was manifest throughout the inquiry.
However his recommendation is that the development be approved and
this decision can be made by the Secretary of State and justified on
'the findings of fact'. These remarks may somehow make the objectors
feel better but they do not affect the basis for the final decision
and need not be a relevant consideration for the Secretary of State.
I have described the evidence which was included in the 'findings
of fact' and argued that the criteria of 'relevance' governing their
inclusion derived from the Reporter's model of his fact-finding role
in the inquiry. Before commenting further on this model I want to look
briefly at the evidence which was excluded from the findings of fact,
i.e. that evidence which was considered either "irrelevant" or "non-
factual" or both.
(1) Best Evidence
The Reporter stated that he would only accept the evidence of the
most "qualified" witness on any particular topic. Thus though several
witnesses gave evidence on the suitability of alternative sites and on
shipping movements in the Forth, the evidence of the Forth Ports
Authority was accepted as the "best evidence" on these topics and
appears as such in the findings of 'fact'. As we have seen, during
the inquiry, the Reporter often restricted the presentation of
evidence or cross-examination because the best evidence on that topic
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had already been given or could be expected to be given by another
witness. The Reporter occasionally announced which witness he held as
"most qualified" but there were no formal principles made publicly
available to justify the Reporter's choice. His rule of thumb seemed
to be to select either the most senior official of an organisation or
else the witness whose advertised expertise seemed to correspond most
closely with the particular subject under investigation. The
governing assumption seemed to be that experts and specialists had a
monopoly of knowledge in their field, unless it was proved otherwise.
The fact that evidence was organised by witnesses rather than by
issues, meant that this category of "best evidence" was important, but
this mode of organisation further hampered lay participation because
they could never be sure which witnesses evidence was going to be
"best evidence".
(2) Cross-Examination
This will be excluded from the 'findings of fact' where it
challenges irrelevant or non factual evidence or where it is
inaccurate or wrong and thus does not challenge relevant factual
evidence. Most of the time of the inquiry was taken up by cross-
examination of the applicants, local authorities and their "experts"
by the objectors. Very little of this cross-examination appears in the
findings of fact and was therefore "unsuccessful". This doesn't mean to
say that it was irrelevant, it may have served other functions, e.g.
as a challenge to the applicants to convince the Reporter that their
facts were accurate, or , politically, to legitimate the exercise of
power over the local community, but it did not provide the Reporter
(or the Secretary of State) with facts which might have caused
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approval to be with-held.
(3) Other Excluded Evidence
Most of the evidence of the applicant companies, including the
complete evidence of six of their witnesses on the design, layout, and
operation of the plants is included in the findings of 'fact'.
Only small sections of their evidence were excluded: e.g. policy
evidence on the nature of the company's structure, the current and
possible future state of the oil industry and the practical
accomplishments and future policies of the companies. This evidence
was either irrelevant or a matter of opionion rather than fact, (see
Chapter 6)
The evidence of their hazard witness was largely excluded as was
the evidence of the planning witness appearing for both companies.
The controversy over hazard will be discussed at length in Chapter 6.
The policy evidence was considered non-factual and irrelevant by the
Reporter because it did not fit in to his underpinning argument. The
evidence of the planning witness was excluded either because it was
opinion rather than fact or because other witnesses gave the 'best
evidence' on several topics covered by this witness.
Most of the evidence of Cremer and Warner, the independent
assessors hired by the local authorities was in the findings of
'fact'. The exception was their evidence on hazard. The evidence of
the Health and Safety Executive was excluded in its entirely because
of 'best evidence' from another witness (often Cremer and Warner) or
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because the evidence was opinion about facts rather than facts
themselves.
With the exception of their comments on the lcoal employment
statistics and the provision of infrastructure, the evidence of the
local authorities, councillors and planners was excluded from the
findings of fact. Their evidence was either opinion or statements of
policy neither of which were considered 'factual' by the Reporter.
The only pieces of the objectors' evidence to appear in the
findings of 'fact' are some of their experts' information on the
hazards of vapour clouds, and evidence on the problems of hiring
skilled labour in Fife. It might also be argued that the Reporter's
early comments on the beauty and amenity of Braefoot Bay reflect the
evidence of many of the objectors. Objectors' evidence excluded from
the findings of 'fact' includes the Regional Council's policy on
industrial strategy, the attractions of the area to a prospective
labour force, the destruction of amenity, national energy policy, the
world food supply, swimming, air pollution, noise, the history of
Inchcolm and sailing. In Chapter 6 I discuss the evidence of a
Conservation Society witness, which did not appear in the findings of
'fact'.
Evidence on Regional Council policy is irrelevant to the findings
of fact and to the inquiry as are remarks about national energy
policy. Both national and local government policy are treated as
facts for the purposes of the inquiry - political debate over policy
takes place in the House of Commons, or the Council chambers or
constituency meetings but not at a public local inquiry. Evidence on
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noise and air pollution were excluded because it was non-factual, i.e.
the evidence was not based on experimental evidence (see Chapter 6),
though the topics may have been relevant. Evidence on swimming,
sailing, the cultural heritage of Inchcolm, the potential diminution of
the attractiveness of the area as a home and the destruction of
amenity did not appear as factual evidence in the findings of fact.
However, this evidence, a substantial part of the objectors case,
appeared in the Report in the form of the Reporter's expression of
regret at the local costs of the development which were outweighed by
the national benefits.
"Relevant" topics, then fall into three headings.
(1) Economic - What are the costs and benefits, locally and
nationally of the development? A large part of the
objectors' evidence presented the local costs, expressed in
non-quantified terms of the loss of amenity, destruction of
the quality of life etc. This was compared with the national
benefits in terms of export earnings, tax revenues,
employment for construction and operation etc. Thus though
the lay objectors' evidence was accepted as relevant it was
inevitably ineffective. It is inevitable that a large
development, such as the one proposed, will
drastically change the environment, wherever it is
constructed.
(2) Environmental - Are the sites physically suitable? Is there
adequate infrastructure? What effects will the development
have on the environment? The evidence of the applicants, and
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the consultants was accepted as factual on this topic. The
lay objectors were unable to challenge their facts.
(3) Technological - Can the development be constructed and
operated to an acceptable level of safety?
Facts on this topic constitute the bulk of the findings of fact
and again the evidence comes from the applicants and the consultants
and not from the objectors. Under cross-examination the expert
witnesses convinced the Reporter that the plant could be designed and
built to an acceptable level of risk and the objectors were unable to
find flaws in this evidence, even though their advocate was
responsible for much of their cross-examination on the highly
technical design details of the plant.
Thus much of the evidence of the lay objectors was irrelevant,
and where it was relevant it was ineffective. Either their evidence
on 'relevant' topics was "non-factual" or their cross-examination on
relevant topics, though it may have tested the evidence of the
applicants and consultants, did not challenge its "factual" status.
It is clear from this analysis of "relevance" that both the
Reporter and the lawyers at the inquiry shared the same criteria, e.g.
the objectors' advocate, employed only part-time because the Action
Group had limited funds, concentrated on trying to challenge the
technical evidence of the applicamts because he knew that this was the
most important topic of the inquiry, i.e. if he could suggest that the
plant could not be built safely, and this was accepted as factual by
the Reporter, this would at least delay the construction of the plant
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until the appropriate safety standards could be met. The close fit
between the applicants' evidence and the Reporter's findings of fact
can be largely attributed to the professional advice and assistance on
the presentation of their case to the applicants by the senior
advocates whom they retained. Similarly the precise and concise
cross-examination conducted by these lawyers demonstrated that they
shared the same criteria for ascribing relevance and facticity as the
Reporter. In the following chapter, 1 describe what counts as "a
fact" in the inquiry and thus describe the "professional frame of
reference" in more detail.
It is clear, however, that this frame of reference is not shared
by the lay objectors nor is it made publicly available to them during
the inquiry. The objectors' evidence contains more irrelevance than
relevance, as does their cross-examination. I examine the different
"frame of reference" which is reproduced in their participation in
Chapter 7.
The technical-rational function of a public local inquiry is to
collect relevant facts. I have argued in this chapter that there are
no public criteria which describe what counts as "relevant". However
the Reporter conducts the inquiry qith a set of criteria for ascribing
"relevance". These form part of the "professional frame of reference"
which he shares with the lawyers and most of the expert witnesses in
the inquiry.
By examining the Reporter's conduct during the course of the
inquiry and by comparing the "Findings of Fact" with the summary of
evidence, I have reconstructed the main criteria for ascribing
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relevance, these I have described as economic, environmental and
technological. From a starting assumption of overwhelming economic
need, the object of the inquiry is to ensure that the proposed designs
pose an "acceptable" degree of risk and have an "acceptable" impact on
the environment.
Evidence on these issues will be relevant but its inclusion in
the Findings of Fact, which I have argued is the crucial achievment
for success in the inquiry (in technical rational terms), depends on
whether it adequately fulfills the criteria of "facticity" i.e. what
counts as a fact for the purposes of the inquiry, which I analyse in
Chapter 6.
I argue that the technical rational collection of relevant facts
is the bureaucratic duty of the Reporter. For him it is what the
inquiry is "really" about, it is his most important function in
tension with his duty to encourage lay participation. However for the
lay objectors, as I show in Chapter 7, the collection of information
is only one role of the inquiry process. They do not share the
precise "professional frame of reference" and do not therefore award
the inquiry process legitimacy on technical-rational grounds. For
them the inquiry is also about jsutice, morality and responsibiltiy.
I argued in Chapter 4 that these rhetorical notions are reproduced in
the inquiry in the sympathetic characteristics of the Reporter i.e. in
his "democratic" role rather than his "bureaucratic" role.
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CHAPTER 6
The Reporter 3 - the criteria of 'Facticity'
In Chapter 5, I looked at the Reporter's findings of "fact". I
argued that since the findings of 'fact' are the evidence on which
a decision is made, it is crucial for a group of participants to have
their evidence included in the findings. This would be one measure
of successful participation; an index of the ability of a party to
exercise power. I have discussed the criteria used by the Reporter
to ascribe relevance to evidence. In this chapter I will go on to
examine the criteria he uses to ascribe "facticity". Much of the
objectors' evidence fell into the "relevant" categories of
environmental, technological or economic, yet very little was
included in the findings of fact. How does the Reporter decide what
constitutes a fact?
I want to address this question by focussing on the treatment
of one particular topic, hazard. The controversy over hazard is a
good example of the Reporter's criteria for ascribing
"facility" to evidence for the purposes of the inquiry. Also, a
high proportion of the evidence given in the inquiry falls into this
category.
Having described the criteria used by the Reporter to decide
what constitutes a relevant fact, I want to examine the extent to
which these criteria are shared by the advocates and experts. I
will argue that these three share an approach to the inquiry which I
describe as a "professional frame of reference". This set of
assumptions about what constitutes correct procedure and about what
is relevant and factual, is reproduced in the actions of these
participants and effectively constructs their participation in the
inquiry.
- 171 -
Thus, following Giddens (Giddens 1976), I want to show how
power, in this case manifested by dominant economic interests
operating through a process of technical rational decison making
within the framework of an interventionist democratic state,
actually operates in the social practices of the inquiry. i.e. how
authority is exercised.
In this chapter I will complete a description of the
professional frame of reference which is predominantly technical
rational but my general concern is not just to demonstrate that
technical rationality dominates, but to show how it dominates.
This will be done in chapter 7. I argue that technical rationality
does not dominate either with the unambiguous consent of the
objectors or through their absolute subjection to it. Domination
operates through contradictions that are visible in the social
practices of the inquiry; at the level of "the cultural milieu"
(Willis 1977). The lay objectors both penetrate the dominant
technical rational ideology and are limited by their allegiance to
it, i.e. they put forward both a technical and a non-technical case.
I show in the next chapter, how these contradictions operate. Thus
I am concerned to show the relationship between the lay objectors
and the dominant frame of reference. The following analysis of
"facticity" in this chapter completes my analysis of the
professional frame of reference.
The hazard controversy concerned the phenomena of "open
flammable cloud explosions"; though there was even debate over this
definition. Each group of participants seemed to agree that the
most hazardous event at Braefoot Bay would be a spill, at the
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loading lines, of the liquified, petroleum gases. (L.P.G. s i.e.
propane, butane, gasolene or ethylene). these are refrigerated to
very low temperatures to maintain them in a liquid state for easier
movement. If a spillage occurs, the liquid immediately evaporates
since the surroundings, at land or sea, are much warmer. This gas
mixes with air to form a highly flammable mixture. A cloud of this
air/gas mixture forms and moves with the wind. After a certain
period of time, the cloud mixture reaches a point of maximum
inflammability before the ratio of gas to air drops until the gas is
dispersed into the atmosphere. Under certain conditions, if the
cloud finds an ignition source, it can either burn or explode.
Where the participants disagreed was in the precise definitions
within this general model e.g. - what size of spillage is required?
How likely is a spill of this size? At what concentration does a
cloud reach maximum inflammability? How will the cloud travel? How
is its movement affected by ground/air/sea/weather etc. conditions?
The objectors advocate led the objectors' expert witness. The
advocate's argument was that since so little was known
about the behaviour of these open vapour clouds, the possibility of
the spillage of ethylene presented an unacceptable risk to the
community under the plans at that time put forward by the
applicants. The witness had already submitted a written
precognition so his examination can be seen as the advocate's
attempt to select and present those parts of his evidence which he
would most impress the Reporter.
The advocate firstly established that the witness thought there
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was a significant risk of deaths and damage from an open flammable
cloud fire. This was not because of an inadequate standard of
safety disclosed by the applicants' plans, but because there was
insufficient information to judge the standard of safety. After
referring to warnings given in previous years by the witness about
the danger of L.P.G. s and the need for further research into the
behaviour of vapour clouds, the advocate further established
that since a serious disaster in 1968, little more work had been done
which gave any more understanding of how these explosions can
occur.
There followed a long piece of evidence by the witness
explaining why his calculations differed from those of Cremer and
Warner, the independent advisors, and further justifying his
decision to depart from various similar models of vapour cloud
behaviour and to accept different assumed constants within these
models. The advocate's intention here was to bring out the link
between the lack of knowledge and data, and the sophisticated
theoretical level of the conflict. His argument might be summarised
as follows, "since there are few facts tested by experiment or
experience; we have to rely on theoretical extrapolation for our
information and that is why I am leading this witness's theoretical
evidence, which tells us that more work needs to be done to provide
more facts".
The witness then went on to describe the possible hazard. This
would be a small spillage of ethylene which exploded close to a
jetty releasing a vapour cloud which might drift outside the site
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and find an ignition source in an area where there might be members
of the public. This was followed by another technical discussion
about flame acceleration which again showed the lack of knowledge
about ethylene cloud behaviour, and a further discussion on the
differences in the Cremer and Warner calculations which the witness
considered not too significant since neither he nor Cremer and
Warner,
" would like to say that our predictions
were accurate to more than a factor of 2."
Finally the advocate established through the witness that a
spill of 30 tons of ethylene or propane, given "favourable" weather
conditions, could cause an explosion at either of two points outside
the site boundary which could cause loss of life.
At this point it is interesting to note certain omissions in
the advocate's examination: e.g. he did not discuss the
probabilities of events which might result in a spill other than to
get from the witness that there was a "significant" risk. The witness
insisted that he had said this because there was insufficient
information about the detail of the plant to make a quantitative
assessment of the hazard.
This is interesting because at the end of his cross-examination
the witness was asked by the Reporter whether he thought that the
plant could be designed and operated in a way which would meet his
standards of safety. The witness asserted that this could be done
as there were further safety features which could be built in.
(Though he later said, in a letter to the Reporter, that these
safety features involved the use of new technology.)
This is an example of the partial presentation of evidence by
advocates. In this instance the advocate wants to make the point that
there is a risk and proceed quickly on to detailed discussions of the
nature and extent of the potential damage. He represents the
objectors, and so his interest is in having the development refused.
In his estimation, in order to further this interest he must
concentrate on the nature of the risk and play down the statistical
likelihood of a serious accident.
To further his argument, the objectors' advocate then attempted
to show that the disagreements between his witness and Cremer and
Warner were not due to major differences in their assumptions or
scientific method but to a lack of information and knowledge about
the behaviour of vapour clouds.
"Well it isn't that we disagree but we
realise that there is a lack of knowledge in
this area." Witness for Cremer and Warner
(2427)
So the objectors' advocate did not argue that tested and proven
evidence is not generally adequate. On the contrary, he maintained
that in this case there was insufficient empirical evidence
which resulted in academic, theoretical controversy. His conclusion
was that the hazards were uncertain, and so the development should not
be granted permission.
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In effect he argued that in the absence of empirical evidence, other
sorts of evidence constitute relevant knowledge. In this case the
theoretical extrapolations of his witness were used to suggest links
between existing facts and to explain inconsistencies and ambiguities
in an explanatory scheme resulting from a lack of tested empirical
evidence. The advocate was making a claim for knowledge based not on
"facts", but on the "creative" use of theory and fact to interpret
evidence and predict behaviour where there is little experimental
evidence, though his main point was that there were insufficient facts
to be able to guarantee an adequate level of safety.
I will examine some reasons for this approach by the objectors'
advocate below after I have dealt with the cross-examination of the
same witness by the advocates for the applicant companies.
In cross-examination, the first of these advocates (for Shell
Expro) began by establishing that the witness had departed from his
initial method and had inserted a different calculation of his own.
(1)
There was no justification in the original paper for this procedure.
He continued to ask the witness to justify his assumptions and
departures from established methods, without actually challenging
these methods. He was attempting to suggest that the extrapolations
made by the witness were both different from the work done by other
scientists and entirely theoretical, i.e. untested by experiement.
The cross-examination continued to argue that the risk of a
spill depended on a detailed hazard and operability audit which
(1) i.e. different from that used by Cremer and Warner, the independent
consultants.
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could be completed when the detailed designs were submitted. The
advocate also led the witness to assert that refrigerated storage
was in many important ways safer than high pressure storage.
The advocate for Esso Chemicals began his cross-examination
with a series of questions designed to state the witness's position
in an ironic way emphasising his reliance on hypotheses, i.e. that
if a cloud forms in a certain position after an unlikely
spillage, and conditions are right, it might travel to a_
certain place and, there explode. Because of the witness's
departures from other works the cloud is assumed to travel further
(2)
and create greater blast damage. He immediately followed this
with
Advocate : "I wonder if we could move
away from the theoretical
into the field of practice."
"
: "Can you point to any spill
of ethylene on water which
has occurred and has resulted
in an explosion?"
"
: "Can I take it from that, that
you can't point me to any other
spill of ethylene which has
resulted in an explosion."
"
: "Well can you tell me any other
case where a pressure, leaving
aside ignition by T.N.T., of
301b p.s.i has been measured
at the edge of an ethylene cloud?"
"
: "You see, I just want to find out
how far this is established by
(2) Here the advocate is implying that this expert is something of a
maverick in being out of step with other experts in the area. This
supports his argument that the witness's evidence is speculative
and untested and thus not "factual" for the purposes of the inquiry.
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experiment and how far it remains
in the field of theory.
Witness : "Well it is neither established by
experiment nor to my knowledge
is established by actual incidents
that have taken place. It is
entirely a theoretical structure
based on the knowledge that I have
of the difference between ethylene
and propane."
This cross-examination presents an entirely different version
of this witnesses evidence from the version presented by the
objectors' advocate. The aim is to suggest that the evidence
presented by the witness as knowledge, consists of theoretical
speculation and not "facts" tested by experiment or experience, and
as such is irrelevant. This supports the arguments of their
clients, firstly that a hazard and operability audit will minimise
the risk of an accident and secondly that this confidence is
supported by the existing "facts" about the companies' safety record
and about the behaviour of liquid petroleum gases.
I want to draw two points from the analysis so far.
Firstly the analysis demonstrates the way in which knowledge is
constructed in the inquiry. The careful selection of evidence and
questions in their examination and cross-examination conducted by the
advocates, is not designed to produce some sort of "neutral" truth, it
is designed to produce "facts" which will support their clients' case
and cast doubt on that of their opponents.
"It is thought that the lawyer, because he
deals in facts, should be concerned with the
discovery of truth. He is not. He is only
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concerned that the right conclusion is
reached on the facts before the court.
These conclusions are reached on the
evidence which is available, which sometimes
has nothing to do with the truth at all."
(Du Cann 1979 p20)
This comment concerns courts but applies equally to public
inquiries. Lawyers present evidence which fits with the Reporter's
definition of a "relevant fact" and which will favour the argument
they want to make in favour of their client. Recent work in the
philosophy of science argues that knowledge is the product of certain
theoretical, methodological and value assumptions. The categories
(3)
'true' and 'false' are internal to particular claims for knowledge,
rather than absolute terms. Thus the Reporter might first ask of
particular evidence, "is this evidence a candidate for the categories
true or false", and then decide whether it is true or false according to
the criteria within his frame of reference. In the same way the
criteria of "facticity" can be further split. Is the evidence a
candidate for facticity, i.e. is it the sort of information which can be
true or false then is it or is it not a fact? There is an implication
in the last sentence of the example above that truth is an absolute
category to which legal procedures do not necessarily approximate. I
argue that knowledge is always a product of particular social
practices and we cannot design procedures for establishing "absolute
truth" because there is no neutral method nor neutral language.
I will specify more clearly below what are the criteria for
ascribing "facticity" in the dominant frame of reference. For the
(3) See Giddens 1976 Chapter 4 also Khun 1970 Lakatos and Musgrave 1970
Feyerabend 1975 Barnes 1974 Hollis and Lukes 1982.
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moment I want to argue that the category of "relevant fact" in the
inquiry is not equivalent to that of absolute truth. This is the
rhetorical claim. The inquiry is supposed to be impartial, the
attribution of facticity is commonly assumed to be a neutral
activity just as science is held to be value-free. The "facts" of
the inquiry have to be presented as the truth, or to use a more
sophisticated conceptual analysis, the public, in this case
primarily the objectors, must be persuaded that the information has
been gathered fairly and openly. Thus I argue that this is another
requirement for legitimation. However because the "Findings of
Fact" are not produced until the end of the inquiry, and because it
would be virtually impossible for an inexperienced objector to find
out during the course of the inquiry what were the dominant criteria
of relevance and facticity, these isssues are less crucial for
legitimation than the manner in which the Reporter directs lay
participation, (see chapter 4).
The second point is that although the advocates are putting forward
different arguments and have the opposite interests, they share
(with each other and with the Reporter) the same basic assumption as
regards what constitutes relevant knowledge and what constitutes a
"fact". They all agree that evidence tested by experiment or
experience, i.e. proven "fact" will be accepted by the Reporter and
that anything else is second best and will not be likely to be
included in the findings of "fact". The basic argument of the
applicants' advocates is that an acceptable level of risk can be
guaranteed by a hazard and operability audit and that in any case the
available "facts" (evidence tested by experiment or experience) do
not suggest the possibility of a disaster. The objectors' advocate
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skips over the hazard audit and the statistical chances of hazard
and asserts that since there are so few "facts" known about the
behaviour of these clouds, no level of safety can be guaranteed and
so the development ought to be moved. Shell/Esso say - the facts
say it is safe, the objectors say - there are not enough facts. All
the advocates realise the importance of facts to the Reporter and
construct their cases accordingly.
Findings of Fact
I now want to look at the Reporter's treatment of this
controversy. How much of this was included in the findings of
"fact"?
He decided that none of the controversy over the detailed
behaviour of vapour clouds counted as "fact". He summarized, in
very general terms, what a vapour cloud was, how it formed, and how
it might behave, then, with regard to the movement and the explosive
potential of the cloud, over which most of the discussion was, he
said,
"Parties differ on what over-pressure should
be assumed at the edge of an exploding
ethylene cloud. No experiments involving a
large scale spill of ethylene have been
carried out."
The Reporter went on to say, that there had been numerous
incidents around the world involving L.P.G. storage but that the
root cause of disasters is frequently failure to identify the full
range of hazard inherent in an operation and to this end a full
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hazard and operability audit should be carried out.
During the period of the inquiry when vapour cloud behaviour
was being examined, the Reporter asked the objector's expert witness
and Cremer and Warner to meet and compare their work so that they
could "agree to disagree" when giving evidence at the inquiry. This
was to allow the Reporter to be able to make more direct comparisons
and see exactly where the points of difference lay so that he could
assess any claims that they might be included in the findings of
fact. At the end of the inquiry, the Reporter merely categorised
this as academic theoretical dispute and as such, not factual.
Thus the Reporter only ascribed facticity to evidence which had
been tested either by experiment or by experience. Scientific
theories which used hypotheses to link particular pieces of factual
information did not appear in the findings of fact.
Before going on to discuss certain implications of the
definitions used by the Reporter, I want to give one more
example of the precise and rigid boundaries of relevance and
facticity common to the Reporter and the advocates. This example
deals with the evidence and cross-examination of an "expert" witness
for the Conservation Society.
This witness asserted that since the recent disasters at Qatar
and at Flixborough, it had to be accepted that
"even the best laid plans could go wrong."
He maintained that the problem required new thinking and that
he had seen no evidence of this in the applicants' proposals. His
evidence took the form of various suggestions as to how the safety
of the proposed developments might be increased, e.g. the
arrangement of the plant should be changed from a matrix formation
to a long "necklace of beads" layout, (this would isolate each
process or storage unit and prevent the spread of a disaster), there
should be automatic fire-fighting equipment using liquid nitrogen
and not water, and there should be fully redundant secondary
containment for pipes and storage tanks. His conclusion was that
since there was no 100% safe solution for the handling of L.P.G.s
at sea, the development should be sited in a more remote area. Under
the assumption that the developments at Qatar and Flixborough were
designed and operated to the highest standards of safety, it must be
concluded that since both plants suffered disasters then
present scientific knowledge is inadequate and that new thinking and
new technology is required to improve safety. Thus though this
witness supported a hazard and operability audit, he insisted that
this in itself was insufficient.
His own new thoughts, which he admitted were only intended
as guidelines for others to pursue more rigorous inquiries were all
theoretical constructs and extrapolations. None of the procedures
had been empirically tested, necessary equipment and machinery had
not been designed and there were some suggestions which were
impractical even before they had reached the drawing board.
However, as consultant for the conservation society and not for the
applicants, he was under no obligation to provide detailed technical
designs. His aim was to show the sorts of direction that further
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research might take to raise the safety to an acceptable level.
In cross-examination the objectors' advocate selected
several of this witness's statements to construct an argument which
would support his client's case. He established that the lack of
proposals for secondary containment of spillages and the novel
technology that such proposals would require, meant that the
Braefoot development could not be made 100% safe and therefore ought
to be refused planning permission.
Earlier in the inquiry this advocate made the comment,
"There is probably little in Mr. X's report
that I consider assists the line that the
Action Group will be taking at the inquiry."
We can now see "little" means his assertion that since there
was no 100% safe solution to the problem of handling L.P.G.'s, the
development ought to be moved to a more remote location. The
advocate used those parts of the witness's evidence which supported
his case. i.e. his fears about safety, but ignored the rest of his
evidence i.e. the theoretical speculations on how to improve safety.
Essentially this witness's argument was similar to that of the
objectors advocate: there have been too many accidents in
developments of this type for us to allow them to be built near
residential areas unless much more research is done and new
technology developed. The advocate did not use the witness's
evidence on what sort of research and technology ought to be
pursued. He treated this witness's evidence in much the same way as
that of his own expert witness. He used their evidence to argue
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that there were not enough facts known about key areas of this
development and that therefore it should not proceed until more
facts were available. For him, an absence of facts leads to
theoretical disagreements which form insufficient grounds for calculating
how safe the development can be expected to be.
I want to compare this treatment of the witness with his cross-
examination by the Shelly/Esso advocates. During this, I felt the
atmosphere at the inquiry was less than serious. The tone of many
of the questions suggested a kind of ironic disbelief, as if the
questioners were amazed that this witness had the nerve to present
such evidence. There was much amusement from the Shell/Esso and
District Council benches at the wit of the applicants' counsel. Even
the witness himself, who had encountered at least one of the
applicants' advocates before in a similar inquiry, gave the
occasional wry smile, as if he had expected his evidence to be
treated flippantly.
The Shell advocate established that, contrary to the witness's
evidence, there was fully redundant secondary containment planned
(4)
for the Shell storage tanks. He also secured from the witness the
information that his plan for using nitrogen spray might split a
ship's hull and thus cause more spillage; exactly what he was trying
to prevent.
The Esso advocate began by establishing that the witness'
(4) This means that if the first container burst, the second container
had the capacity to retain the full contents of the first container.
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evidence on noise was a purely subjective statement made without any
testing or proven empirical evidence to substantiate it. He pointed
out several factual errors in the evidence, but most of his
questioning concentrated on the impracticality of the witness's
evidence; e.g. large quantities of nitrogen would need to be stored
round each item of plant, maintenance of underground tanks would be
very difficult, the notion of a long process line from St. Fergus to
Moss Moran with an ethylene cracker on a branch line in Arbroath
seemed ridiculous, the fact that neither his "necklace of beads"
layout nor his 2 mile ariel pipeline to a floating harbour; have
ever been used before, far less been empirically tested. The
advocate finally established that the witness himself was not happy
with the practicality of his schemes, though the witness had not
intended the schemes to be practical but to be speculative
suggestions requiring further development. In particular the
advocate's questions on the 2 mile ariel pipeline into the Forth and
the "branchline" to Arbroath were heavily ironical and caused
amusement throughout the inquiry.
Again these advocates were concerned to show the absence of
facts tested in experience or experiment in this witness's evidence.
Despite the witness's asertion that he was only suggesting future
avenues for research and not presenting a fully tested alternative
design, the applicants' advocates subjected his evidence to rigorous
tests of 'facticity'. The object of the cross-examination was to
demonstrate that the evidence was not only inconsistent, factually
inaccurate, and full of holes but also theoretical, and
unsubstantiated by any research, testing or experience. The
advocates knew that this evidence was not what the Reporter wanted
and displayed this by the use of ironical questioning. The example
demonstrates that the advocates share the same definition of "fact" and
operate using this same definition despite representing clients
whose interests are opposed. The interests of their clients are
best served by ensuring that the Reporter's interests are secured.
None of this witness's evidence appears in the findings of
'fact'. Though the topics covered by his evidence, i.e. the
technical design and operation of plant, are relevant enough, his
evidence does not conform to the criteria of facticity used by the
Reporter. As we have seen, the Reporter excluded almost all the
evidence on hazard and on how to make the development safer, on the
grounds that the evidence consisted not of "facts" but untested
theoretical speculation or opinion. The Reporter preferred to rely
on a hazard and operability audit to ensure an adequate level of
safety was reached for the plant.
This audit consists in an examination of the design and
construction of each item of plant and equipment, starting from one
end of the process and working through to the other. Failure of
each item is postulated, and the consequences of this failure are
followed to other parts of the process and so on. This is often
known as a "detailed fault tree analysis. The object is to isolate
all possible breakdowns and then design preventative devices into
the process so that all hazards are provided for. This, according
to Shell/Esso experts and according to general expert opinion,
reduces the risks of catastrophe to an acceptable level.
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In effect, this means designing into each system the
accumulated empirical evidence about each piece of equipment, in
order to improve the safety. One would expect this to be done with
any piece of remotely hazardous industrial equipment. One would
also expect that it had been done on several plants which have since
failed disastrously. Since the Reporter is only concerned with
evidence tested by experiment or experience, the highest standard of
safety he is likely to get is that the industry keeps up with the
latest accident. E.g. in this inquiry, the Reporter recommended
fully redundant secondary containment for the storage tanks after
accidents at Qatar and Flixborough caused by failure of tanks
without this safeguard. The argument put forward by the Action
group advocate is that the rate of accidents suggests we don't know
enough facts - therefore a fault-tree analysis is not sufficient by
itself, and development should therefore not be permitted in
residential areas.
The objectors' expert witness argued that the "facts" alone
were inadequate to ensure safety, and that until more research was
carried out, speculative theory should be used to gauge the possible
behaviour of vapour clouds and allow for this in the design and
siting of the plant. The conservation society witness felt that too
many accidents had occurred despite the safety precautions built in
to designs and that therefore new thinking and imagination was
required to bring these developments to a reasonable safety
standard.
The latter witnesses would probably not consider their evidence
strictly factual, by the rigorous standards applied by the Reporter.
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However they would claim their evidence was relevant knowledge, as
would other parties whose evidence was excluded from the findings of
fact.
The Reporter is concerned only with factual evidence. Evidence
is factual if it has been adequately tested either by experience or
experiment. He does not accept that there are insufficient facts,
as a cursory look at his "Findings of Fact" will show. Previous
accidents in the industry are relevant but only in so far as
mistakes, design faults and technical problems can be isolated and
remedied, thus making each new development safer. The Reporter is concerned
with ensuring that it can be built with an acceptable degree of risk but
this is to be calculated on evidence which has been tested by experience or
experiment and not by theoretical speculation or untested extrapolation.
(5)
The Reporter describes himself as a
"seeker after truth".
I would argue that this carries absolutist implications.
However from my analysis in this Chapter I would also argue that the
notion of "relevant facts" is the product of a particular set of
methods and assumption drawn from the Reporter's training,
experience and professional knowledge of his powers, duties and
responsibilities. Thus "truth" is not absolute - it is the product
of a professional frame of reference. It is "truth" for technical
(5) My concern here is not with the relationship between "economic
requirements" and "safety regulations" though the issue is clearly
raised here. For a recent study of precisely this problem see
Carson (1981).
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rational purposes which is presented rhetorically as absolute and
neutral. Before going on to consider the implications of this, I
want to look briefly at other grounds used by the Reporter to reject
evidence as non-factual.
I showed in Chapter 4 that much evidence was excluded from the
findings of fact, not on the grounds of substantive irrelevance, but
because the evidence was not "factual". This evidence included such
categories as judgement, opinion, policy, reaction to facts or
personal feelings.
In this example the objector has presented to the witness the
argument that potentially hazardous developments ought to be
situated away from populated areas.
Witness: I am aware of that, but I don't regard
this as being relevant to my part of the job. I am
not involved in establishing the location for petro¬
chemical plants.
Objector: I appreciate that. You might have a personal
view on it do you?
Witness: My personal view is that where you can possibly
provide yourself with room space (sic) from populated
parts, from habitation, where you can provide it
you do so. But I know that this situation is not
always there. You may be forced to put your
installation in a much less limited space than
what you would desire to.
Objector: And thereby increase the risk of a disaster?
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Witness: I should not say that. I should say and
therefore having to look extra cautiously at all
the design features.
Objector: But you are always looking extra cautiously at
the designs aren't you?
Witness: That is really to a certain extent where you in
one case provide yourself with one line of
defence, and then you provide yourself with two
lines of defence, and being accused of spending
too much money.
Objector: If a commmunity is at risk surely a company of
the size of Shell could spend a little bit more
money and take it somewhere else?
Witness: Well this is not
Objector: It is not a decision for you to make, I can
appreciate that?
Witness: It is not a decision for me to make and in that
respect I am not taking part in it.
Objector: Which comes first money or human life? I wouldn't
have thought you would have needed to wait to
answer that?
Witness: I should say what comes first is quality of human
life, which may mean in certain cases that a
certain amount of risk has to be accepted by the
community to be prospering and I think that if
we were not there doing anything our country,
the countries we live in, would not have the same
quality of life we have now.
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Objector: Well I appreciate that if I get into my car to
drive, the benefit I get is that I get here in
comfort and quickly, but if I set up my house in
Aberdour and along comes Shell and sets up a
petro-chemical complex, I didn't ask for it, 1
don't want it, it is no benefit to me, is that
not a justifiable way of looking?
Witness: May I refuse, Mr. Reporter, to answer this sort
of question?
Reporter: I think you have got more cooperation out of this
witness than perhaps you expected. Thank you.
This is an example of a common line of questioning by the lay
objectors which I will discuss in Chapter 7. This does not produce
evidence which the Reporter will consider "factual". The objector
asks for the witness's personal opinion, the Reporter would be
concerned with his professional evidence, he asks moral and
political questions which are similarly irrelevant. I suspect that
if the witness had not shown himself willing to answer the
questions the Reporter would have interrupted the questioner. This
example occurred quite early in the inquiry and thus the Reporter
was probably keen to allow the objectors some "leeway". The witness
was the general policy witness for Shell and not a technical expert.
It could be argued that part of his role in the inquiry was to face
public criticism of general company policy. This is a further
example of the Reporter extending "democracy" by allowing objectors
to participate though their contribution was of no assistance to
his bureaucratic function of information gathering. Later, more
experienced witnesses refused to answer questions asking for their
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personal opinion, (see Chapter 7)
Beware gentlemen! No doubt you have been
paid a large sum of money to give professional
advice to your clients, so that what you are
giving us here today is your professional
opinion?
Yes.
If we have heard your professional opinion, is
there anything in your private conscience that
worries you about this development?
In case you are wondering who to talk to at the
moment, it doesn't trouble me if it is your
professional or your private opinion: have you
got any reservations or do you see any areas
where real difficulty or damage could arise at
this development? I think we will probably get
the same answer put that way as put the other
way?
Here, the Reporter again tries to move the inquiry away from
questions of moral opionions to facts, "real difficulty or damage".
The Reporter's final comment suggests that he is aware that the
witness is experienced and will not respond to questions concerning
his "private conscience". However at the same time he attempts to get a
response to keep the objector happy, and to prevent him from feeling
that his moral concerns are not being treated seriously. One could
read the objector's question as a "partial penetration" (Willis 1977) of






a disjunction between his notion of justice and the technicality and
professionalism of the inquiry. He is, in the broadest sense,
recognizing that the inquiry is political. He wants the inquiry to
debate values rather than test facts. I have more to say on the
moral basis of lay participation in Chapter 7.
The dominant frame of reference
I have argued that the "findings of fact" are a more significant
part of the final report than the summary of evidence. The Reporter
organises the evidence according to relevant issues and selects
certain evidence as being "the facts of the inquiry". It is these
'facts' which justify a particular decision. It is not that the
Reporter prejudges the final outcome of the inquiry, but he has some
questions to which he requires answers and thus concentrates on
particular issues (relevance) and only a certain kind of evidence on
these issues (facticity). This is precisely his bureaucratic function as
Reporter. This is not, however, publicly available in the inquiry.
During the inquiry evidence is given by witnesses rather than
according to issues. The Reporter gives hints as to his aims and
methods but never an explicit formulation of his bureaucratic role.
Nor does he summarise his findings as he proceeds, these are only
available in the Report published after the end of the inquiry.
There was, however, one witness at the inquiry who, as it were,
gave a "sneak preview" of the final Report.
The planning witness for the two applicant companies, clearly
demonstrated a close familiarity with the dominant frame of
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reference. His evidence was not factual and thus was not in the
findings of fact but was significant in the inquiry for two main
reasons.
His evidence came at the end of the applicants' case and it
consisted of a summary of good planning arguments for the approval
of the development based on the factual evidence provided by the
applicants' witnesses who had preceded him. In other words he
performed the same tasks of selection, assessment and judgement as
the Reporter. His evidence is in content and arrangement very
similar to the Reporter's final Report. Though not "factual", his
evidence demonstrates that the applicant's evidence was designed to
provide the factual basis for a planning argument based on the same
criteria applied by the Reporter.
This witness was very experienced in public inquiry work and
presented himself impressively in the witness box as calm, quietly
confident and relaxed. His arguments sounded convincing and he
dealt with hostile cross-examination with a mixture of charm and
authority. Coming at the end of the applicants case, he presented
what sounded like extremely good arguments for approving the
development. This is not just my opinion but was shared by many of
the participants at the inquiry including a large number of
objectors, some of whom felt that their case was hopeless, after
the evidence of this witness.
Though the applicants began their evidence with a general
policy witness whose evidence attracted some emotional cross-
examination from the objectors, the interim evidence had been
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specialised, and technical and concerned specific parts of the
development. The presentation of the evidence of the planning
witness was the first time that the case for the development had
been argued in detail. It had a demoralising effect on the lay
objectors.
This witness's evidence reproduces important parts of the
dominant frame of reference, and for this reason is powerful. there
are no explicit references to the criteria of "relevance" or
"facticity" or to the political assumptions which constitute good
planning arguments. The argument for the development is presented
as obvious and inevitable. His argument suggests that given the
facts i.e. the great economic need for the development, the
suitability of the site, the acceptability of the risk levels and
the commitment to minimise environmental damage then any rational
man would give approval to the development. The decision is a
rational one based on technical information. Government policy is
technical information a "fact" for the purposes of the inquiry and
not a matter for discussion.
From my conversation with the objectors at this stage of the
inquiry I would argue that this evidence demoralised the objectors
because for the first time they heard the full technical rational
case for approving the planning applciation and they were both
convinced that it was a strong argument and dismayed that their work
in the inquiry didn't seem to be represented and didn't seem to have
counted.
This provides further support for my arguments in the next
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chapter about the significance of the relationship between the
objectors and the dominant technical rationality of the inquiry.
The Professional Frame of Reference
I have argued in this chapter and the previous chapter that the
criteria for ascribing "relevance" and "facticity" to evidence are
the central constituents fo a "professional frame of reference"
which is shared by the Reporter, and the lawyers (and the witnesses)
but which is not publicly available to the lay objectors.
Evidence in the areas of economic need, technological design
and environmental impact is considered relevant and within these
areas evidence which has been tested by experience or experiment is
considered factual, as are statements of government policy. Given a
policy decision that oil resources should be exploited, the
technical rational problem becomes can this plant be constructed so
that there is an acceptable level of risk to the community and an
acceptable impact on the environment. As the Reporter said
"the balance sheet that I will be drawing up
(is) whether the overall benefit and
disadvantage to the community is one that
says they (Shell/Esso) shouldn't come here
at all."
The Reporter's function is to collect "relevant facts" on which
a sort of cost-benefit analysis can be conducted. I have argued
that he is interested in a limited sort of information which
excludes expert knowledge where that is speculative or "pure" theory
as well as other sorts of information which he is presented with
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such as opinion, value judgements and personal feelings.
This part of the "professional frame of reference" consists of
the bureaucratic function of the inquiry, the criteria by which
information is selected out of the evidence presented. The other
part of the "professional frame of reference" which I analysed in
Chapter 4, I described as the democratic role of the Reporter. I
argued that he fulfilled his responsibility of encouraging lay
participation through the helpful and sympathetic attitude he
adopted towards the objectors. This part of the professional frame
of reference is not so important for the lawyers because they play a
much less important part in controlling the inquiry and have no
direct responsibility to make participation easier for lay
objectors. I would argue, however, that in a number of minor ways
they shared the "democratic" element of the professional frame of
reference. Their own interests were served by tolerating lay
participants and by not objecting to their "wayward" questioning.
They had a responsibility to their clients for public relations, a
responsibility to uphold the rhetoric of justice, fairness and
impartiality and their interests would be further served by
assisting the Reporter rather than by hindering him. So though the
Reporter was largely responsible for balancing his bureaucratic and
democratic functions, his sense of balance was largely shared by
the lawyers in the inquiry. It is through this "professional frame
of reference" that the Reporter controls and directs the inquiry.
His bureaucratic fact finding role takes priority over the
assistance and encouragement of lay participation but I argue that
the two are inextricably interlinked. It is not that the inquiry is
simply technical rational and that lay participation is a sham. I argue
that the objectors did participate in the inquiry and in a
particular way, which I describe in the next chapter, awarded the
inquiry legitimacy. It is for understanding how this operated that
it is important to see how the bureaucratic and democratic roles
were actually put into practice; how they remained in tension within
the professional frame of reference.
This "frame of reference" reproduced by the Reporter and the
lawyers, is not simply a product of the shared knowledge or the
'professional ethos' of the legal profession, although this culture
is a very important medium for its dissemination. It is beyond the
scope of this current study to trace the precise structural sources of the
ideologies contained in their frame of reference, but one obvious
source is planning law, and another the political practice of
"planning". This raises questions about the relationships between
law, politics and technological innovation to which this study
contributes in a particular way.
I am concerned with the political role of the inquiry in
legitimating state action and thus with the perceptions of the lay
objectors of what might constitute "good planning arguments" rather
than with examining what constitutes the latter from a legal or
bureaucratic point of view. However, in McAuslan's terms (McAuslan
1979), planning law has tended to concern itself with
"facilitating the carrying out of policy and
decisions on land use by public officials,
and with maintaining the existing state of
property relations in society, and the
existing allocation of social resources."
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The law is not neutral but serves conservative political
objectives, conserving the existing controlling institutions and
social relations. For McAuslan lay participation is subservient to
the ideology of public interest. Rather than participation in
inquiries being a citizenship right, it is formally based on
property rights and is controlled by the discretion invested in
public officials "to determine the nature, scope and effectiveness of
lay participation". (McAuslan 1979)
"Public interest" in the Moss Moran case is defined by
Government policy on the exploitation of oil resources and by
certain technical measurements of risk and environmental impact.
Lay participation has very little impact on these technical rational
issues. I argue that the inquiry system itself and particularly the
Reporter's discretionary power
"determine the nature, scope and
effectiveness of lay participation"
In the next chapter I want to describe how the lay objectors
participated in the Moss Moran inquiry. I show that contrary to
McAuslan's argument, their participation was meaningful to them. I
want to show how technical rationality dominates with the consent of
the lay objectors in other words how legitimation is secured in the




One of the main aims of changes to inquiry procedure rules was,
ostensibly, to provide an improved facility for lay participation in
the inquiry. I have argued in Chapter 1 that most of the changes
applied to pre-and post-inquiry procedures e.g. the advance
circulation of written precognitions of evidence, the pre-inquiry
procedure meeting and the circulation of new-evidence, submitted after
the inquiry has closed, to all participants. Some of these have
undoubtedly aided lay objectors, but only in as much as the changes
have made the inquiry more efficient, in terms of time and resources,
for al1 parties concerned.
Procedures during the inquiry have remained largely unaffected
by these changes. They are left to the discretion of the
Reporter. I have described how the adversary procedures of the
courtroom were adopted into the inquiry and how they continue to
form the basic structural procedures of the inquiry. Circular 14
suggests that the Reporter should encourage
"the maximum informality of procedure so
that the ordinary interested person does not
feel inhibited from making a contribution
without personal representation."
My argument in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 has been that the Reporter the
lawyers and the experts share a tacit frame of reference which is
reproduced in their actions in the inquiry. This frame of reference
crucially supplies those criteria by which evidence can be labelled
"relevant" and "factual" and also contains the methods and techniques
of examination and cross-examination within the adversary procedure.
In other words this frame of reference describes the underlying formal
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structures of the inquiry.
The emphasis, in this frame of reference, is on collecting
certain sorts of information efficiently. I have described this as
the bureaucratic function. The encouragement of lay participation, the
democratic function, takes a lower priority. Though the inquiry may
allow some relaxations in the adversary procedures which would not be
tolerated in a court of law, it is nevertheless tightly structured in
a particular manner.
It is against this background that I turn to examine the
participation of the lay objectors in the inquiry in more detail.
What sort of frame of reference underpinned their participation? To
what extent, if at all, did they share the dominant professional
frame of reference? To what extent did their participation change
during the course of the inquiry?
I expected to find a relatively precise professional frame of
reference. For the Reporter, the lawyers and to a lesser extent the
expert witnesses, the inquiry is part of their job, for which they
have been trained. The inquiry is a part of the broader legal
system within which the advocates work every day. The sociological
literature on bureaucracy and the professions would lead us to
(1)
expect a tightly organised "way of doing things" in the inquiry.
The professional frame of reference produces a particular sort of
knowledge from the inquiry.
(1) See Salaman (1981).
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The lay objectors are more problematic. The Action Group members
share a desire to stop the development, but their motives, strategies
and expectations might vary widely. However the knowledge they
attempt to produce in the inquiry through either evidence or cross-
examination, is produced in response to certain interests. In other
words, they must have some "method" of participation in the inquiry,
even if this is full of contradictions. Their actions in the inquiry
do not appear spontaneously in the course of the inquiry but reproduce
certain ideological structures; particular ways of looking at the
world, for example views of how democracy works, of the function of
the public inquiry, of the relative moral status of an expert, a
Regional Councilor and an oil company executive, etc.
In this chapter I analyse their evidence and cross-examination to
discover what sort of frame of reference underpinned their
participation.
The Lav Obiectors
Around ten 'lay objectors' participated regularly in the inquiry,
sometimes conducting cross-examination on their own behalf, sometimes
on behalf of the Action Group. The interests, abilities and knowledge
of these ten varied considerably but as a group they can be described
as confident, articulate and middle-class.
In the early days of the inquiry, however, these objectors were
obviously nervous and unsure of themselves. They were hesitant; they
spoke in low voices, their questions were interspersed with long
pauses, and they repeated themselves. By the end of the inquiry these
'faults' had almost disappeared as the objectors became more confident
and more accustomed to the atmosphere of the inquiry. It was as if
the objectors had 'learnt' how to behave in an inquiry.
(2)
At face value then, it might appear as if procedures had been
kept sufficiently "informal" to allow the objectors to participate.
And indeed the objectors expressed a degree of satisfaction with the
inquiry and participated throughout the inquiry in an orderly
manner. Although they continued to express dissatisfaction and
frustration I have argued (Chapter 3) that they can be said to have
awarded legitimacy to the inquiry process because though they were
sceptical before the inquiry started they persevered with their
participation and did not abandon the inquiry.
In this chapter I want to look at these contradictions in more
detail and provide an account of how legitimation operated in the
social practices of the inquiry.
Lack of Resources
Before proceeding with this analysis I want to mention a number
of practical problems which severely limited both the extent and the
quality of the lay objectors' participation. These concern the
unequal distribution of such resources as time, money and access to
knowledge.
The inquiry was held during normal office hours. This meant that
(2) For examples of how participants in a social setting construct and
manage their identity see Goffman (1959) (1963) Berger and
Luckman (1967).
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those objectors with full-time jobs found it very hard to attend the
inquiry regularly and their rota system led to a lack of continuity
in their cross-examination and a great deal of repetition which was
inevitable because one objector had not heard his colleague's cross-
examination of a previous witness. This problem would have been eased,
had the objectors bought a copy of the daily transcript but the cost
of this was outside their limited resources. The cost of legal
representation and an expert witness put a severe strain on even the
relatively affluent communities represented by the Action Group.
Being unable to buy much 'expert' and professional assistance, they
had to do their own research, which involved the use of another scarce
resource, time.
Though the oil companies would protest that the inquiry cost
them a great deal of money, they provided themselves with whatever
professional and technical assistance they required to present their
case and there was very obviously a vast gap between their resources
and the resources of the Action Group.
Some members of the Action Group claimed that they would have
won their case if they had had access to the same resources as the
applicant companies. This claim raises a number of crucial issues,
e.g. What is meant by effective participation? Is this the same as
"winning one's case"? Would the conduct or the result of this
inquiry been different had there been no lay participation? Is
'effective' lay participation possible in public inquiries? What
light does this study shed on the practical operations of democracy?
I will discuss these issues in the final chapter, but I will show in
this chapter, that the extension of democratic participation is much
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more than a "resources problem"; that it is a complex political
problem of a liberal- democratic state which requires the consent of
the majority in order to govern, (see chapter 2)
Lav Participation
I have shown that the 'professionals' in the inquiry share a
relatively precise 'frame of reference' which guides their
participation in the inquiry. I now want to see what sort of 'frame
of reference' the lay objectors use to guide their participation.
For the lay objectors in the Action Group, participation
involved cross- examination, although a larger number of lay
objectors gave a brief statement of evidence at the end of the
inquiry. The objectors employed an advocate to conduct the
detailed technical cross- examination of the oil companies' expert
witnesses. Individual objectors usually added their own questions
in cross-examination of most of the technical witnesses, the policy
witnesses and the local authority witnesses without the aid of
counsel.
Compared to professional cross-examination, lay cross-
examination was imprecise, garrulous, wide-ranging and thus difficult
categorize. However, I have tried to produce some features of lay
cross-examination which seem to me to best describe it.
Criticism
A great amount of the lay cross-examination seemed to be aimed
at discrediting the witness in one way or another. This is a valid
- 207 -
and much-used technique in courtroom cross-examination. If doubt
(3)
can be cast on the credibility or reliability of a witness in a
trial, the judge (and or jury) might be less likely to accept his
evidence. Only exceptionally will this witness be giving 'expert'
evidence, and this technique is more frequently used to cast doubt
on a witness's memory of an incident. In the inquiry, the lay
objectors used this technique to challenge the sincerity, competence
and efficiency of the applicant companies and their employees.
A representative was asked whether he considered it good
business to sign contracts before being in a position to supply the
contracted goods. This is obviously a challenge to the
representative's commercial competence. There were many questions
accusing Shell of serving the interests of their shareholders rather
than, as Shell had claimed, the interests of the nation as a whole.
(The implication intended by the objectors was that these two
interests were always incompatible and that they, rather than the
oil companies, represented "the interests of the people".) There were
also questions about the detailed design of various pieces of plant,
the estimated life of the Brent oil field, negative tidal surges and
the consequences of ingesting fuel oil, which were asked to try to
catch the witness out; to show that the companies had not been as
thorough as they had suggested, to challenge their arithmetic, to
doubt their expertise: in general, questions designed to discredit
the witness. The questions may have concerned relevant topics,
however they were not part of a systematic testing of the evidence
but rather one-off challenges to perceived weaknesses. These
(3) McBarnett (1981) Du Cann (1979).
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perceptions were usually inaccurate.
The objectors faced a formidable task in discrediting a company
with the resources, reputation and record of Shell or Exxon, and it
is not surprising that little evidence gleaned from this sort of
cross-examination was incorporated into the final report. Most of
this questioning was based on inadequate information and was an act
of desperation rather than of calculation.
e.g. An objector asked a Shell witness
about earlier plans for St. Fergus,
the subject matter of the Peterhead
inquiry in which Shell were not even
involved. The same objector made some
remarks in his questioning about the
Peterhead inquiry, which were wrong.
The Reporter intervened to correct
him.
I would also place under this heading those attempts by the
objectors to challenge rhetorical claims made by the applicant
companies. e.g. An oil company witness would claim that
(Shell)..."would take a very serious
view...."
of some topic, or that the use of a particular construction
method would have
"a minimal effect on the environment"
The objectors would spend time demonstrating in cross-
examination, that these claims were empty, ungrounded and meaningless.
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However I have already shown that such claims did not come under the
Reporter's criteria of "relevant fact" and so a challenge to these
claims would not appear in the findings of fact, i.e. The Reporter was
content to establish "the facts" and make his own judgements, leaving
the evaluations of both sides as of minor importance.
In general the attempts by the lay objectors to criticise the
company were unsuccessful either because they were inaccurate or
irrelevant (in terms of the inquiry). The Reporter was concerned
with the factuality of the evidence and was interested in cross-
examination which challenged this. Much of the objector's cross-
examination was designed to discredit the witness (and thus his
employer) by attempting to find faults in isolated pieces of
evidence. This is a useful technique in the criminal court when
what is being tested is the witness's credibility.
In a criminal court, a witness's account of an event which was
probably unexpected, happened very quickly and some months
previously can be challenged on the grounds of the human
fallibilities in perception and memory. Neither the integrity nor
the status of the witness need be challenged.
However, in an inquiry, the point is to test the professional
competence of a witness, e.g. is the design for the refrigerated
pipeline competent and safe? If part of an expert's evidence was
shown to be wrong, then this would discredit the rest of his evidence
and would challenge his status as a competent professional. But
this will be a difficult task which will involve a detailed
technical knowledge of the field in question, rather than a taken
for granted, common-sense knowledge of the problems we have in
reconstructing the events of a road accident.
Negotiation
Often in cross-examination, the objectors would seek assurances
from a witness on some topic e.g. the risk to the community, the use
of local labour, compensation etc. Some of these assurances were
incorporated into the long list of planning conditions set out by
the local authorities. In particular, the cross-examination of the
Forth Yacht Clubs consisted of a process of negotiation to ensure
the continuance of the annual Aberdour Regatta. Several witnesses
were asked to give assurances that from their point of view they
could see no reason why, with detailed consultation, the Regatta
should not be able to go ahead. The Club's representative
maintained a courteous and dignified attitude throughout the inquiry
and used the inquiry as a forum for arbitration. He also
participated as an individual and maintained his objection to the
development regardless of assurances concerning the Regatta. This
raises the question of whether the adversary procedure with its
emphasis on conflict is formally suitable for the processes of
negotiation and conciliation which go on in the inquiry.
It could be argued that for some of the lay objectors one of
the main functions of the inquiry was the negotiation of conditions
with the applicant companies. Thus the inquiry concerned the precise
form of the development rather than whether or not the development
should go ahead. As one objector said,
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"we know the thing's inevitable so we just
have to get what we can from the companies."
The adversary procedure sets two "sides" against each other -
for and against the development. Though there is no doubt that most
of the objectors were against the development, most of their
"effective" participation, in terms of practical results, was in
negotiating concessions, a particularly good example being the
Regatta. The adversary procedure is not ideal for negotiation. It
has to be done during cross-examination and thus with one witness,
where it may concern an issue under the responsibility of three
witnesses. Negotiation requres a dialogue and cross-examination
limits the capacity of the questioner to make statements. However
the adversary procedure is an effective way of collecting and
testing information, the Reporter's primary function, and it might
be that a seminar-type procedure which would be appropriate for
negotiation, would be ineffective for the collection of information.
I would also argue that the use of the adversary procedure
serves to secure legitimacy. Because it deals with witnesses rather
than issues, it conceals the "issue-centred" nature of the inquiry
from the layman, who only glimpses the underlying structures of the
inquiry. The adversary procedure brings with it the ideological
messages of "justice, fairness and equality" which reinforce the
respect held by the lay objectors for the democratic process as they
experience it in the inquiry.
The adversary procedure is an important part of the structure
of the inquiry, it serves a variety of functions some of which may
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assist lay participation, some which undoubtedly hinder it. In
Chapter 8 I will look at proposed changes to inquiries, which would
relegate adversary procedure to a small part of the process, in the
light of this study of the Moss Moran inquiry.
Public Relations
There were occasions during the inquiry when the objectors
seemed to be using their cross-examination as an occasion to attract
public attention and public sympathy. The local and national press
gave daily coverage of the inquiry, and the press table was usually
occupied.
One objector in particular would appear, usually first thing in
the morning, and attempt to secure headlines in the following day's
press. On one occasion he put the 'curse of St. Columba' on the
developers and on another suggested that each job created by the
development would cost the taxpayer 1 million pounds and accused a
local councillor of trading Fife's heritage for a short term
economic gain.
This same questioner twice attempted to get an assurance from
witnesses that they would accept the decision of the Reporter even
if it disagreed with the final decision of the Secretary of State.
In one instance, the witness was unaware of the correct
administrative procedure, and the Reporter had to intervene with
an explanation. This type of questioning certainly brought some
light relief to the inquiry and the headlines may have boosted the
morale of the objectors. It was, of course, irrelevant as far as
- 213 -
the Reporter was concerned, and it is perhaps worth noting that the
advocates did not indulge in such behaviour, with the exception of
the occasional joke.
All of the objectors at the inquiry maintained a courteous and
calm front, tempers were rarely lost, there were no attempts to
disrupt the inquiry, no ungentlemanly behaviour, few personal
insults. The objectors seemed concerned to present themselves as
decent, responsible, conscientious members of the community, perhaps
thinking that the Reporter (being 'one of them') would be more likely
to listen to sober evidence from sensible people, than to violent
protestations from agitators. As demonstrated by John Tyme's
(4)
Highway Inquiries protests, it is possible to persuade middle-class
conservative objectors to behave in a more violent and angry
manner. It is significant that the Action Group did not choose this
course, though they were aware of the possibilities.
Expertise
Those objectors who had some technical knowledge occasionally
questioned the expert technical witnesses on some detailed technical
point. This always appeared as a contest between amateur and
professional. Usually the objector did not have sufficient
knowledge and tried to use what little he had, together with his
common sense to try to pick holes in the expert's evidence. This
typically resulted in the expert explaining patiently to the amateur
just where the latter's knowledge or experience was deficient. The
(4) See Sharman 1977.
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objector's attitude in this case must have been hope that he would
stumble on something that had been missed by the expert, or uncover a
gap in his reasoning. I did not find one example, where an expert's
evidence was substantively challenged by a lay objector. Experts
spent a lot of the inquiry's time explaining their work to lay
objectors. Again this can be seen as the inquiry securing
legitimacy for the planning process. Lay objectors, particularly
those with some expertise, are able to challenge directly the
"experts". Thus when the experts "win", as they almost always do,
lay objectors are more likely to accept their superior knowledge and
skill because they have had a chance to "test" their evidence. Of
course, even the layman with some expert knowlege is hardly on equal
terms with an applicant's expert witness. He will have less time,
money and research facilities, less specialised knowledge, less
familiarity with his material and probably less confidence.
Crucially the objectors did not know why they were asking particular
questions. Whereas the advocates, in cross-examination, attempted
to make a particular point which they knew the Reporter would think
was relevant, the lay objectors even in these instances where they
had expertise, tended to pursue critical arguments for their own
sake. They did not share the same criteria for ascribing
"relevance".
Though the lay objectors usually adopted the concepts
and categories used by the lawyers and applicant companies, there
were a few occasions when these definitions were challenged, where
the objectors introduced alternative definitions of their own. In
the first example below, the objector tries to establish a difference
between the 'technical statement' of a fatal accident and its 'real
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meaning' in terms of human suffering. The objector is trying to
suggest that loss of life is an absolute value which should not be
measured against economic benefits. It is a protest against the
apparent glibness, which allows us to talk about death and
employment prospects in the same breath. The witness, a senior Regional
councillor, believes that jobs have always been paid for by
suffering and disagrees with the witness's perceptions.
Objector: The technical statement doesn't mean
anything to me and it wouldn't have
meant anything to any of your
Regional councillors?
Witness: I think there might have been the odd
member who would have had a better
understanding of it.
Objector: There was a recent pipeline incident in
the Alaska pipeline. Now as I
understand it in non-technical terms,
it meant 1 man killed perhaps one
family without a father, husband,
five men injured, no indication yet
as to how many of them will ever work
again and yet in this technical
report it would feature as "June,
1977, U.S.A." or "Alaska" wherever it
happended "failure in pump, escape of
contents, shutdown of pipeline" a
technical statement which bears no
relation whatsoever to the reality of
one dead, five injured, goodness
knows how many families
affected Do you take my point
that these are technical statements
and mean nothing to the ordinary man
in the street?
Witness: I fail to see the point that you are
driving at. I mean, I have read, as
you have, about the incident in
Alaska but so far I don't know any of
the detail and, like yourself, I
regret the fact that people are
killed not only in Alaska but in
industry in this country every day.
Objector: So I take it you will not disagree that
all the members of Fife Regional
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Council were not aware in real terms,
not technical statements, of the
implications of these two pages
before they voted?
Witness: I think that the Fife Regional Council have a
measure of common-sense in their
approach to such matters we
have also got on occasion to give
approval to the sinking of coal
mines, we know people are
ultimately unfortunately going to be
killed.
Objector: You haven't answered my question were
the Regional Council members aware in
real terms of the consequences of
this sort of incident? Was it
itemised to them, the loss of life,
maimed casualties, damage to
property, was it described to them in
non-technical terms at the meeting?
Witness: No, it was not described in non-technical
terms could I just say this.
this line of questioning is possibly
fair at an inquiry of this nature but
as someone who had the reponsibility
of being Chairman of the Seafield
Disaster fund, of living through the
Michael Colliery Disaster we
are not unaware of the consequences
of industrial development in our
area.
Objector: Are you at risk as a result of this
proposal by Shell/Esso?
Witness: I think it depends on your definition of
risk.
Objector: Right I will define my risk, would you,
if you had children attending
Aberdour school, be worried that
there may be an accident at Braefoot
Bay which could result in the windows
of Aberdour school being blown out at
a time when all the children of
Aberdour are in the playground that
is what I consider risk. Are you at
risk?
Witness: I think an emotive over emphasis.
Reporter: Be fair, in answer to that question I
think your answer must be not in that
sense?
- 217 -
Witness: Not in that sense.
I have demonstrated the variation in the kinds of
questions asked by the lay objectors. Some questions seemed to
assume that the development was inevitable and thus sought to
negotiate conditions, other questions were based on the argument
that the development was an unacceptable risk and that it should be
built elsewhere. Some questions accepted the definitions and
concepts used by the lawyers and experts, other questions challenged
these and offered alternatives. The objectors seemed to adopt a
variety of approaches, not necessarily all logically compatible with
each other. They tried to negotiate with the companies, they tried
to discredit, embarass and ridicule their witnesses and they
attempted to mobilise public opinion in their favour. In Willis'
terms (Willis 1977) some of the lay cross-examination penetrated the
dominant technical rational conduct of the inquiry but their
penetrations were limited by a residual committment to the dominant
paradigm and its institutional setting.
While it is possible to locate and describe the "frame of
reference" which underpinned the participation of lawyers and
experts in the inquiry, the sources of the objectors' participation
seem to be of a different nature. Knowledge is produced in response
to a set of interests. In other words, knowledge is socially
produced by a set of methods and assumptions which have social
structural origins, (see chapter 2) The lawyers, scientists and the
Reporter are all concerned to produce the same 'relevant facts' on
which a decision can be made. They thus perceive the inquiry as a
forum for the construction and presentation of these facts and also
for their defence if they are 'seriously' challenged, by other
'relevant facts'. This form of participation is very familiar to
them: it is how they earn a living. This "frame of reference" is,
then, quite explicit in their participation. Though they will not
necessarily be aware of their actions, their frame of reference is
relatively precise, and relatively accessible to sociological
investigation. I would argue that the lay objectors' approach to
the inquiry is quite different. So far, I have only described the
'content' of their participation, I will now discuss their
techniques of participation before I attempt to provide a general account
of their participation in the inquiry.
Techniques
Those lay objectors who participated regularly in the inquiry
and who were unaccustomed to the skills of cross-examination
gradually picked up certain techniques as the inquiry progressed
and their confidence and experience increased. The Reporter
himself commented that cross- examination was a technique which had
to be learnt. There was a noticeable difference between
advocates and lay objectors, in the smoothness and accuracy of their
cross-examination.
Many of the objectors found difficulty in not giving evidence
during their cross-examination. Cross-examination is meant to
challenge points made by the witness in his evidence (or
precognition) and one is not allowed to give evidence in cross-
examination. As noted earlier, the Reporter often but not always
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corrected the questioner if this error was made. Every piece of the
cross-examination must be framed as a question (a point recognized
in the transcript by placing a question mark after each remark made
by the questioner whether or not it was grammatically
interrogative.)
This was gradually learnt by the objectors but an allied
problem arose in their failure to allow a witness to comment on each
hypothesis before asking him the final question, with the result
that the witness often could not answer the question because he did
not accept the hypothesis. Thus the objector might accuse a witness
of being evasive when the witness was only trying to be accurate.
The intrusion of hypotheses, qualifications and "throw-away"
judgements, results in a question being begged to such an extent as
to be impossible to answer accurately. The ineptitude of several of
the objectors in cross-examination caused them much embarassment and
frustration, e.g.
Objector: You refer to the enhancement of the
community, prospective enhancement of
the community to use my words - "in
the quality that our trained
employees bring to the communities in
which they live." Now perhaps I am
unduly touchy but I would imagine so
should many of the people be with
whom you have to deal.
This implies
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Reporter: I think you are giving evidence again
and interpeting what he says. Give
the witness a chance to say what he
means by it and you can follow it up
if you feel he hasn't given the
correct answer.
Objector: Fair enough. I will simply say briefly
that these employees that you are
pouring in as new trades people to
uplift the quality of a backward
people.....
Reporter: No no really you give us so many throw-away
asusmptions that unless the witness
is noting them as he goes along he
isn't going to be in a position to
answer the question.Those who are
unfamiliar with the discipline of
cross-examination because it is a
discipline, do tend to tell a wee
story before they come round to the
question. So if we could ask the
witness to react to this statement
and say what he means and then you
can come back on him. I am not
trying to protect the witness from
you.
The last remark of the Reporter is interesting as it refers
to the conflict nature of the adversary procedure: the Reporter
claims not to be protecting the witness from presumably the attack
of the examiner. It is difficult to see any point in this
objector's cross-examination other than to discredit and criticise
the witness. If the evidence under criticism was crucial the
examination might have been relevant. This was not the case, and it
seems that the Reporter was simply allowing the objector to have his
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say, though insisting that he adopt the correct techniques to preserve
the appearance that the examination was relevant. It seems also
that the Reporter was aware that the examination was irrelevant to his
final report from his prior interventions into the proceedings.
In this instance, the objector did not continue his cross-
examination after the Reporter's final comments. Despite the
efforts of the Reporter to be impartial and informal, his remarks
could easily have been taken as a reprimand; embarassing,because the
objectors in general took great pains to avoid disrupting the
inquiry or upsetting the Reporter. Their anger was directed at
higher authorities and not at the participants in the inquiry.
A further unwritten 'law' of cross-examination is "do not ask a
question unless you know the answer yourself". Adherence to this
rule enables the questioner to maintain control of the examination,
by only allowing the witness to say what he wants him to say, hence
controlling the knowledge produced at the inquiry.
"the person who asks the questions is
structurally very much in a position of
control." (Atkinson and Drew 1979)
This is particularly true when the person is a skilled advocate
with command over all the techniques of cross-examination, and a
clear idea of the case he is trying to present.
The advocates in the inquiry tended to ask a series of
questions, the answers to which, would lead to a conclusion designed
to fit under the Reporter's category of relevant fact. Though after
a while the objectors recognized this technique and attempted on
occasions to put it into practice, their basic method of cross-
examination was quite different. Each objector would question
on every point of the witness's evidence or precognition which he
found unclear, did not understand, thought might be inconsistent or
even wrong. Thus the objector rarely knew the answer to
his questions, quite the opposite, the questions were seeking new
information. These questions gave some control over the answer to
the witness and very often simply enabled the witness to reassert
his own evidence more clearly.
There are other differences between the cross-examination
techniques of advocates and lay objectors. The former tended to ask
short concise questions, very often only requiring a yes or no from
the witness. It is much easier always to know the answer to your
question if there are only two alternative answers. This
technique results in a rapid yet smooth flow which requires little
effort to follow. The lay objectors' questions tended to be more
rambling, to include more hypotheses, to be less articulate and to
allow the witness to be more expansive in his response. It required
much greater concentration from the observer to pick out the points
which were being made, if any, and resulted more often in confusion
and obscurity than precision and clarity. A visit to any court will
demonstrate the fluency, precision and control of most experienced
lawyers.
The experienced advocate is aware that similarly experienced
witnesses will be able to avoid answering certain questions quite
legitimately without any remonstration from the Reporter. These
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include questions referring to someone-else's reasons for a
decision, questions asking for a personal opinion, questions more
properly answered by another witness, questions outside the
witness's competence etc. Advocates can get the information they
require by asking a different series of questions or framing
the questions in a different way. (That is, assuming that the
information is important and relevant. Often these questions are
not relevant and are dropped if an answer is not forthcoming) this
was another cause of frustration amongst the objectors. Many of
their questions were evaded, passed on to another witness or made
into a joke by experienced witnesses, e.g.
In this example the witness has given evidence that the N.G.L.
plant is 'not a dirty industry'
Objector: They are very unsightly would you not
agree?
Witness: They may be unsightly, that depends,
beauty is in the eye of the beholder
is it not?
Objector: I personally might say that a bing
covered with grass was more beautiful
than a gas cracker plant.
Witness: That would be a matter for you to
decide.
Objector: Do you think the local politician who
introduced a cyanide plant outside
Milan probably thought the same
thing. (That it would stimulate the
local economy).
Witness: I am not aware of the mental
operations of any Italian
politicians, I have a big enough job
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in Fife without worrying about that.
In the first example the witness is asked a question which was
interpreted by the witness as requiring a subjective answer. As the
inquriy was only interested in objective facts and not mere personal
opinion, the witness was easily able to avoid answering the
question.
In the second example the witness realises that the Reporter
will not compel him to make subjective assessments of someone elses
decisions and so avoids answering what, as in the last case, seems,
in common sense terms to be an obvious question. These are the sorts
of questions often asked by the objectors.
Towards, the end of the inquiry the lay objectors began to realise
that these subjective questions would not elicit the answers they
wanted and they either tried to frame their questions differently or
satisfied themselves with the evasive answers.
Some of the witnesses were so adept at deflecting questions,
finding obscure interpretations or qualifying their answer, that at
times, even the advocates found difficulty in getting the answers
they wanted. After one local politician, who according to the
Reporter was a canny man "who handled cross-examination very well",
had been cross-examined by several lay objectors, the objectors'
advocate began his cross-examination saying "I'm determined to get a
yes or no out of you". It is interesting to note that the Reporter
admired someone "who can handle cross-examination". From the
reaction in the inquiry to this exchange, it would appear that
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lawyers share this admiration. This fits with the Reporter's
earlier characterisation of cross-examination as an 'art-form'. It
is seen as a precise tool, a set of techniques which, performed
correctly, can provide the Reporter with the information which he
requires. However the subtlety of the techniques is demonstrated by
the ability of experienced witnesses to thwart the less experienced
practitioners.
It is hardly surprising then, that, though they improved
dramatically during the courseof the inquiry, the lay objectors
never mastered the techniques of cross-examination. I give two
examples out of the many.
Objector: "So far I am having great difficulty
getting clear-cut simple answer to
what I would have thought are simple
questions"
Witness: I can give you a simple answer, that
is just not so.
Objector: So no effective survey was carried
out on alternative sites?
Witness: What you say is just not correct, I
carried out this survey and for the
first time in my life, I am hearing
the suggestion I don't know how to
carry out a survey comprehensively
and properly.
Objector: If you will forgive me, it is rather
difficult to know what you do say
because when I put it to you that,
did you carry out the only effective
survey of alternative sites that was
carried out you said no?
Witness: Well that is right, I didn't carry out
the only effective survey because
these other people looked at these
other sites, the team did.
Objector: The team?
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Witness: The team looked at these other sites,
I was the first person to get onto
the sites and say to these companies.
"In my opinion there are various
places that might be possible in this
area, some are better than others,
one or two of them are hopeless but
they are worth more detail" and when
they had done that their own team
came in and made an entire assessment
and then it was decided to go for
Moss Moran.
Objector: So their own team did in fact carry
out a survey of the sites...?
Witness: I understand so, I wasn't with them,
but I understand so.
Objector: And you understand that survey was a
thorough one?
Witness: I am sorry I am not going to speak for
the company at all. I wasn't with
them I don't know what they
did.
Objector: And yet you are in a position to give
an opinion that what I have just
implied is not so?
Witness: Indeed, I am because I know it wasn't
so. You are saying that nobody else
carried out a survey and I say that
is quite wrong, that the team did.
Objector: I said a proper survey? etc.
This example shows the confusion and frustration which can
arise when the questioner combines a lack of knowledge with an
inaccurate and imprecise form of questioning. The witness attempt
to answer the question accurately and finds that the questioner is
not satisfied. This is not because of an evasive answer but becau
of a badly framed question.
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A further example
1. Objector: You also agree that under the heading
of Manufacturing Industries that
Electronics and light engineering
companies feature largely in the Fife
area?
Witness: They feature in some areas largely?
2. Ob lector: In the overall employment situation
in Fife?
Witness: They constitute a proportion - but in some
areas they are not present
3. Objector: Do you not also point out in your
Regional Report that the employment
in manufacturing and service sectors
has the largest growth potential?
Witness: I would not be in a
position to be categorical about
that.
Objector: I rephrase that question and say
would you agree that in the Regional
Report you forecast a substantial
growth in electronics and light
engineering industries for which Fife
is well placed?
Witness: Well - I think that is the case. We are
supposed to be the electronics centre
of Western Europe.
5. Objector: An I not also right in saying that
the employment in these sectors has
been increasing and growing over the
last ten years?
Witness: In some instances although they have in
fact been affected by the economic
recession.
6. Objector: But as an overall situation am I not
right in saying that there has been a
growth of employment in these sectors
which in fact goes against the trend
in Scotland generally?
Witness: There has possibly been a small growth in
these industries but insufficient to
take account of unemployment that
obtains in the Fife Region.
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7. Objector: That was not my opinion. "During the
period 1964 to 1974 there was an
increase in manufacturing employees
in Fife of over 40% the largest
increase in the whole of Scotland."
You would agree therefore that over
the last ten year period the
manufacturing industry has been growing?
Witness: Yes, but not sufficiently.
8. Objector: In the light of all I just say would
you not agree that the long term
solution for Fife's unemployment
problem lies in the light industrial
and service sectors which are
compatible with existing industries
and not in the primary industries
such as mining or its modern
counterparts the oil or gas-related industries?
Witness: No I would not agree with you. I think
the responsibility of the Regional
and District councils is to ensure as
wide a diversification of industrial
opportunity as is possible
An example of an objector attempting to build up to a point
and being frustrated by the witness's refusal to commit himself as
well as by his own imprecise questioning. Almost every answer is
qualified which means that the questioner has to work harder to
establish the point. Question 2 is a more precise version of
question 1 as is question 4 of question 3 and 6 of 5. The point is
finally established in question 7 then, having seemingly cornered
the witness into admitting that employment in manufacturing industry
in Fife is growing (against a national trend) the questioner lets
the witness off the hook by bringing in "the long term solution to
Fife's unemployment problem" and "compatible with existing
industries". These terms have not been defined or discussed and the
witness can thus begin qualifying and introducing new material. The
remainder of this piece of cross-examination led the cross-examiner
nowhere and he eventually gave up and started on another point.
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I want to mention one further point of difference between lay
and professional cross-examination. The lay objectors tended to be
very repetitive. They made the same points many times both within
one piece of cross-examination and in their cross-examination of
different witnesses. They tended to ask more questions than were,
strictly speaking, necessary. The advocates, on the other hand,
made an effort to restrict their questioning to the minimum. Indeed
so skeletal were some pieces of their cross-examination that, as a
lay observer, I could not understand what points had been made nor
what argument had been established, without close attention to the
transcript and the relevant precognitions of evidence.
One explanation for this difference lies in their
different approaches to the inquiry. Since the advocates were aware
of the Reporter's criteria for ascribing facticity and relevance to
evidence (i.e. they knew the sort of information which would appear
in the 'findings of fact') and since they knew that the Reporter
read a copy of the transcript of the day's proceedings each evening,
they were able to present their facts and arguments as clearly and
as briefly as possible in the knowledge that this would make life
easier for the Reporter. They were, in effect, constructing and
presenting knowledge for the Reporter to read.
The objectors having, a different approach to the inquiry, were
more concerned, I would argue, with the public presentation of
their case. They needed to hear the witness concede a point in
cross-examination and the objectors wanted to be sure that the
Reporter was aware of this concession. For the objectors, the
inquiry was a public contest, where the rhetorical content of an
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argument was important. The advocates seemed less rhetorical in the
inquiry than they might have been in court trying to persuade a jury
of the credibility of evidence. This is because they saw the
inquiry as being concerned with the presentation of scientific and
technical information, to a Reporter who shares their assumptions.
In contrast to the participation of the main lay objectors, it
is instructive to look at that of the R.S.P.B. representative, an
experienced 'inquiry-objector'. The R.S.P.B. objection was into
bunkering facilities for fuel oil and the possible deleterious
affects on wild birds. The representative's cross-examination was
brief and precise. He established that there were two possible
bunkening sites, suggested that the site which posed less of a
threat to wildlife ought to be chosen, and negotiated a couple of
minor conditions concerning the operation of the facilities. Thus,
the objection was against a specific issue, rather than against the
entire project. The representative was realistic enough to know
that he could not avoid bunkering facilities and so negotiated the
best compromises he could under the circumstances. Because he had
settled for a realistic goal, he could frame his questions precisely
towards the achievment of that goal.
His aims and techniques fitted well with those of the lawyers
and experts in the inquiry. Both his evidence and cross-examination
provided 'relevant facts' for the Reporter. This can be seen in
contrast to the inarticulate and contradictory aims of the
objectors, and the variety of techniques used to pursue these aims.
Their assumptions about the nature of society and the nature of the
inquiry do not fit with the assumptions put into operation by the
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professionals, as I will argue later in this chapter.
From the evidence so far presented I would argue that it is
clear that lay objectors had a different, "frame of reference" from
the "professionals" in the inquiry. For the latter, the inquiry was
an administrative procedure, the primary function of which was to
collect a certain sort of information on a limited range of issues
concerning the proposed Shell/Esso development. I have described
this as the bureaucratic function of the inquiry. They also shared
knowledge of the correct techniques of participation.
The frame of reference underpinning the lay objectors'
participation is less precise, full of contradictions and is
constructed during the course of the inquiry. Because of its
variety and imprecision, the objectors' "frame of reference" is
much more difficult to isolate analytically, but I will describe
what I think are the most important constituents.
The first point is that the techniques of the lay objectors
changed during the course of the inquiry. Initially, few of the
objectors had much experience of public speaking, far less of cross-
examination in a public inquiry. There are no formal instructions
to laymen on how to participate. At the pre-inquiry procedure
meeting the Reporter gave the objectors some clues. He confirmed
his intentions to make participation easier for them, warned them
about being repetitive in cross-examination, and the participants
were given information about the advance circulation of
precognitions, the organisation and timing of witnesses, and the
desirability of avoiding time wasting. This did not give any clear
descriptions of the aims of the inquiry or the appropriate modes of
participation during the inquiry. The Reporter's comments concerned
the timing of the inquiry, its efficiency and his sympathy with the
(unspecified) problems of lay participation.
The objectors had to rely on their scant knowledge of public
inquiries, and what most of them referred to as their "common-
sense". In selecting appropriate behaviour in an unfamiliar
setting, people will tend to refer to the models provided by
significant others in the setting. In other words the objectors
(5)
would model their participation on the advocates and look to the
Reporter for approval of their techniques or for suggestions for
change. Also from a pragmatic point of view, the objectors were
aware that the Reporter as the person reponsible for the final
Report and recommendations, was the man whom they had to impress.
One obvious way of gaining the Reporter's respect was to present
themselves as decent, reponsible, moderate, conscientious citizens,
as people who took their democratic responsibilities in the inquiry
seriously. Again the obvious way of showing respect for the inquiry
and for the Reporter, is to attempt to participate in the same
manner as the advocates, i.e. to behave "properly" in the inquiry. So
not only was there no other model of behaviour for the lay objectors
to adopt, but the mode of participation used by the advocates,
appeared to be appropriate for the effective presentation both of
themselves and of their case.
I have argued that the lay objectors learnt some of the
(5) The concept of "significant other" comes from Mead (1934).
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techniques of cross-examination as the inquiry progressed but this
was of little avail to them either because they were pursuing
irrelevant topics with the correct techniques or because they had
inadequate mastery of the techniques e.g. they would learn to
conduct cross-examination without giving evidence and would build up
a set of questions attempting to make a point and then be frustrated
in their efforts by an inability to frame their questions with
sufficient precision. As the inquiry progressed, the lay objectors
became more confident and more skilled in cross-examination, in
imitation of the advocates. Thus, to this small extent, they
reproduced the dominant frame of reference through their
attempts to adopt the techniques of the adversary procedure.
On one hand, the objectors orient towards the techniques of the
adversary procedure. They see them as the "correct way to go about
things" in the inquiry; as a way of impressing the Reporter. They
also get a good deal of personal satisfaction from their modest
successes in mastering a new skill. As the inquiry progresses they
get enjoyment out of "playing at lawyers", in some cases, quite
convincingly. However, the more like lawyers the objectors
become, the more legitimacy they award to the system. They begin to
experience the inquiry as conducive to lay participation, after all,
they are getting answers to questions, the Reporter appears to be
listening and reacting, the witness is taking the questions
seriously. As their participation is accepted, so they feel they
are being given an opportunity, that their participation can be
effective.
On the other hand, however, the objectors find the techniques
of cross-examination difficult. They have to learn them during the
course of the inquiry from their observation, listening and
discussion amongst themselves. Thus because they only partially
share the dominant frame of reference, their cross-examination is
often frustrated. They can't get an answer to their question
because it is badly worded, or irrelevant, or repetitive, or
addressed to the wrong witness. This leads them to feel that
witnesses are being evasive, that the inquiry system is loaded
against them, that no-one wants to listen to their arguments and
that the decision has already been taken "behind the scenes" anyway.
It is in this sense that they can be said to have penetrated the
dominant frame of reference. They feel frustrated at the lack of
response to their efforts. They feel that their participation is
worthless and that the claims of the inquiry system to offer them an
opportunity to participate are just empty rhetoric.
Thus their orientation towards the techniques of cross-
examination causes anger, frustration and criticism of the system
and at the same time provides them with personal satisfaction,
optimism, and some commitment to the value of their participation in
the inquiry. On balance, the latter positive attitudes
predominate. The objectors, overall, feel that the inquiry does
give them an opportunity to participate and this is one way in which the
procedures of the inquiry are granted legitimacy.
While the objectors, during the inquiry, grew more
"professional" in their approach to the inquiry, still, the majority
of their questioning in cross-examination took different forms.
They only attempted to adopt the techniques of cross-examination,
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and to stick to technical subjects in certain parts of their cross-
examination. In general, their basic technique of cross-examination
was to go through a witness's precognition and ask a question on any
section which they found ambiguous, which they did not understand,
with which they disagreed or were angry or to which they had a
sufficiently strong reaction. They put questions requiring a
personal response to expert witnesses, they asked questions about
the morality of the development, and they made personal attacks on
witnesses. In addition to playing the part of "lawyer" they also,
and predominantly, played the part of "layman", i.e. they presented
themselves as intelligent and reponsible members of society who were
nonetheless naive and relatively ignorant both of the law and of the
technical detail of the subject matter of the inquiry. One objector
in particular would often preface his questions with disclaimers
e.g.
"Now I am just a simple man, but "
or
"My knowledge of these things is very
limited but it seems to me that "
The implication is that somehow lack of expertise or of knowledge or
of a technical speciality is no real drawback; that somehow, careful,
rational thought can produce questions which can be as penetrating
and useful as those of the advocates, and, that where rational
thought fails and emotional reaction slips through, then that is a
legitimate expression of the strength of their convictions which
ought to be taken into account by the Reporter.
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There is, then, within their participation, a contradiction
between a "professional" understanding of what the inquiry is about
and how they can best participate, and a less articulate belief in
their democratic right to express themselves; an assertion of their
"freedom". Ironically they experience the exercise of their rights
more clearly when they are restricting their participation to the
professional mode and tend to be frustrated when expressing
themselves more freely.
These contradictions are manifested throughout the
participation of the lay objectors.
From the earliest stages of the formation of the Action Group
before the inquiry, to the immediate aftermath of the inquiry, there
was always an undercurrent of pessimism amongst the objectors. This
was expressed in various ways,
"What chance have we got against giant
multi-nationals?"
"Its all been covered up already by the
politicians."
"We don't stand a chance in the inquiry."
"The decision has been made already, this is
just window dressing."
Almost everyone of the objectors at some stage made this sort
of comment. They felt that there was very little chance of the
applicants being refused planning permission, and that there was
very little they could do about it.
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Nevertheless, they worked hard to establish and organise the
Action Group, spent much time on research for the inquiry and
participated vigorously and enthusiastically in the inquiry. This
energy could hardly have been devoted to a completely "lost cause".
The objectors felt that so long as they used the available
democratic procedures correctly and responsibly that they stood some
chance of success, and that the decision might go in their favour. The
objectors may have been reluctant to express such optimism, but
their conduct is incomprehensible without this fundamental faith in the
ability of this democratic institution to provide them with
justice.
The participation of the lay objectors is full of
contradictions. They believed that the inquiry was a sham and that
they had no chance. They also believed that democracy would somehow
provide them with justice.
Sometimes they attempted to behave like lawyers in the inquiry
because it seemed "the right thing to do" and because they felt it
offered them more chance of success. Most of the time, their
participation was eclectic, an expression of their view of
democratic participation i.e. that they should as free and equal
citizens stand up in the inquiry and put forward their arguments
against the development.
When the objectors behaved like lawyers, they felt they were
participating effectively in the inquiry. However their most deeply
felt oppositions to the development appeared in their non¬
professional participation.
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The existence of these contradictions raises a number of
questions. What are the sources of their optimism and pessimism
and why does their optimism dominate?
Their pessimism comes from a pragmatic distrust of politicians in
action and a realistic awareness of the power of multi-national
corporations. Their optimism from a belief in the ability of our
democratic society to provide justice under the law, to protect the
rights of the individual and secure our freedom. The objectors were
fundamentally sustained by a belief in the moral rectitude of their
case, the objectors felt that they had "right" on their side.
How important is the adversary procedure for securing
legitimacy? I argue that one of the main reasons why the objectors
feel the inquiry is fair is that they actively feel like a
participant when they are adopting the techniques of advocacy with
some degree of success. They feel effective. Whereas, when they
express their objections in a more spontaneous manner, they feel
frustrated and pessimistic.
There is a sense, then, in which the adversary procedures, are
necessary for securing legitimacy. The use of these procedures
though they inhibit lay participation in some ways, also enable lay
participation in ways which the objectors experience as meaningful.
How is it possible for such contradictions to exist
simultaneously?
"People often maintain unreconciled
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contradictions in their viewpoint,
contradictions expressed in different
contexts it is in this linkage
between opinion about national policy and
immediate experience that many of the most
obvious contradictions arise." (Hall et al
1978)
Participation in the inquiry for the professionals is a job;
a routine which is largely detached from other parts of their lives.
(6)
Though some of the objectors' cross-examination attempts to address
the expert witness in his capacity as parent, or as a moral
conscience, the expert witness can keep these roles outside the
inquiry.
For the objectors, however, the inquiry is much more than a
job. It involves more than a professional commitment. They are
involved as representatives of their families, their communities,
and, on a broader level as active "political" participants in the
democratic process. This is an opportunity to participate in the
system, in which hitherto they may have done little more than cast their
votes. The development has direct implications on their lives, they
have the chance to contribute to the process of deciding whether or
not it should go ahead.
The contradictions in their participation lie between their
immediate experience of the political process and their less
articulate "common-sense" notions of what it means to be a member of
democratic society. The latter involves such ideas as the nature of
(6) Weber argued that this was an important part of bureaucratic
organisation. See chapter 2 and Weber (1964).
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justice according to law, the relationship between the individual
and the state, and notions of reasonable and
responsible behaviour.
These are nebulous and complex ideas, but it is important to
describe, even generally, some of these ideas, because of their
powerful effects in the inquiry.
In trying to account for "common-sense" attitudes towards crime,
(Hall et al 1978) resort to an analysis of what they call "the English
ideology", some features of which apply to the common-sense attitudes
of the lay objectors to their participation in the public inquiry.
Their political role in the inquiry is governed by notions of
"respectability", "self-discipline" and "deference to authority".
Despite a streak of non-conformity, the objectors begin with a
respect for democracy and its institutions, exemplified by their
respect for the Reporter during the inquiry. Democracy depends on
the exercise of self-discipline by the individual, otherwise our
society would lapse into tyranny or anarchy. Thus as objectors at
the inquiry they have a duty to behave responsibly, to conform to
the expectations of the Reporter, to be considerate, obliging and
not to cause trouble.
The public inquiry provides a forum in which the individual
objector can air his grievances against corporations and State
officials. The inquiry symbolically promises justice, equal
treatment and neutrality both in the rhetoric of "lay participation"
and in the speech and actions of the Reporter. The classical
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liberal model of law (see chapter 2) does not describe the
objectors' experience of law in action or even politics in action,
but coupled with a respect for authority, and the professionalism
and disinterested reasonableness demonstrated by the Reporter and
the lawyers in the inquiry, this model remains a powerful symbolic
foundation for their participation. Despite both evidence and
strong feelings to the contrary the objectors retain a residual
faith in the ability of the inquiry process to provide them with
justice. They retain
"A vague image of the rightness,
reasonableness and fair play of the British
system of justice." (Hall et al 1978)
These notions are deeply embedded in the way the objectors make
sense of the world. As far as they are concerned these ideas are a
matter of "common-sense". For them it is "natural" to respect
authority and to behave "properly". Their enthusiastic
participation is based on a faith in the capacity of law in a
democracy to provide justice and a belief in the moral rectitude of
their case. Being predominantly middle class, these objectors also
believe themselves to have a certain status and importance in a
democracy, such that their voices will be listened to.
Their pessimism derives from their deference to authority and
from a residual fatalism. While they accept in general terms the
realities of politics, their own distance from the exercise of power
and the need to accept what happens as inevitable, they also retain
beliefs in justice, democracy, self reliance and self-importance
which, when they are faced with an immediate personal problem, can
combine to dominate their attitudes of passive resignation.
These beliefs and attitudes are not produced by the inquiry but
they have to be reproduced in the inquiry. In other words, "social
structures must pass through the cultural milieu" (Willis 1977)
the objectors have to reproduce these contradictions in the
inquiry. I have argued that the objectors can be said to have
awarded the inquiry legitimacy for a number of reasons e.g. their
active and enthusiastic participation throughout the inquiry, the
absence of any attempts to disrupt the inquiry or to give up their
participation, and their expressions of satisfaction at the
conclusion of the inquiry. However they were also sceptical of the
inquiry process and of the possible effectiveness of their own role
in it and expressed a cynicism towards politics in general. Thus
legitimation was secured only with a struggle. I have shown the
various ways in which the objectors' committment to the status quo
was sustained in the inquiry. Their faith in the fairness of the
inquiry process limited the potential effects of the anger and
frustration which arose when they "penetrated" the dominant
technical-rational frame of reference i.e. when they realised that
their interests and arguments were irrelevant to the outcome of the
inquiry. Legitimation operates in the social practices of the
inquiry only through the existence of these contradictions.
Though the inquiry might transform the "political" into the
"technical/rational" (Roger 1978) or be seen as using the symbolic power of law
in a political ritual (Lukes 1975) neither of these are totalitarian
processes. The maintenance of hegemony is an active struggle with
opportunities for either side to reinforce or threaten it. In the
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final chapter I will discuss the importance of this level of
analysis, and draw some conclusions of relevance to those concerned
with the reform of public inquiry procedures.
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CHAPTER 8
Sociological Analysis and the Public Inquiry
In this final chapter, I want to draw together the analysis
conducted in the previous four chapters to give a description of the
public inquiry in terms of the production and reproduction of
ideological structures. I argue that this analysis, which attempts
to describe how power operates in day to day social practices, is
important because it faithfully portrays the contradictions and dissonance
which exist at the cultural level. I describe some of the ways in
which social practices are inextricably related to social structures
and how power is related to knowledge. This has important
implications both for the conduct of sociological inquiry and for
contemporary political practice.
These arguments are made by comparing my analysis with studies
which deal with lay participation both in the public inquiry and
more generally in the legal process. I argue that my analysis
retains space for political practice which is logically eliminated
by the methods of these writers though each would claim to have
political aims. I share their aims but argue that their analysis
gives little assistance in selecting appropriate strategies to
pursue these aims.
Finally, I make some further comments on the relationship
between sociological inquiry and political practice and suggest some




This section summarises the analysis of chapters 4 to 7.
Inevitably I make generalisations and simplifications but
qualifications can be found in the corresponding sections of the
relevant chapter. My aim in this section is to give a more stark
analysis, in order to draw out the significant implications.
There are few stated rules or directives governing procedures
during the public inquiry. Procedure is left to the discretion of the
Reporter. The Reporter is the central figure in the inquiry. His two
main functions are the control of the procedure of the inquiry and the
collection of information. I argued that the latter, his
"bureauratic" function, was more important than his "democratic" role
of assisting and encouraging lay participation.
The Reporter was sympathetic and helpful towards the lay
objectors. They acknowledged this. He also attempted to maintain a
mood and atmosphere in the inquiry which was less formal that a
court of law. Thus, on the surface lay participation appeared to
be a less daunting task in the inquiry than in a law court.
However the Reporter insisted that the objectors try to observe
the rules and techniques of cross-examination. This not only
restricted what the objectors could say, but also when they could
speak and how they should express themselves.
This was the balance maintained by the Reporter between his
- 246 -
obligation to enable laymen to participate without professional
representation and his task of collecting relevant factual
information. So long as "informality" did not threaten the
"evidence-testing" function of cross-examination, and did not
prolong the inquiry "unnecessarily" the Reporter was prepared to be
tolerant. (see chapter 4) Thus he would not allow the objectors to
give evidence during cross-examination though he would allow some
irrelevant questioning, if, for example, it seemed to be important
to the objector.
By the operation of his discretion, which is based on his
professional knowledge of the functions of the inquiry, the Reporter
balances concessions to laymen with the efficient collection of
relevant facts, in a way which gives a fairly relaxed atmosphere to
a tightly organised set of procedures.
These procedures are designed to give the Reporter relevant
facts on a particular number of issues. e.g. the detailed design of
the plant, certain qualities of the marine site, the acceptability
of the impact on the environment etc. The need to exploit oil
resources is a matter of government policy and therefore an
unchallengable 'fact' for the purposes of the inquiry. The Reporter
is concerned to establish that the development satisfies certain
regulations governing safety, environmental health and planning.
Evidence is assessed according to precise
criteria of 'relevance' and 'facticity'. (see chapter 5)
None of this information, with the exception of the factual
status of Government policy, is publicly available to lay
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objectors, though it is part of the professional knowledge of
lawyers and also the technical experts who gave evidence for
the applicant companies. For example though evidence is given at
the inquiry by a succession of witnesses, this evidence appears in
the findings of fact organised by 'issues'. It is clear that
throughout the course of the inquiry the professionals are aware
that the inquiry is concerned with certain "issues" but this is
never made explicit to the objectors.
In general the "professionals" share a precise "frame of
reference". This concerns the object and functions of the inquiry,
the issues involved and the criteria for ascribing relevance and
facticity to evidence.
It is in this sense that the inquiry is highly formalised. Though
the atmosphere may be informal, though laymen are encouraged to
participate and though sympathy for their difficulties is expressed,
the objectives and procedures of an inquiry are in many ways as
precise and formal as those of a court of law. (see chapter 6) The
knowledge required to participate in an inquiry in a "professional"
manner is inaccessible to the ordinary layman without considerable
study and thought.
For the professionals the question "should this development be
permitted" is not a moral, political or emotional question but a
technical question which can be answered by referring to a
particular sort of information on a limited number of issues.
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Thus, their participation involved the reproduction of a
precise professional frame of reference. The Reporter's control of
the lay participants also involved the reproduction of broader
ideological notions of "fairness" and "justice" which he had to fit
in with his more important functions.
The objectors' participation was not underpinned by a coherent
frame of reference, and contained many internal contradictions,
(see chapter 7) On the one hand they knew that their arguments would
make little impression to the final outcome of the inquiry both
because they had inadequate resources and because they felt that the
decision to proceed with the development had already been taken
behind the scenes by the politicians. They felt powerless
and manipulated and were critical of the inquiry system and thus,
with the democratic process more generally. On the other hand,
however, they participated diligently in the inquiry, they attempted
to put forward technical arguments through their advocate, they
became more proficient at the techniques of cross-examination and at
the end of the inquiry felt that the Reporter had been sympathetic
and fair.
These contradictory attitudes existed within the Action Group
both before and after the inquiry. It is not that their criticisms
and frustrations were "cooled out" by the conduct of the inquiry
(1)
itself, so that they disappeared, it is rather that the objectors'
belief in democracy, in the ability of the legal process to produce
"justice" and in the value of "reasonable" behaviour was sufficiently
(1) Garfinkel 1952.
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reinforced during the processes of the inquiry to secure their
reluctant award of legitimacy. In other words they did not disrupt
the inquiry, or refuse to participate, but participated in the
inquiry at the same time remaining critical of the inquiry system.
Thus, encouraged by the atmosphere in the inquiry and
the sympathetic approach of the Reporter, the objectors retained a
residual hope that somehow the moral justice of their case would be
recognised, and their belief that democracy and law were concerned
with this sort of justice would then be justified. At the same time
they knew that the outcome of the inquiry would go against them and
that the powerful forces ranged against them would win. Their hope
in the inquiry lay with the fairness and sense of justice manifested
by the Reporter. Ironically, their efforts to please the Reporter
drew them into behaving more like professionals and proferring
technical/rational arguments.
My argument is that the inquiry exists as a legitimate
institution precisely because of the contradictions within the
ideological structures reproduced by the lay participants and that
the procedures of the inquiry operate to preserve these
contradictions by reinforcing the ideologies of "justice according to
law" and "individual responsibility" which are important assumptions
of the dominant ideological structure of liberal-democratic law. The
penetrative criticisms of the objectors are limited in their
effectiveness by these powerful conservative ideologies. However
these ideologies are "real", in terms of the perceptions of the
objectors. Their criticisms are based more in self-interest than in
any alternative political theory. It is not that they suffer from
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false-consciousness or have their "real interests" concealed from
them. The inquiry system does not by itself construct an allegiance
to the status quo for the objectors, this allegiance already exists;
the inquiry procedures provide opportunities for this ideology to be
reproduced.
I have attempted to show how the ideologies of representative
democracy and of the neutrality and justice of law, are reproduced in
the inquiry so as to secure legitimacy for the inquiry system and more
generally for the democratic process. This is accomplished by the
incomplete correspondence between legal rhetoric and legal practices.
The rhetorical claims concerning the importance of making lay
participation easier are reproduced in their rhetorical form and also
in certain practices which are experienced as helpful and "informal"
by the lay participants. However the dominant ideologies reproduced
in practice (i.e. the professional frame of referenece) control the
practical outcome of the inquiry in terms of the "facts" on which a
decision will be based and this frame of reference is not made
publicly available. In this sense I have attempted to show how
legitimation works through day to day social practices; through the
complex inter-relationships of power, language and knowledge. This
analysis demonstrates the fragile nature of consent even amongst the
conservative middle-class when their own interests are threatened by
the State claiming "the public interest" as justification.
I have argued that is is only by describing the complex and
contradictory processes whereby power operates through social
practices that one can understand how legitimation works, and that
this is a crucial problem both for sociological inquiry and for
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political intervention.
I now want to demonstrate the usefulness of this approach to
sociological analysis by comparing my work with another sociological
study of the same public inquiry.
Sociological analysis and political practice
John Roger (Roger 1978) describes the inquiry system as
restrictive. It reduces a political agenda to a technical agenda so
that,
"the question quickly becomes one of what
ways (sic) can the development of a
particular site be made more agreeable to
objecting parties than should the site be
used for this purpose at all."
He argues that the public inquiry system generates
"inauthenticity". The system generates the appearance of
"responsiveness" but also "the feelings of having been cheated and
manipulated" Objectors are somehow led to believe that they have an
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process but the
system operates to exclude people
"from controlling the quality and direction
of their social existence". (Roger 1978)
He characterises this gap between the appearance of
- 252 -
responsiveness and the reality of exclusion by using concepts from
Habermas.
For Habermas public policy is now made and justified in a
"techno-decisionistic" manner. Experts decide on tecnical solutions
to problems, based on their specialised knowledge and politicians
make decisions based on these technical solutions. This is
contrasted to the open and unrestricted public sphere, which Habermas
would like to see, where public needs are decided based on the
values and norms of a community which are generated in free and open
public debate, and where there is free interaction amongst experts,
politicians and the public.
The inquiry, for Roger, is 'techo-decisionistic'. The Reporter
favours a "closed state of knowledge" which consists of carefully
relected technical evidence which
"directly engages the inquiry remit"
and is less inclined towards an "open state of knowing" favoured by
the objectors which would admit
"broader or more personal factors into the
evidence".
The power to control what counts as knowledge lies with the
State and thus in this inquiry with the Reporter as a State agent.
In general for Roger, in the inquiry
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"the ideal speech situation gives way to
complexity reduction"
In an "ideal speech situation" (again from Habermas) a
consensus of truth is arrived at through rational argument. It is
assumed that there are no structural limitations placed on the
selection and use of speech acts. This is then an authentic public
sphere of rational debate between equals where "participants must
accept the force of the better argument." This ideal mode of
public debate and decision making has given way to "complexity
reduction" (Luhman) where debate is limited, and dysfunctional ideas
and knowledge are systematically screened out of the decision-making
proces s.
Roger goes on to argue, with reference to the Moss Moran
inquiry, that because the inquiry system failed as an
"institutionalised ideal speech situation", the lay objectors were
forced to express their case outside the inquiry forum, through a
press conference and a published statement of their case. He also
argues that the objectors were forced to adopt a technical/rational
case concentrating on hazard because of the technical emphasis of
the inquiry.
He concludes by commenting
"the chance for an open public forum was
lost and the scenes reminiscent of the
English mortorway inquiries never
materialised."
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At a general descriptive level, Roger and I share a broadly
similar view of the inquiry. Our main points of agreement are as
follows.
"Political" questions are dealt with as "technical" problems,
and decisions are based on the specialised technical evidence of
experts. This is presented ideologically as a neutral,
technical/rational process. The public inquiry system does,
rhetorically, offer the promise of participation but does not
redistribute power to enable lay objectors to present certain sorts of
argument in certain sorts of way i.e. to adopt technical/rational
approach themselves.
However there are a number of ways in which Roger's analysis is
unsatisfactory. He does not explain how it came about that
"the scenes reminiscent of the English
motorway inquiries never materialised."
We agree that the objectors were aware of the disruptive
tactics used to prevent such inquiries taking place and were equally
aware that this was a tactic available to them.
Roger argues that they did not adopt these tactics because they
were forced by the inquiry system to adopt a technical-rational
case. I agree but argue that the objectors did not "select" this
approach as a deliberate alternative to some other tactic which then
disappeared from their concerns. My analysis of their participation
shows that their other tactics were sustained throughout the inquiry
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alongside their technical/rational approach. The inquiry system is
awarded legitimacy precisely because these penetrative tactics are
permitted in the inquiry, i.e. because the lay objectors experience
participation in the inquiry as meaningful.
Roger cannot account for the award of legitimacy to the
proceedings made by the objectors. He describes their participation
as being both "engaged" and "disengaged" without being able to account
for the logical contradictions in their actions. I described the
objectors' participation as the reproduction of a variety of
ideological structures. The liberal/democratic ideology dominated the
critical penetrations made of it. It was powerful enough to overcome
those occasions when the gap between rhetoric and practice became too
obvious. In other words though the objectors felt that the inquiry
was a sham and was unjust, they remained convinced, as responsible
citizens, that the law would somehow provide them with justice and
that the conventional procedures of democracy could be relied upon,
(see chapter 7) Some explanations for this particular pattern of
ideological reproduction can be found in the day to day procedures of
the inquiry e.g. the objectors felt that the Reporter had made great
efforts to aid their participation, and that the inquiry itself had
been conducted fairly. Though they felt the system was unjust, they
were somethow reassured when they experienced part of the system as
operating fairly. Their seduction into the attempted adoption of the
techniques of advocacy as a means of pleasing the Reporter is a
further example of the dominance of liberal/democratic ideology. But
it is important that the objectors participated in their own defeat
and were not, in any simple sense, crushed by the state, as seems to
be the unavoidable conclusion of Roger's analysis. He cannot provide
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any satisfactory account of the contradictions within the
participation of the lay objectors. I have argued that such an
understanding is essential if we want to understand how technical
rationality dominates the inquiry.
From my analysis of how the inquiry was constructed, and how
legitimation was secured, it is possible to locate moments for
potential transformation, e.g. Had the Reporter showed less interest
in helping the objectors, less sympathy with their case and their
difficulties in presenting it and less tolerance with their
'unprofessional' participation, the objectors might have been forced
to cast more doubt on the fairness of law and/or democracy and to have
perceived the inquiry as an illegitimate exercise of power.
One could locate a number of such 'potential transformations' but
one of these would not be the possibility of an "institutionalised
ideal-speech situation". For Habermas, it is the whole system of
state policy-implementation which is techno-decisionistic and his
"institutionalised ideal speech situation" is a Utopia to which we
might aspire rather than a practical project which might be achieved
by applying a particular strategy. Thus, for Roger to claim that the
Moss Moran public inquiry was even potentially an "open public forum"
is misleading.
The "ideal speech situation" takes place amongst equals where
the relationship between power and knowledge has been removed. It
is the realm where rationality rules through open and free
discussion. My analysis shows the contemporary relationship between
power and knowledge in the Moss Moran inquiry. This relationship is
inextricably tied to structural inequalities of power and knowledge
in society some of which are institutionalised in forms of political
and legal organisation. To remove the existing power-knowledge
relationship would involve a revolutionary social change, and I
would argue that it is quite wrong to suggest that this was ever a
possibility during the Moss Moran inquiry.
While Roger can demonstrate that the inquiry system is
technical/rational and that it does not offer objectors the
possibility of "effectively" participating in decision-making, he can
provide no knowledge which would help devise a political strategy
which might make participation more effective, because he does not
have a conceptual framework which allows him to discuss how the
inquiry attains its varied and contradictory objectives.
For example he claims that
"the question then quickly becomes one of
what ways (sic) can the development of a
paricular site be made more agreeable to
objecting parties, than should the site be
used for this purpose at all."
I accept his argument that the planning system is
technical/rational rather than political. One example of this is that
Government policy is a "fact" for the purposes of the inquiry rather
than a matter for challenge or debate. This however is clear before
the inquiry begins, it is part of the structure of the inquiry system.
There is never any possibility of alternative policies becoming part
of the inquiry remit, so I am perplexed as to what precisely Roger
means by
- 258 -
"the question then quickly becomes "
I also agree that the inquiry is about how to secure a degree
of consent from the objectors but Roger does not deal either with
the nature of this consent or the methods by which it is secured,
e.g. the development can be made more agreeable both by the
negotiation of specific planning conditions with the developers and
by convincing the objectors that the inquiry has been carried out
fairly and power exercised legitimately. Roger cannot account for
the second point.
Roger also claims that the inquiry appears to be responsive,
i.e. appears to promote and encourage lay participation, but he does
not account for the nature of the objectors' participation nor
discuss the extent to which this "responsiveness" of the system is
experienced in practice. Despite the dissatisfactions expressed by
the objectors, they still participated in the day to day procedures
of the inquiry and must have felt somehow that they were
participating in a meaningful way. Because Roger cannot account for
this contradiction, he cannot explain the political significance of
allowing lay participation in the public inquiry.
As one final example Roger claims that the Reporter operates
with a very specific remit and has subtle, precise and often
unspoken criteria for ascribing relevance to evidence. My analysis
confirms exactly this point, but I attempt to show what these
criteria are, where they come form and how they operate in the
inquiry. It is important to realise that as well as operating with
a precise remit, the Reporter also attempts to make the inquiry more
informal, and is genuinely sympathetic towards the lay objectors.
These contradictions are necessary to understand the inquiry's
legitimating function.
For Habermas our whole democratic system has transformed many
political questions into technical questions. At the level of the
public local inquiry the transformation is already complete - it only
remains for legitimation to be secured in practice. There is never
any potential "authentic public realm" or "institutionalised ideal-
speech situation" at the Moss Moran inquiry. The objectors reproduce
liberal/democratic ideological structures in their participation - it
is not that they somehow have an "authentic" voice which is simply
shouted down by the dominant louder voices in the inquiry. Before the
inquiry starts, the objectors are prepared to grant some degree of
legitimacy to the democratic process, it is this which has to be
nurtured and maintained during the inquiry process for legitimacy to
be secured. In contrast, Roger implies that the objectors are cajoled
and bullied into presenting a technical-rational case against their
will and their instincts by the domination of State agents and
institutions in pursuit of technical rational knowledge.
However I argued that the objectors did not only reproduce
aspects of the dominant ideology, they also penetrated this in a
variety of ways. e.g. they were sceptical of their chances of
success, they voiced personal and emotional criticisms of the
development which they knew were not strictly relevant, and they
felt themselves being manipulated and their views ignored.
There are contradictions in their participation. The potential
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for changes or reforms can be assessed by examining the nature of
these contradictions. That is why this level of analysis is
important and where idealist analyses, comparing Utopias with
contemporary practice, fail. Roger addresses himself to several
questions which he cannot answer using his approach e.g. why did the
objectors participate in the inquiry? How was a measure of consent
secured from the objectors? In what ways was the inquiry responsive
to lay participation and why was this significant?
He wants to compare what happened at the inquiry with what
could have happened. However had his analysis of what happened been
more sophisticated he would have realised that his models of what
could have happened were Utopias which were never a practical
possibility, that is to say that they could not have happened.
Roger's analysis leaves no room for the contradictions which I
found in the objectors' participation. The awkwardness of the
practices of the inquiry are ignored in order to fit a conceptual
explanation which is at a much more general level. Roger's analysis
is useful as polemic. It might prevent us from becoming complacent
with our "open democracy". This explanation may be valid at a general
historical level, but not so as an explanation of the day to day
practice of one inquiry. There can be as many problems involved in
arguing from the general to the particular as vice versa. There is a
problem in using ideal-type concepts to analyse the construction of
social order. This approach is also adopted by Bankowski and Mungham
(Bankowski and Mungham 1978) in a general discussion of lay
participation in the law. They also use Habermas when they describe
the introduction of lay participation into a technical rational
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society as creating a tension between "democracy" and "efficiency". I
have described a tension between the "bureaucratic" and "democratic"
functions within the professional frame of reference (see below p221).
The bureaucratic function is the collection of relevant facts, the
democratic function is given in the rhetorical instructions to the
Reporter to assist and encourage lay participation. Though the
concept of "bureaucractic" function which I borrow from Weber, is very
similar to the ideal-type of "bureaucratic efficiency" used by
Bankowski and Mungham, our concepts of democracy are quite different.
Bureaucratic efficiency, in ideal terms, requires that decisions are
based on the technical knowledge of experts. The "good" is decided
not by "the practical reasoning" of the community but by the State in
the name of the public interest.
It is not quite clear what Bankowski and Mungham mean by
democracy. At times they seem to refer to some Utopian system of
unconstrained rational debate amongst equals, at others to the
rhetorical claims made by law about the nature of lay participation
in legal fora. An example of the latter might be the circular 14
instruction to Reporters to allow "the maximum informality of
procedurels" and to encourage "openness, fairness and impartiality".
By "democratic function" I mean these rhetorical instructions to the
Reporter. An important part of this study has been to describe how
lay participation operates in the practices of the Moss Moran
inquiry. In purely conceptual terms there is an obvious tension
between a non- political, precise technical-rational mode of
decision-making and a mode which involves open discussion and
contribution from a variety of parties with competing interests.
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It would be possible to analyse the inquiry in these terms under
category 3 in their paper (Bankowski and Mungham 1978). Lay objectors
by their participation in the inquiry become surrogate lawyers and
thus "efficiency" wins because the objectors participate in a
technical/rational manner. This is very similar to the argument put
forward by John Roger, that the objectors are "forced" to adopt a
technical-rational case.
Bankowski and Mungham proclaim an interest in making institutions
susceptible to democracy and accuse others of being unable to do this
because they accept the tension between "efficiency" and "democracy"
as inevitable.
I would argue the Bankowski and Mungham confuse matters here
because like Roger they slip back and forward between social practices
and ideal-types without providing any adequate conceptual links. In
practice, the public inquiry operates in a technical/rational manner,
and makes rhetorical claims about the open and impartial nature of lay
participation. The lay objectors, though critical of the system in
some ways, nevertheless award legitimacy to the planning process and
to the democratic process in general. Thus in a sense, the urge to
democracy is effective because it has meaning for the objectors in
practice, i.e. technical/rationality can only operate by using the
ideology of democracy in such a way that people are reasonably
satisfied.
Thus matters are more complex than Bankowski and Mungham
suggest - it is not that the ideal-type of technical/rationality
exists in practice and operates effectively and that the ideal type
of democracy is completely defeated and absent. The very notion of
an ideal-type is that it has no precise existence in practice - it
(2)
may be a useful tool for conceptual discussion of
social change but it cannot be reproduced exactly in a particular
social practice. It has already been abstracted from social
practices. It is a statement of general tendencies and common
factors which deliberately eschews the specific social practice in
order to discuss structural changes.
Thus Bankowski and Mungham's categories of "efficiency" and
"democracy" are inappropriate as an explanation of the contradictory
practices of a particular piece of lay participation. Like Roger,
their work, read as polemic, may serve a practical political function
in rousing people to action, but in itself, their explanation is
monolithic and tells us very little about the political strategies
which might be appropriate to pursue a more "effective" democracy.
If one's aim is to understand how social practices reproduce
social structures, how the State's activities secure legitimacy in
practice and most importantly how change might be achieved e.g. "how
institutions might be made susceptible to democracy" - a different
(3)
mode of analysis - such as the one I have adopted and practised, is
required.
As Bankowski and Mungham well know,
"sometimes participation can become penetration"
(2) See Weber 1949.
(3) I would rephrase this as "how power can be redistributed to the
less powerful".
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political reform it is not a matter of constructing an ideal type
for "democracy" and then trying to implement this in social practice.
Notions like "ideal speech situation" are Utopian goals towards which
one might choose to aim. In order to make inquiries "more susceptible
to democracy" we need to understand how they operate within a
particular political system and how power operates through the
practices of the inquiry. We need to locate those areas where
particular strategies might be effective. The game of inventing
conceptual Utopias is of a different order from the game of attempting
to construct these Utopias in practice. Utopian visions may help to
encourage people to fight for more control over their lives but they
cannot provide them with the potential means of securing more power,
and social change can only be achieved by the exercise of power.
Habermas 'ideal speech situation' is intended as a conceptual
model against which we can measure the degrees of constraint operating
in our own society. We might decide that it is a desirable model of
society but then the problem becomes how to achieve it. The analyses
provided by Bankowski and Mungham are and by Roger are unpromising
starts. If technical rationality has such absolute dominance - how can
it be changed?
For the purpose of political practice it is not enough to say
that some "ideal" form of popular participation is not achieved, nor
that technical/rational decision making dominates, nor that the
operations of the legal system may be characterised as absurd from a
particular perspective (Carlen 1976), nor that the legal apparatus is
designed to secure specific practical and ideological ends (McBarnett
(4)
1981). I agree with all these arguments in as far as they claim to be
general statements of what happens in society. However they tend to
present social structures as monolithic and impenetrable - even though
most of the authors know this is not the case. They lose the dialetic
between action and structure and the notion of society as a process.
They are all useful for various purposes e.g. demystifying the
dominant ideologies of our society or challenging complacency at all
levels of society. However for the purpose of choosing practical
political strategies to move towards Utopian goals, they
are of not much use. We need more detailed decriptions of how power
operates in social practices if we want to make any changes with
predictable outcomes.
I attempt to look at the inquiry as the production and
reproduction of structures and as part of the social process. The
object is to see how in a specific practice, social structures are reproduced
and, from the point of view of political practice to establish where
dominant ideologies are or might be penetrated.
(4) Both Carlen and McBarnett claim to provide explanations of how the
capitalist State uses law to achieve its own ends. The criticisms
I have mad of Roger and of Bankowski and Mungham similarly apply
to them. If their analyses only claim to demonstrate that legal
rhetoric does not appear in practice then I accept their arguments
and also agree that this level of anlaysis is politically useful.
It is when they attempt to provide causal explanations of the
social practices of particular institutions in terms of the
monolithic dominance of the State that I find cause to make
criticisms. Their analyses do not adequately describe the
contradictions in social practice, the relationships between
language, power and ideology and thus are of no use for choosing
political strategies. One can only despair at the successful
cunning of the State when one should be encouraging equally




I now want to extend the discussion of the notion of the
"ideological gap" which I raised in Chapter 2. I argued there, that
the existence of a gap between the rhetorical claims made by law and
the practices of law in action was inevitable for two reasons.
(1) Meaning, is constructed in particular discourses, and in
particular social practices, thus words do not have one
unambiguous meaning. This can only be fixed for particular
purposes in particular practices.
(5)
Thus e.g. the instruction to the Reporter contained in Circular
14, to ensure
"the maximum informality of
procedures"
has a variety of "meanings".
For example, it serves the ideological purpose of legal rhetoric
in affirming the sincerity of the inquiry process in inviting the participation
of "ordinary folks", reassuring them that it will be made easier for
them and that it won't be like giving evidence at the High Court.
In its practical manifestations it means that the inquiry
procedures consist of a set of variations in the procedures of a
court of law that are perceived as such by both the Reporter, as a
(5) see my discussion of Garfinkel in Chapter 2.
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lawyer and by the objectors as lay persons. In other words, the
Reporter believes that he is relaxing procedural rules to assist the
laymen (while maintaining other procedures to secure his more
pressing ends) and the objectors feel that they are being given
a fair opportunity to participate.
(2) The second reason for the inevitability of the gap is
closely related to the above. Procedural rules and
rhetorical instructions serve several different puposes. e.g.
they reproduce the ideologies of justice and equity as part
of the requirement of law to secure legitimacy for the
operations of the State - this has to be done both at the
level of rhetoric and in practice through the day to day
operations of its institutions. They also reproduce in
practice, with a greater or lesser degree of precision, the
daily procedures of the law. (see McBarnett on due process,
McBarnett 1981)
In the inquiry, there were very few public rules governing the
day to day procedures of the inquiry thus the Reporter had a great
deal of discretion which he used to balance the competing claims of
"efficiency" and "democracy". In other words the rhetorical "maximum
informality of procedures" was reproduced in the practice of the
inquiry where some of its various meanings were realised. Most
importantly, as I have argued, both the Reporter and the objectors
believed that "informality" was aiding lay participation, though
neither meant exactly the same by this term. For the Reporter it meant
giving them a chance to have their say, helping them to understand
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some "legal" procedures. For the objectors it also meant that
(6)
someone would hear what they were saying and act on it, in their
interests. The Reporter was able to conduct the inquiry in such a way
that his technical/rational objectives could be efficiently satisfied
at the same time. It is the nature of this gap between the rhetoric
and practice of law or between democracy (the rhetorical encouragement
of lay participation) and efficiency (the technical rational result of
the inquiry) that I have tried to provide an account of in chapters 4,
5 and 7.
I would argue that my analysis shows that for political
purposes the concept of "a gap" is both inaccurate and unhelpful.
The rhetorical claims of "lay participation" are reproduced
during the procedures of the inquiry, the participants have to
believe that participation is possible and that it operates fairly.
It is only when this is not achieved, when objectors perceive the
inquiry as unjust, as unresponsive to their interests and desires,
as an attempt to conceal the exercise of powerful dominant interests,
that a politically useful gap exists. A gap between the "ideal" and
"the practical" is an essential part of bourgeois law and it must be
(7)
(6) e.g. the techniques of cross-examination (see Chapter 7).
(7) The gap is inevitable now at this historical juncture -
within the ideological structures of liberal democracy - it
need not necessarily always be inevitable. Building Utopias
as goals or exhortations is a legitmate activity but
designing strategies to reach these Utopias is a different
order of activity, we have to start from the historical
situation in which we find ourselves. Thus the public
inquiry is a liberal/democratic institution which serves a
variety of functions. We can only change the inquiry in so
far as these changes are compatible with these broader
structures - or in so far as they can instigate changes at
broader levels.
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reproduced in practice - there is no political point in attempting
to close the gap either by attempting to realise the ideal in
practice or to invent new ideals and new procedures to implement
these ideals in practice. Both these projects are il1-concieved for
the reasons I have discussed above.
In one sense there is no gap between the rhetoric and the
practice of law because the rhetoric must be "lived as real" in the
practices of the inquiry by the objectors, in order for the inquiry
to secure legitimacy. Thus one important significance of rhetorical
claims is only constructed in material practice. "Social structures
have to pass through the cultural milieu", as Willis puts it. (Willis 1977)
In another sense, the gap between idealist visions of popular
participatory democracy and lay participation in the contemporary
public inquiry is inevitable because of the "imaginary" nature of
ideology which always presents the social world "as if", (see p69)
We have here two different notions of the reproduction of
ideological structures. These structures present law as just,
equitable, and neutral. This is a sham, because law represents
particular interests and reproduces injustice and inequality.
However the dominant ideology of liberal/democratic law is
reproduced in the inquiry i.e. people in the inquiry think it is
operating fairly. One of the reasons for this is that many of the
practices of the inquiry are not only mythically fair but
practically fair, e.g. the Reporter does give the objectors certain
sorts of assistance in their participation which might be judged
"fair" by an observer as well, as by both parties involved.
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Thus, in this public inquiry, the dominant ideology provides
opportunities for its own penetration but survives these comfortably.
Under different conditions it might not survive. This analysis is
different to the models of dominance suggested, for example, by
Bankowski and Mungham (Bankowksi and Mungham). It specifies the
points of actual or potential penetration and gives some scope for
adopting political strategies within the existing democratic
procedures.
Implications
I now want to make some comments about the broader implications of
my analysis of the Moss Moran inquiry. I have claimed that this
work is underpinned by an interest in extending democracy by
redistributing power and attempting to reconstitute some form of
political forum, outside parliamentary debate and pressure-group
politics. I share, with those who follow Habermas, a desire to see
ordinary people secure greater involvement and control in political
decision making, to transfer power from experts making
technical/rational decisions to lay persons making political
decisons.
How might this be accomplished in the light of the work in this
research?
I would argue that firstly, "ideals" are goals to be
(8)
pursued rather than immediately realisable achievements and that
(8) For Bankowski and Mungham the ideal-type of "democracy" also seems
to be a political "ideal" though usually there is a distinction
between "ideal types" which are a heuristic device and ideals
which are the expression of ultimate value.
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secondly we have to select appropriate short-term strategies for
political action. This entails a fundamental scepticism about the
potential and predictable efficacy of legal reforms. Leaving aside
for a moment the special problems of the "Big Public Inquiry" - the
small and middle sized inquiries are technical rational and non
political. They function to secure legitimacy for planning decisions
and at the same time provide one way of publicly scrutinising
planning applications to ensure that specifically measured standards are
met by the applicants. The contradiction between "efficiency" and
"democracy" is thus inevitable, but the specific balance in some
inquiries may possibly be shifted towards democracy.
Big Public Inquiries create a great deal of media interest.
Pressure group objectors use these Inquiries as a means of securing
publicity. They want to make the public aware that political
decisions are being disguised as technical decisions. With
increased public awareness of how the system works, objectors will
increasingly be able to use the system for their own political purposes.
There is already a crisis in the role of Big Public Inquiries.
(9)
Their ability to secure legitimacy is under threat, from those
pressure groups which are critical of the inquiry system and which
try to expose its true political nature. From the point of view of
many of the objectors, Windscale should have been about the
desirability of nuclear power in Britain instead of the suitability
of a site for the reprocessing of nuclear waste.
(9) See chapter 1 p22.
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The PERG (PERG 1978) and OCPU (OCPU 1979) proposals are
intended to extend democracy by providing "interested
parties" (conceived in the broadest sense) with the opportunity to
engage in public political debate fully backed with research and
evidence. A decision would still be taken by the Minister but he
would have a more difficult task in concealing the true assumptions
and values underpinning this decision. Thus it would be more
difficult to justify decisions solely on the grounds of technical
rationality because their political nature would be clear and
public.
My particular concern in this study has been with the local lay
objectors, rather than the political pressure groups who very often
dominate the objectors in a Big Public Inquiry. The lay objectors
did not share the political analysis and committment of the latter.
Professional groups accept the likelihood of the development
proceeding, and regard their work in the inquiry as being political,
i.e. securing publicity and attempting to "raise the consciousness"
of the public. The lay objectors participate because
they want the development stopped and they have faith that the
democratic process gives them an opportunity to do this.
However penetrations existed amongst this group and there is the
potential for lay objectors to start behaving like pressure groups.
This could put strain on the public inquiry system and there would be
increased pressure for reform from the Reporters and from the legal
profession. Reporters, in particular, would find themselves involved
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in political debate (as is happening already in BPI's) when they are
supposed to be neutral servants of the law. So long as lay objectors
continue to have ultimate faith in the democratic process as it
operates in the public inquiry - the Reporter can cope with their
partial penetrations and general awkwardness. However as soon as
objectors begin to use the inquiry as a forum for political debate in
a fully conscious manner the Reporter would be in trouble. The
tactics and modes of procedure which operated as I have described in
the Moss Moran inquiry would be inappropriate. The quiesence of lay
objectors would not be secured by procedural strictures or by securing
respect for the Reporter's own personal decency.
It should have become clear that my political and theoretical
commitment to this particular mode of analysis would not lead to a
list of suggested reforms for public inquiry procedures, though I
believe that the OCPU proposals for Big Public Inquiry procedures
could make our democracy more open in a small way.
My argument is that my analysis of how power operates in one
particular medium-sized inquiry will be useful to all those who are
involved in public inquiry practice whether they be civil servants,
ministers, lay objectors, lawyers, expert witnesses or whoever. I
would support strategies designed to make democracy more open, and
to redistribute power to those sections of the population which don't
have much. However my analysis might be equally useful for someone
who wanted to secure legitimacy for the state more cheaply. My
analysis was designed to inform political practice, that does not




Bankowski and Mungham suggest that the legal profession is one
serious impediment to the extension of "democracy". Though they
themselves do not discuss public inquiries, I would argue that they
might see the use of lawyers in inquiries
as one way of establishing technical rational domination
and preventing meaningful participation by lay persons. They would
like to see the domination of lawyers, experts and "professionals"
generally removed, and "ordinary" people permitted to take decisions
involving their own lives. My work on the Moss Moran inquiry would
confirm that laymen very often attempt to conduct themselves like
lawyers, at least by imitating the more obvious techniques of cross-
examination. However, though I share their concern to "make institutions
more susceptible to democracy", I don't agree that the removal of
lawyers from the inquiry would necessarily make it any more
"democratic". This is an example of a Utopian strategy which is
inappropriate because of an inadequate understanding of how power
operates in social practices.
The system is technical-rational, the removal of lawyers (which
is politically highly unlikely) would not change the system itself
and in fact might make it even more difficult for the objectors to
participate. For example if they had a very strong technical-rational
counter case, skilled legal representation might give them the best
chance of success. The inquiry is a democratic process which
amongst other things, requires applicants to produce certain
information about their plans, to ensure these meet a variety of
standards and that mistakes have not been made. Even this level of
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public accountability is an improvement on uncontrolled
industrial/commercial development. It does not provide lay
objectors with the opportunity to get involved in political debate
about economic and social policy in general, far less to
influence policy decisions in a direct way. In our parliamentary
democracy these functions are formally provided for elsewhere
(Parliament, ballot- box, media, MPs' surgeries etc).
The ideological social relations of liberal-democracy are
reproduced at the level of belief, and in the public rhetoric of
those who support the system and in that sense are reproduced in
social practice. However they are not an accurate description of
how power is distributed and operates in our society. They support
a particular power distribution and present it as just, fair, and
inevitable. They present the contingent as necessary; the political
as neutral.
The fact that the inquiry collects certain information in order
to make a decision is presented as neutral. Given certain neutral
"facts", rationality tells us that only one decision is appropriate.
This is a political decision. The question of desirable economic
and social goals is not on the agenda. That has already been set by
Parliament another institution in which power operates but not
(10)
according to the ideological relations of liberal democracy.
The inquiry is simultaneously, an instrument for securing the
award of legitimacy from a potentially critical public, an example
(10) See my discussion of Law and State in Chapter 2 and more
particularly Miliband (1969).
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of powerful forces securing their own interests and a method of
controlling and limiting these forces.
To eliminate lawyers from the public inquiry might involve the
loss of the last function without any significant pay-off in terms
of the arousal of a public political awareness. The elimination of
lawyers will not in itself create the "ideal democracy" and might
well eliminate those few parts of the 'ideal' that currently operate
in social practice. Bankowski and Mungham do not see that law, as a
means of regulation may serve useful social functions in addition to
its mystificatory ideological functions. This is a point taken
up in a paper by Paul Hirst. (Hirst 1980)
Hirst is critical of those Utopian writers who seem to suggest
that law is bourgeois and that it will thus be unnecessary in a future
socialism. Hirst argues that socialist states will need
"a firm framework of public law."
Democracy, for Hirst is not an absolute end in itself in the
sense that for example Bankowski and Mungham talk about "mass
popular democracy". Democracy is a means of selecting candidates to
perform certain functions - not to "represent" the will of a
particular constituency. Notions of "representativeness" require
some notion of "general will" which for Hirst is metaphysical and
thus of no practical significance. Systems or organisations are from
the start implicated in a historical power structure which is not
equitable. Law, defines the public domain in a liberal democracy,
constitutes subjects as legal individuals and allocates formal
rights and duties. In liberal theory this set of relations
should correspond to "the real world" and a lack of fit is a cause for
concern. However in Hirst's analysis, these relations are
ideological. They may or may not be reproduced in social practices
and their precise significance can only be examined at this level.
Democracy is a way of attempting to control powerful interests by
enabling and limiting action. For Hirst this will be as
necessary in any socialist state.
One important function of law in a liberal-democracy is the
securing of legitimacy and in this, the ideological presentation of
law in liberal democracy as just, fair and impartial is vital. Thus
the gap between ideology and practice is vital, given that social,
economic and political relations are unequal.
Hirst argues that while law,
"does not solve all the problems of the co¬
ordination and control of State and other
agencies nor does it have a general,
definite content or effectivity, it can be
made to have definite effectiveness as part
of the overall design and setting of the
conditions of action of State and other
agencies".
In other words it is possible to conceive of legal regulation
which is not synonymous with the State, which in fact attempts to
define and limit the action of the State. Law in liberal
democracy is both an instrument of the State and retains a degree
of independence which constrains certain State actions.
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Hirst's point is that the notion of "legal regulation" is as
necessary to a socialist democracy as it is to a liberal democracy.
What Hirst is unclear about is whether the ideological gap, (between
legal rhetoric and legal practice) will exist in a socialist
democracy? Will socialist law present a set of ideological social
relations by which it will attempt to secure the award of legitimacy
or will legitimacy be granted solely because there is a good fit
between the claims made by law and its practical achievments as
perceived by all sections of the population?
These are not questions that can be answered by reference to
this study of the Moss Moran inquiry, but it is possible to
speculate. One possible scenario of planning in the sort of
socialist democracy hinted at by Hirst might resemble the OCPU
proposals for a Big Public Inquiry. The inquiry would be in two
stages. The first stage would include the presentation of evidence
and argument about the proposed development. This would explicitly
include political debate about economic and social policy relevant
to the development. In the Moss Moran case these could have been
debates on the nature of hazard assessment procedures, the economic
and social consequences of a growth economy based on fossil fuels or
even the difficulties of lay participation in the process, the
domination of experts, the role of the Reporter/ Inspector.
After this stage would come the testing of evidence by cross-
examination. A socialist democracy will have specific criteria by
which to decide which evidence is relevant and how to assess the
weight which should be given to different evidence. In contrast with the
Moss Moran inquiry, these criteria can be made public and explicit.
(11)
There will almost inevitably be conflict - the interests of some
groups are going to be placed above the interests of others. Unless
we are in Habermas ideal communications society, where the defeated
interests would submit to the pure rational superiority of their
opponents, this conflict is inevitable and probably insoluble. The
State would nevertheless have to ensure that somehow those interests
which were defeated were appeased to avoid social unrest or
revolution.
The social world is so complex, prediction is a perilous
occupation. However I would argue that socialism will require to secure
legitimation and it is likely that the ideological force of legal
regulation would be a powerful tool. One reason for this is the
current importance of law for legitimacy - any socialist law will
have this legacy to cope with.
I don't want to indulge in further speculation. The shape of
law in a socialist democracy will depend on the social relations and
conditions of the time and place. These cannot easily be predicted
and it seems clear that any immediate change of this nature in
Britain is unlikely.
However I would argue that any such change will only be
achieved by adopting strategies which penetrate the weaknesses in
the operations of the dominant power structure. Some of these
(11) Exactly what these criteria might be will depend on the existing
social conditions. There is no reason why the criteria might not
be exactly the same as the current criteria. The difference is
that they would be publicly available.
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strategies could involve the use of legally defined rights and
statuses as a point of entry. From this point of view Bankowski
and Mungham are wrong to suggest the elimination of law and lawyers
as a strategy for extending "democracy". The selection of
appropriate strategies requires an understanding of the complex and
pervasive operation of power in social practices such as I have
attempted to accomplish in this study.
That part of their work which consists of the "demystification"
of the relationship between law and State and of the gap between
rhetoric and practice remains useful for the purpose of making people
aware of the political nature of decisions which are presented as
technical-rational. This is not to say that we must necessarily
disagree with the decision. For example, in the Moss Moran case it
may be that after a full political debate and close examination and
testing of evidence given the political, social and economic
conditions, that one might support the development. But this would be
a political decision, justified by argument and evidence and not a
technical-rational decision which is presented as "inevitable" given




The nature of ethnographic investigation, where a lone researcher
studies a social setting using qualitative, interpretive methods
rather than quantitative methods, raises the inevitable problems of
validity. How does a reader assess the results of the research? To
assist the reader, in this section, I give a brief description of the
sources of my data and the methods which I employed to collect this
data. I also make some comments on the assessment of the validity of
1
ethnographic research.
My methods of data collection were observation, interviews and
documentary analysis.
(1) Observation
I attended two meetings of the Action Group before the inquiry,
the pre-inquiry procedure meeting and the whole of the inquiry itself.
During the inquiry, I adopted the role of an interested member of the
public. That is to say that I only read the material which was
available for general public consumption. 1 did not read the verbatim
transcripts during the inquiry nor did I read those precognitions of
evidence which were not readily available to the general public. As
a researcher I could have had access to these materials but, as far
as possible, I wanted to try to make sense of the inquiry as an
intelligent layman. Since I had no previous first-hand experience
of inquiries, I felt that this approach might help me understand the
position of many of the objectors.
I took extensive notes on my observations and also recorded my
own changes of perspective and understanding as the inquiry proceeded.
See also Chapter 1 and Chapter 8 of the main text.
- 282 -
(2) Interviews
This method consisted predominantly of informal conversations with
the objectors particularly before the inquiry but also during the
inquiry itself. I was interested in two main topics:
1. Descriptions of the organisation of the Action Group, their
activities, and their tactics for the inquiry.
2. Their attitudes to the progress of the inquiry and to the politics
of lay participation (in the most general sense).
These discussions were supplemented by more formal interviews with
leading members of the Action Group, before the start of the inquiry.
These interviews were unstructured, but covered the same topics as
above. I was interested in their descriptions of what was going on
inside the Action Group, and their attitudes to and knowledge of public
inquiries before they began to participate in the inquiry.
I decided not to conduct further interviews during the course of
the inquiry because I was concerned with the problem of contamina^tTon.
That is where the researcher changes the data which he is trying to
collect by the very conduct of the research. I saw two potential
problems:
1. That I would lose my detachment as an independent observer by
getting too close to the objectors and developing sympathy for
their case.
2. That my questions might cause the objectors to think about the
inquiry in a different way, with the result that they might
change their tactics or their mode of participation.
I did, however, conduct interviews with three objectors at the
end of the inquiry. The questions concerned their perceptions of the
inquiry, the value of their participation, the likely outcome of the
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final Report and their views of the inquiry system after their
experience of participation.
As the inquiry drew to a close, over the last three or four days,
I had more informal conversations with objectors on the above topics,
because I judged that the danger of contamination had passed.
(3) Documentary Analysis
Primarily because of the danger of affecting the cause of the
inquiry by my efforts to collect data, I decided that my main source
of information would be official documents.
The most important document was the transcript of the inquiry.
This was the official verbatim transcript which was used by the
Reporter, and those parties who could afford to purchase a copy.
I borrowed a copy of the transcript for about eighteen months. The
transcript consisted of 19 A4 volumes of typescript. There were
around 200 pages on average in each volume. It consisted of a verbatim
account of the day to day proceedings of the inquiry.
In addition to the transcript, I also obtained copies of all
precognitions of evidence submitted by the various participants as
well as a number of other submissions, observations and reports sent
to the Reporter.
After the inquiry had finished, I obtained a copy of the final
Report. These documents were supplemented by my daily notebook of
the inquiry, which ran to nearly 200 pages over the 18 day course of
the inquiry.
Techniques of Analysis
I approached the transcript with a number of questions in mind.
These had been formed by my reading of the literature, my observations
during the inquiry and my interviews and conversations with the
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objectors. With these in rnind, I read through the transcript a number
of times isolating the contributions of certain individuals and groups:
the Reporter, the Objectors, the Lawyers and the Technical Experts.
An important technique was to compare the evidence as it appeared in
the verbatim transcript with the Reporter's summary of evidence and
findings of fact in the Final Report. This also allowed me to assess
the "success" of cross-examination and to develop the criteria of
"facticity" and "relevance".
Throughout the period of data analysis I constantly referred back
to my own diary of the inquiry and to the interview notes and read
and re-read the transcript, ffly conceptual scheme ordered the data
and influenced its collection but was at the same time re-shaped and
re-formulated by the process of data collection itself. This
interaction between theory and practice is one of the justifications of
the ethnographic method.
Validity
Validity is always a problem in ethnographic research. I would
argue that my methods of data collection and analysis were rigorous
and thorough and that I have produced an account of the inquiry which
not only fits with the literature on the subject (albeit in a critical
manner) but which could be read and evaluated by the inquiry
participants themselves. This is perhaps the ultimate test of validity
for a piece of ethnography.
As I argued throughout the main text of this study, my aim was
to produce an account of how structurally located power operates through
the day to day social practices of the inquiry. I selected those
methods and concepts which, I have argued, were most appropriate for
my purpose. This is not to say that my account is arbitrary, nor
that it is unrelated to the inquiry as a series of material events
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which were experienced by the participants. Fly aim throughout was
to understand the experiences of the various participants and to
explain how these various perceptions and internal contradictions
could co-exist within the social order of the public inquiry. Though
ethnography requires the use of subtle interpretive methods, that does
not mean that data collection cannot be thorough, disinterested and
accurate.
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